Fear Management

Foreign Threats in the Post-War Polish Propaganda. The Influence and the Reception of the Communist Media (1944-1956)

by Bruno Kamiński (Author)
©2019 Monographs 388 Pages


The so-called ‘people's power’ – the communists – tended to make Poles afraid. At first – afraid of the Anglo-Saxon imperialists, then of the German revisionists, Zionist 5th column and ‘Kuroń and Michnik walking on the CIA’s leash’. The creation of the atmosphere of fear featuring Germans and their alleged ‘return’ lasted until 1970. In his Fear Management Bruno Kamiński reaches to the origins of this story. Based on a huge selection of sources this analytical study exhibits how in the first 15 postwar years Poles were threatened with the Western world. In the beginning, the Germans were chosen to play the role of the main enemy, dethroned later by the Americans. At the same time, the author proves that fear next to nationalism and ethnic hostility developed into one of the pillars legitimizing the communist system.
Marcin Zaremba, Polish Academy of Science, University of Warsaw

Table Of Contents

  • Cover
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgements
  • Epigraph
  • About the author
  • About the book
  • Citability of the eBook
  • Contents
  • Abbreviations
  • Introduction
  • Historical context
  • 1 State of the art
  • 1.1 Fear
  • 1.2 Propaganda
  • 1.3 Fear and propaganda
  • 1.4 Establishing the communist power in Poland
  • 2 The key problems addressed in the book
  • Hypothesis
  • 3 Methodology
  • 3.1 Institutions producing propaganda and monitoring social moods
  • 3.2 Propaganda agents
  • 3.3 Key parts of the communist propaganda discourse analysed in the book
  • 3.4 Sources
  • 4 Structure of the book
  • I ‘German hydra is coming back to life’67. Anti-German media discourse – the benchmark image of the foreign enemy in the communist propaganda (1944–1956)
  • The press channel of postwar fear distribution
  • 1 German threat in Polish tradition and culture
  • 2 Various shades of fear of Germans
  • 2.1 Physical German threat
  • The endangered border with Germany
  • Werwolf and other dangerous underground German troops
  • Great Britain and the USA are raising the Nazi empire from the ashes
  • 2.2 Language of fear: ‘Hangmen, murderers, bestial torturers’
  • Nazi crimes in propaganda literature
  • Dreadful graphic images of Nazi crimes
  • Greiser, Fisher, Höss – symbols of Nazi bestiality
  • 2.3 The political, military and economic German threat
  • Political threat
  • Military dread
  • Economic danger
  • 2.4 German stigma on the political opponents of the regime
  • The concept of ‘reaction’
  • The Nazi-like PSL
  • The fascist blemish on the underground state
  • PSL and NSZ – successors of German oppressors
  • 2.5 The German threat after 1947
  • Disturbing sowing and lethal crops
  • Official integration vs factual remilitarisation of Germany
  • We will not allow the rebuilding of the Wehrmacht!
  • Adenauer – a new leader of old enemies
  • Conclusion
  • II Greedy capitalists and aggressive neighbours. The local dimension of the German threat with the examples of Łódź and Szczecin (1945–1947)
  • 1 Łódź and Szczecin – historical and sociological sketch
  • 1.1 Postwar conditions of the cities
  • 1.2 Local societies and their concerns
  • Initial enthusiasm in postwar Łódź
  • Settlers surrounded by ruins and rumours in Szczecin
  • Local media in Szczecin
  • 2 Anti-German atmosphere in the cities
  • 2.1 The problem of Volksdeutsche in Łódź
  • 2.2 Settlers on alien ground in Szczecin
  • 2.3 De-Germanisation of the city
  • 2.4 Out with the German enemies from Poland
  • 2.5 Anti-German political slogans
  • 2.6 German criminals and bandits in Nazi uniforms
  • 3 The local specificity of a German
  • 3.1 Nazi occupants and greedy German capitalists from Łódź
  • Perpetuating the memory of the war terror
  • Panorama of German greedy capitalist exploiters
  • The positive memory of local Germans
  • Why do you employ German conspirators?
  • Polish collaborators of the German enemy
  • 3.2 The city of strikes
  • Current historical interpretations of strikes
  • Successful translation of fear into anger
  • The mistrust towards the anti-German propaganda in Łódź
  • 3.3 The eternal German enemies in Szczecin
  • The Piast ideology in practice
  • 3.4 ‘The wild west’
  • Do not believe in rumours
  • The guard on the Oder
  • The anti-governmental attitude towards the referendum and elections
  • Conclusion
  • III The threat of spies, conspirators and internal enemies in the communist propaganda in Poland (1945–1953)
  • 1 Spy-mania and the postwar reality in Poland
  • 1.1 The panorama of local fear in Poland after 1947
  • 1.2 The figures of spies and conspirators in the postwar propaganda discourse
  • The time of foreign spies in postwar Poland
  • False French diplomats
  • The British and American intelligence infiltrating Poland
  • 2 Titoism and its dreadful consequences
  • 2.1 Propaganda image of Tito and Yugoslavia before 1948
  • 2.2 Stalin-Tito split
  • Exclusion from Cominform
