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Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan

by Zia Ul Haque Shamsi (Author)
©2020 Monographs 202 Pages

Summary

The India-Pakistan relationship is complex and choreographed with wars, protracted conflicts and active disputes. Although the presence of nuclear weapons has decreased the probability of an all-out conventional war, the frequency of minor conflicts and crises have increased manifold. India considers nuclear weapons a deterrent against nuclear strikes, whereas Pakistan assumes that these would deter a nuclear as well as a conventional war. The central argument of this book is that another military engagement between India and Pakistan, similar to one in February 2019, exists with varying degrees of probability, thus challenging the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Until the probabilities of military engagements are minimized, the possibilities of peace and stability in the region would remain elusive. Therefore, the situation asks for scholarly contribution in developing a new paradigm wherein the two nuclear neighbors are made to recognize the need to resolve their disputes instead of just managing them, to avoid recurrence of violent conflicts that can lead to a catastrophic nuclear exchange, no matter how limited it is.

Table Of Contents

  • Cover
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • About the author
  • About the book
  • This eBook can be cited
  • Table of Contents
  • List of Maps and Tables
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • Abbreviations
  • Introduction
  • Conflict and Security
  • Policy and Strategy
  • Possibility-Probability (P2) Model
  • Research Questions
  • Central Argument
  • Conclusion
  • Chapter One: India-Pakistan Relations: A History of Wars and Conflicts
  • Introduction
  • Historical Background
  • The Karachi Agreement (1949)
  • Indus Water Treaty (1960)
  • The Rann of Kutch Conflict (1965)
  • First General War between India and Pakistan (1965)
  • Operation Gibraltar
  • Operation Grand Slam
  • The 17-Days War (September 1965)
  • The Tashkent Declaration (1966)
  • Second General War between India and Pakistan (1971)
  • The Simla Agreement (1972)
  • Conclusion
  • Chapter Two: The Doables: Sir Creek and Siachen Disputes
  • Introduction
  • Sir Creek Dispute
  • Siachen Dispute
  • Conclusion
  • Chapter Three: India-Pakistan Relations: Instability, Crises, and Rapprochement (1983–98)
  • Introduction
  • Exercise Brasstacks (1987)
  • The Kashmir Crisis (1990s)
  • Conclusion
  • Chapter Four: Post Nuclear Environment: The Kargil Conflict (1999)
  • Introduction
  • The Military Engagement on Kargil Heights
  • Analysis on P-2 Model
  • Conclusion
  • Chapter Five: Post 9/11 Environment: Crises and Rapprochement
  • Introduction
  • Twin Peak Crises (2001–02)
  • Air of Change: Need or Compulsion
  • CBMs: Past and Present
  • Mumbai Attacks (2008)
  • Conclusion
  • Chapter Six: Role of Nuclear Deterrence in Conflicts and Crises
  • Introduction
  • Nuclear Deterrence: Guarantor of Peace in South Asia?
  • Role of the US in Indo-Pak Conflicts & Crises
  • Conclusion
  • Chapter Seven: Decolonization of the Kashmir Issue: Post Pulwama Environment
  • Introduction
  • Decolonization: How?
  • India on Jammu and Kashmir: From Strategic Pendency to Strategic Urgency
  • Proposed Preparations for Pakistan
  • Conclusion
  • Chapter Eight: Application of ‘Possibility-Probability’ (P2) Model
  • Introduction
  • Mutually Agreeable Voluntary Actions (MAVA)
  • India-Pakistan Relations: Possible Scenarios with varying probabilities
  • Possibility-Probability (P2) Model for Decision-Making
  • Conclusion
  • Chapter Nine: Fear Wars and Near Peace: The Way Forward
  • Introduction
  • The Way Forward
  • Conclusion
  • Conclusion
  • Appendix ‘A’ Lahore Declaration: 1999
  • Appendix ‘B’ Simla Agreement: 1972
  • Bibliography

 

Maps and Tables

Map 2.1 Sir Creek Map-B-44

Map 2.2 Siachen Glacier Area

Table 4.1 The Kargil Conflict on P2 Model

Table 8.1 The Kargil Conflict 1999

Table 8.2 The Siachen Conflict: 1984- to-date

Table 8.3 Operations Gibraltar April 1965

Table 8.4 India-Pakistan Relations: Possible Scenarios by 2020–25

Chart 8.5 Possibility-Probability (P2) Model for Decision-Making

 

Preface

India-Pakistan relationship is complex and choreographed with wars, protracted conflicts, and active disputes. Though the presence of nuclear weapons has decreased the probability of an all-out conventional war, the frequency of minor conflicts and crises have increased manifold. India considers nuclear weapons as deterrent against nuclear strikes, whereas Pakistan assumes that these would deter a nuclear as well as a conventional war. The central argument of this research is that another military engagement between India and Pakistan, similar to February 2019, exists with varying degrees of probability, thus challenging the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Until the probabilities of military engagements are minimized, the possibilities of peace and stability in the region would remain elusive. Therefore, the situation asks for scholarly contribution in developing a new paradigm wherein the two nuclear neighbors are made to recognize the need to resolve their disputes instead of just managing them, to avoid recurrence of violent conflicts that can lead to a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

Keywords: India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Realism, Nuclear Deterrence, War, Conflict, Crisis, Security, Stability, Decision-making, Possibility-Probability (P2), Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, Strategic Pendency

 

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I bow my head before Allah Almighty for His Countless Blessings upon me during the entire period of my research.

