Cyber Security Challenges Confronting Canada and the United States
Table Of Contents
- About the author
- About the book
- This eBook can be cited
- List of Illustrations
- List of Tables
- Chapter 1. Introduction and Background
- Chapter 2. Research Questions, Methodology and Limitations
- Chapter 3. The Canada—U.S. Alliance
- Chapter 4. Al Qaeda
- Chapter 5. People’s Republic of China (China)
- Chapter 6. Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran)
- Chapter 7. Islamic State (IS)
- Chapter 8. Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK/North Korea)
- Chapter 9. Russian Federation (Russia)
- Chapter 10. Analysis and Findings
- Chapter 11. Conclusion
- About the Authors
List of Illustrations
Figure 2.1 York Intelligence Red Team Model-Cyber (YIRTM-C)
Figure 2.2 Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model
Figure 11.1 Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model Matrix←vii | viii→
List of Tables←ix | x→
This study looked at taking a conventional understanding of the four instruments of national power (diplomacy, information, military and economic measures/D.I.M.E.) and turning the tables to see how potential adversaries could use these against the national security interests of Canada and the United States. Moreover, this particular work focused on qualitative research regarding the cyber threat that has continually beleaguered these nations by malevolent actors mostly over the last five years. The study also affords consideration to how nefarious individuals, non-state actors, or nation states can implement the instruments of national power through the application of a new model named the York Intelligence Red Team Model-Cyber (YIRTM-C) using sources guided by the Federal Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model to arrive at results.←xi | xii→
This research looks to enhance what Boyer calls the scholarship of integration (Glassick, 2000). It does so by considering a series of mini case studies looking at four nation states and two non-state actors. One of the prevailing issues of contemporary times centers on the issue of cyber threats confronting western nations (Weaver, 2017). When turning to the topic of information and cyber warfare, information is often seen as far more valuable than currency and is even more valued than money because it is through information that one can attain more wealth (Bruce, Hicks and Cooper, 2004, 11). It can shape opinions, influence actions, and through the use of what is now termed “deep fakes” can alter the actual presentation of speeches by leaders to convey anything other than what they actually stated (with extreme realism).
These threats are becoming more destructive and disruptive and most nations’ infrastructure is extremely vulnerable to them (GAO-16-332, 2016). Compounded with the use of asymmetrical and hybrid warfare, these threats are real.
The Cyber Domain
The introduction of cyber as a domain for conflict is a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, debates are ongoing as to whether cyber should be regarded as ←1 | 2→a fifth-domain analogous to the physical military theaters of land, air, sea, and space and whether there has yet been any real incident analogous to conflict on those domains meeting the threshold of warfare (McGuffin & Mitchell, 2014). The growth of cyber is marked by a number of incidents and prolific cyber-weapons: the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) use of the ‘logic bomb’ is often considered the first case of cyber-operations with respect to national security; these also include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) PROMIS; the rise of non-state hackers; the Russian’s ‘Moonlight Blaze’ (which gained information about American missile targeting systems); and the Chinese ‘Titan Rain,’ to name but a few (Lakomy, 2013, 108). A critical event with respect to the militarization of cyber within classic geopolitics is Russia’s actions in Estonia, which is regarded by some as the first ‘cyber war’ “since computer networks were used to paralyze the critical infrastructure of a nation-state” (Lakomy, 2013, 106). Lastly, the famous ‘Stuxnet’ virus is routinely invoked as the beginning of a “new era of cyber-warfare and suggested that this new type of cyber-weapon had a similar meaning for international security as the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (Lakomy, 2013, 106). This statement suggests that cyber, like nuclear weapons, has changed the actual structural conditions of warfare and conflict while it increased the ‘grey zone’ spectrum of operations once reserved for classical espionage. The empirical question regarding cyber is to what degree will cyber continue to be used, and within what capacities, in terms of offensive attacks. While most concerns for defensive cyber examine the integration of civilian infrastructure with the internet of things (IOT), offensive cyber strategies may be used to attack a military’s increasing reliance on networked technology, even that which is offline. Cyber may also play a role in hybrid warfare, where attackers may “leverage this expanded attack surface through target sets that generate effects in both the information and physical domains” through direct or nth level multiplier effects (Gendron, 2013; Leuprecht and Skillicorn, 2019, 389).
Thus, cyber-operations may be used to undermine the integrity of a nation-state by hindering the state’s ability to pursue its interests (however defined) through immobilization, which may also yield physical destruction in the classic sense of warfare. Further, cyber-operations may be used to undermine the stability of a society that is reminiscent of classic disinformation campaigns. This may be especially true as the diversification of actors and their access to technology, combined with the decline of violent geopolitical conflict between major state powers (Kshetri, 2013), suggests that digital and cyber-based threats will grow in prevalence and sophistication as they are used to elicit specific political, social, and economic outcomes.←2 | 3→
Politically, Lakomy argues that “Cyber-warfare challenges the security policies of all industrial states and the lack of a clear international mechanism to coordinate responses has increased the need for independent action to be undertaken in a spinoff of an arms race. In short, each state is forced to develop its own plan of action with or without its allies” (2013, 108). Thus, cyber threats may prioritize national action and self-interest from a classical focus on raison d’etat as the international order is too slow to adapt and other competitive pressures may become manifest (e.g. trade wars).
- XIV, 148
- ISBN (PDF)
- ISBN (ePUB)
- ISBN (MOBI)
- ISBN (Hardcover)
- Publication date
- 2020 (October)
- New York, Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Oxford, Wien, 2020. XIV, 148 pp., 6 b/w ill., 6 tables.