  • Popular reception of the Soviet critique of Yugoslavia
  • 2.3 Disposable heroes. Show trials of the alleged spies and conspirators within the Socialist Bloc
  • Hungarian Titoism. The trial of László Rajk
  • The second phase of the plot. The trial of Traicho Kostov
  • Zionist conspiracy. The trial of Rudolf Slánský
  • 2.4 Popular reception of the anti-Titoist propaganda
  • 3 Conspirators in the Polish Army, spies in the Catholic Church
  • 3.1 The trial of the Generals
  • 3.2 The trial of Bishop Kaczmarek
  • 3.3 Trust vs. mistrust. Social approach towards both trials
  • The critique of sources
  • Perpetrator’s point of view
  • Conclusion
  • IV Dangerous capitalists. The fear of the American economic enemy (1945–1956)
  • 1 From hope to threat. Propaganda vision of American economic policy
  • 1.1 Gifts from ‘aunt UNRRA’
  • American help for Poland
  • The neutral image of the UNRRA in the communist propaganda
  • UNRRA and the promotion of the communist authorities
  • The propaganda critique of American material support
  • 1.2 Dollar ante portas. Propaganda’s negative image of the Marshall Plan
  • Beware of the Marshall Plan
  • Propaganda explanations of rejection from the ERP
  • The Dollar invasion of France
  • 1.3 And now we will starve. The social reception of the anti-ERP propaganda
  • 1.4 American economic crisis strikes back
  • Local experience of the Great Depression
  • The British victim of the ERP
  • ‘Ami go home’. The French resistance towards the economic crisis in communist propaganda
  • The epidemic of poverty in Italy
  • Own reflection in an old mirror
  • Never ending economic crisis
  • 1.5 In progress you should trust
  • Socialist progress vs. capitalist regress
  • Friend vs. enemy
  • 1.6 ‘Why do you keep slandering the USA?’ Social reception of the ‘American economic threat’ in the communist media
  • 1.7 Colorado Beetle invasion. The American threat to the Polish economy and its social reception
  • The genesis of the invasion
  • American origin of the pest
  • The expansion of the beetle invasion
  • I cannot stand such slander. Social reception of the propaganda news on the American origin of the pest
  • 1.8 The fairytales designed to indoctrinate children
  • Conclusion
  • V ‘Nazi racism is raging in the state of Mississippi’. The threat of intolerance, aggression and hooliganism inspired by American culture (1945–1956)
  • 1 Racism – the source of fear and violence
  • 1.1 Anti-Semitism in Europe – local experience of racism
  • Anti-Semitism in the interwar period
  • Jews and anti-Semitism in Poland
  • Polish rescuers of Jews, bystanders and perpetrators of anti-Semitic crimes during World War Two
  • … those are Jews and we must beat them! Postwar anti-Semitic violence in Poland
  • 1.2 ‘Racist savagery of the USA’
  • Nazi inspiration for American racism
  • Racism – a common social standard supported by the American authorities
  • American racism and elections in Poland
  • 1.3 ‘Americans educate criminals’
  • 2 American movies and comic books – a dangerous criminal inspiration for local hooligans
  • 2.1 Hooliganism in postwar Poland
  • 2.2 The graphic instruction of violence
  • The evolution of the propaganda explanation of hooliganism
  • 2.3 The reception of the cultural thread in anti-American discourse
  • Conclusion
  • VI The interwar state of mind. The fear of a new global conflict and the nuclear threat in the communist propaganda (1945–1956)
  • The fresh echoes of old fear
  • 1 War was in the air
  • 1.1 British war provokers in Greece
  • 2 The Korean phantom of the Third World War
  • 2.1 The Korean War as a source of threats
  • Aggression – the modus operandi of American imperialists
  • ‘McArthur’s slayers are worse than the Nazis’ – American threat to civilians
  • 3 Between scepticism, fear, panic and hope. The social reactions to the Korean War
  • 3.1 Nothing to be worry about
  • 3.2 ‘I’m afraid it looks like the beginning of the third world war’
  • 3.3 The sweet taste of panic
  • 3.4 War rumours – the fuel of panic
  • 3.5 War as a source of hope
  • 4 Neutralisation, mobilisation, indoctrination. The state management of emotions evoked by the Korean War
  • In response to imperialism we increase the work dynamics
  • 4.1 Communist peace defence movement
  • The Stockholm Appeal
  • The National Peace Plebiscite
  • 5 Peace sells, but who is buying? Social reception of the propaganda of peace
  • 5.1 ‘We are against the war, but we will not sign anything’
  • 5.2 In the name of peace we oblige to work harder
  • 6 Mother, do you think they will drop the bomb? The threat of the atomic destruction
  • 6.1 Dangerous imperialists and their nuclear bogeys
  • 6.2 American atomic bluff
  • 6.3 The mobilisation against the nuclear threat
  • 6.4 Truman Truman drop the bomb
  • 7 Soviet tanks heading for Warsaw. Propaganda reaction, social reception and further consequences of the prospect of war in October 1956
  • Conclusion
  • General conclusions
  • Afterword
  • Abstract
  • Abstrakt
  • List of Figures
  • Bibliography
  • Sources
  • Audiovisual sources
  • Secondary literature
  • Indeks