I offer my sincerest gratitude to Dr. Rizwana Abbasi for her guidance and support throughout this period. I am indebted to all my teachers particularly Dr Zafar Cheema, Dr Zulfqar Khan, Dr Zafar Jaspal, Dr Tughral Yamin, Dr Naeem Salik and academics, and practitioners from military, and civilian bureaucracy, whose talks, lectures, and discussions have benefitted me immensely in shaping my research on this extremely important subject. An effort has been made to acknowledge and refer their work appropriately; however, if any idea or work is not referred properly, I would seek guidance to make suitable correction.

I am grateful to Peter Lang for helping me complete this project so that it can generate discussions, deliberations, and awareness on the seriousness of the situation in South Asia. My thanks are also due to my late mother for her endless prayers and for the continued support of my wife Khajista, and children Ammad and Unum.

 

Abbreviations

ABM

Anti-Ballistic Missile ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (Pakistan)

AEC

Atomic Energy Commission

AER

Atomic Energy Research

AG

Australia Group AGPL Actual Ground Position Line

AJK

Azad Jammu & Kashmir

AP

Additional Protocol ATGM Anti-tank Guided Missile

BJP

Bharatiya Janta Party BMD Ballistic Missile Defence

BoP

Balance of Power

C&C

Command and Control CANDU Canada Deuterium Uranium CBM Confidence Building Measure

CD

Conference on Disarmament CENTO Central Treaty Organization

CFL

Cease-Fire Line

CGS

Chief of General Staff

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CIR

Canada-India Reactor

CMC

Cuban Missile Crisis

CNS

Centre for Non-proliferation Studies

COAS

Chief of Army Staff

CSI

Container Security Initiative

CTBT

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CTR

Cooperative Threat Reduction

CWC

Chemical Weapons Convention

DCC

Defense Committee of Cabinet

DG

Director General

DGMO

Director General Military Operations

DOD

Department of Defense (US)

DPRK

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

DTD

Director of Technical Development

DU

Dual Use

EC

European Community

ED

Existential Deterrence

EEZ

Exclusive Economic Zone

ENDC

Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee

ERL

Engineering Research Laboratories

EU

European Union

EURATOM

European Atomic Energy Community

EXBS

Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance

EXCOMM

Executive Committee of the National Security Council

FCNA

Force Command Northern Areas

FDO

Flexible Deterrent Options

FGA

Fighter Ground Attack

FMCT

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

FSS

Full-Scope Safeguards

FOBs

Forward Operating Bases

GHQ

General Headquarters

GOC

General Officer Commanding

GP

Global Partnership

GPM

Governmental Policy Model

HEU

Highly Enriched Uranium

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IAEC

Indian Atomic Energy Commission

IAF

Indian Air Force

ICBM

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

ICTP

International Center for Theoretical Physics

IGMDP

Integrated Missile Development Program

IHK

Indian Held Kashmir

INF

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

INMM

Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

IR

International Relations

IRBM

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

IISS

International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

ISI

Inter Service Intelligence

IWT

Indus Water Treaty

J & K

Jammu and Kashmir

JeM

Jaish-e-Mohammad

JuD

Jamaat-ud-Dawa

KANUPP

Karachi Nuclear Power Plant

KRL

Khan Research Laboratory

KT

Kiloton

LeT

Lashkar-e-Toiba

LoC

Line of Control

LTBT

Limited Test Ban Treaty

MNC

Multinational Company

MoD

Ministry of Defense

MoU

Memorandum of Understanding

MRBM

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

MTCR

Missile Technology Control Regime

NAM

Non-aligned Movement

NATO

Details

Pages
202
Year
2020
ISBN (PDF)
9781433172724
ISBN (ePUB)
9781433172731
ISBN (MOBI)
9781433180224
ISBN (Hardcover)
9781433172717
DOI
10.3726/b17452
Language
English
Publication date
2021 (January)
Published
New York, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Oxford, Wien, 2020. XXIV, 202 pp., 1 b/w ill., 2 color ill., 5 tables.

Biographical notes

Zia Ul Haque Shamsi (Author)

Zia Ul Haque Shamsi received a PhD in strategic studies from NDU, Islamabad. Dr. Shamsi is presently serving on the Faculty of Joaan Bin Jassim Joint Command and Staff College, Doha-Qatar.

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Title: Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan