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Consequences of Informal Autonomy

The Case of Russian Federalism

by Alexander Libman (Author)
Monographs 258 Pages

Summary

The book is the first to provide a systematic overview of the interplay of formal and informal institutions as elements of the Russian federalism from the early 1990s to the mid-2010s. It discusses the crucial role of informal power structures and practices in the relations between the center and the regions in Russia, which survived the centralization policy of the Putin government. Using econometric large-N analysis and a set of novel quantitative indicators, the book shows that persistence of informal autonomy in Russia has mostly harmful consequences for the political development of the regions, contributing to the consolidation and strengthening of sub-national autocracies.

Table Of Contents

  • Cover
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • About the author
  • About the book
  • This eBook can be cited
  • Contents
  • List of acronyms
  • List of tables
  • List of figures
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Informal autonomy in federations
  • 2.1 Rules and outcomes
  • 2.2 Mechanisms of informal autonomy
  • 2.3 Stability of informal autonomy
  • 2.4 Informal autonomy and incentives
  • 2.5 ‘Dormant’ formal institutions
  • 2.6 Preliminary conclusions
  • 3. Three eras of Russian federalism
  • 3.1 Early 1990s: Chaos and bargaining
  • 3.2 1990s: Decentralization behind a centralized system
  • 3.3 Early 2000s: Centralization and informal pact with the governors
  • 3.4 Late 2000s – early 2010s: Centralization and informal coalitions
  • 3.5 Preliminary conclusions
  • 4. The Yeltsin era: Quantifying informal decentralization
  • 4.1 Identification strategy
  • 4.2 Proxies of informal devolution
  • 4.3 Dependent variables
  • 4.4 Hypotheses
  • 4.5 Preliminary conclusions
  • 5. The Yeltsin era: Consequences of informal decentralization
  • 5.1 Econometric design
  • 5.2 Results: democracy
  • 5.3 Results: quality of economic institutions
  • 5.4 Results: economic growth
  • 5.5 Results: inequality
  • 5.6 Preliminary conclusions
  • 6. The Putin era: Quantifying informal decentralization
  • 6.1 Proxies of informal devolution
  • 6.2 Dependent variables
  • 6.3 Hypotheses
  • 6.4 Preliminary conclusions
  • 7. The Putin era: Consequences of informal decentralization
  • 7.1 Econometric design
  • 7.2 Results: democracy
  • 7.3 Results: quality of economic institutions
  • 7.4 Results: economic growth
  • 7.5 Results: inequality
  • 7.6 Preliminary conclusions
  • 8. Appointed governors and persistence of informality
  • 8.1 Informal coalitions
  • 8.2 Performance of informal coalitions: ordinary times
  • 8.3 Performance of informal coalitions: extraordinary times
  • 8.4 A new type of actors: federal agencies with a regional responsibility
  • 8.5 Preliminary conclusions
  • 9. Conclusion and outlook
  • 9.1 Key findings
  • 9.2 Post-Crimean era
  • 9.3 Further directions for research
  • Appendix
  • A1. Index of constitutional centralization – regional constitutions
  • A2. Index of constitutional decentralization – power-sharing treaties
  • A3. Share of acts contradicting federal law
  • A4. Econometric analysis
  • Literature

← 8 | 9 →

List of acronyms

← 10 | 11 →

List of tables

Details

Pages
258
ISBN (PDF)
9783653060690
ISBN (ePUB)
9783653954838
ISBN (MOBI)
9783653954821
ISBN (Hardcover)
9783631669587
Language
English
Publication date
2016 (March)
Tags
Informal institutions Russian politics Institutional evolution Center-periphery relations
Published
Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, 2016. 258 pp., 33 tables, 9 graphs

Biographical notes

Alexander Libman (Author)

Alexander Libman is an Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs SWP. His research focuses on sub-national politics and regionalism in Eurasia.

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Title: Consequences of Informal Autonomy