I prefer to rule my people

through fear rather than conviction.

Convictions can change, but fear remains.

Joseph Stalin

In the first years after the ‘war of wars’ fear was a pan-European experience. Polish-American sociologist Jan T. Gross claims that the word ‘fear’ well encapsulates the postwar atmosphere in Eastern Europe in general.2 British-American historian Tony Judt draws an even broader European context of fear stating that although the accents had depolarised, the atmosphere of fear and radicalism persisted after the war.3 British historian Keith Lowe has argued that the six years of World War Two, the period during which millions of Europeans lived under the permanent pressure of fear, led to the savagery of the whole continent. The postwar moral decay and atrophy of state and social institutions exposed Europeans to a large spectrum of threats they had not faced before.4

In Poland, the atmosphere and omnipresence of fear in the Stalinist reality was perfectly illustrated by the Polish poet and novelist Czesław Miłosz in his famous essay Captive Mind, edited in France already in 1953. Analysing the first postwar years in Poland, this Noble prize winner noted: “(…) the peasant who was receiving his own ground was not happy. He was afraid. Despite the constant propaganda assurances the worker (…) did not have a conviction that those factories belonged to him. (…) Small entrepreneurs and traders were facing the fear of belonging to the sphere of society sentenced to destruction in the near future (…).”5 What is important, the same point of view was shared also by the prominent members of communist elites. In a recently published set of so-far unedited interviews that Teresa Torańska recorded in the early 1980s with former members of communist establishment, I found such dialogue between the famous Polish journalist and Jerzy Morawski, an activist of youth structures of the KPP, the PPR and a member of the Bureau of the PZPR:

TT:Don’t you miss the PRL?

JM:Not at all

←23 | 24→

TT:What was the PRL about?

JM:It was about fear. A total fear at the beginning. Fear of the USSR, fear of the system, fear of the omnipresent power.6

All those four conclusions and a recollection shows that soon after World War Two, fear functioned as a central context which was necessary to include in the analysis of the establishment of the postwar political order.

Given the particular conditions in which the communist dictatorship in Eastern Europe was installed, propaganda’s role in the legitimisation of the new rule was as important as ever. At this point propaganda as a method and the emotion of fear as a tool came together. Not for the first time, fear was a powerful motivator in politics and was used to manage political attitudes.

First of all, these discourses were employed by the communist propaganda using fear as a tool to better control the people. However, apart from the intended use of all those elements conjuring up fear, there were a number of, so to say, side factors, which contributed to the state of emotional agitation of the Poles at that time. They created an important background for this study and need to be discussed as well. Both categories of threats, intentionally procured and a natural one, are connected to a general historical context of my study - the reaction to and acceptance of the Stalinist dictatorship in Poland among the broader population. The unknown and, largely imposed by terror, nature of the new political system, together with the old anti-Russian sentiment and the abrupt separation from the ‘West’, deepened the post-war trauma and disturbed the relief from the end of the war horrors.

Fear is one of the primal human emotions which strongly affects people’s behaviour and perception of reality. It is produced by alarming associations, an unclear vision of the future, the sense of lack of control, and uncertainty about future consequences. It is usually quite instinctive. We can distinguish between threat - the effect of which may not be known by the agent procuring it, and fear - the feeling of being threatened. In this book threat is a central figure of investigation because one may trace its discursive or symbolic representation in the sources, whereas fear describes the atmosphere in which threat, anxiety, and phobias existed and were practised. My aim is to examine the ways and results of managing the atmosphere of fear which propagandists tried to evoke through confronting people with visions of threats.

In the period of history discussed in this book Polish society faced numerous literal acts of implementing this strategy. For instance, as the Polish historian and sociologist Marcin Zaremba puts it, German occupants turned out to be masters of the physical form of the fear management.7 The first expressions of this policy were implemented already in late 1939 with a set of mass executions of Poles ←24 | 25→organised in Wawer and Palmiry. But for those terrifying acts, Nazi invaders managed Polish society through arresting thousands of inhabitants of Polish cities and villages. To a large extent this strategy enabled the Germans to gain control over the cowed inhabitants of Poland. The conclusions offered by Zaremba confirm the observations presented by the eminent Polish historian Tomasz Szarota. His classic study on everyday life in the capital city of Poland during the war demonstrates the variety of ways life, and decisions made by the civil inhabitants of the occupied Warsaw, were dominated by fear procured and channelled by Germans.8

With the end of World War Two the strategy of controlling Polish society through mass intimidation was continued by several organs of the communist authorities, mainly by the Ministry of Public Security and its secret police. Yet, in the communist authorities’ attempt to win total control over the inhabitants of Poland, the strategy of physical intimidation was supplemented by a much more sophisticated policy of exposing Polish society to precisely selected propaganda with rhetorical tropes symbolising various threats. Aside from merely putting up the media receivers to fear, the communist agitators also practiced translating dread into other and more required emotions, for instance anger or hatred. The propaganda management and the attitude of Polish society towards Germans and Germany are discussed in the first and second chapters and serve as a good example of this.

The analysis of this strategy constitutes one of the most important components of this book. It is supplemented by another important part of my research that is built around the investigation of the social reception of communist propaganda attempts to manage the emotion of fear. Both of those components are crucial to address the question of the efficiency of the impact that communist agitators and media juggling with various phantoms of threat had on a popular interpretation of the postwar reality.

In this book I interpret the concept of ‘fear management’ as a manipulation with the propaganda information, referring to both the real and artificially stimulated fears. Hunger, crime, extreme poverty and unemployment belong to the first category, whereas news about a pending new world war and homes endangered by external enemies belongs to the second. By ‘managing fear’ the authorities could play out emotions, evoking or concealing some postwar threats. Fear was an important problem the communist government had to deal with in order to retain the power they had just captured. By foreign threats I understand the rhetorical tropes of the ‘foreign enemies of Poland’ exploited by communist propaganda with the intention of legitimising the power of the communist authorities (presented i.e. as a protector of peace) and, consequently, to delegitimise the USA and its Western allies (painted regularly as war provokers). In this book the foreign threats are represented mainly by such rhetorical tropes as the ‘German threat’, ‘American dread’ and the ‘danger provoked by Western spies’.

←25 | 26→

The tremendous effort the propaganda apparatus invested in burdening the anti-communist opposition, and other precisely selected groups of enemies of the Polish state and nation, with the responsibility for all the concerns Polish society was facing should be seen as a well-organised mechanism of fear outsourcing. This modern term, taken from business terminology, refers to a cost-cutting policy of hiring external organisations which then provide the main company with services at a far cheaper cost than those generated by the company’s internal units. This way the main company reduces its own costs and burdens external companies with responsibility for activities they were entrusted with. This particular model of business relationship perfectly reflects the mechanism implemented by communist authorities in terms of reducing their own responsibility for a set of threats Polish society had to struggle with, especially in the first postwar decade.

Historical context

The communist fear management strategy this book is dedicated to began to be implemented in Poland already in late July 1944, when the Red Army entered the territories of Poland and implemented the first forms of Polish communist administration – Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), which was situated in Chełm and later in Lublin. The PKWN, a provisional communist government of Poland that was actually established in fact in Moscow in the summer of 1944, was mainly formed by the activists of the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP),9 a communist political body largely shaped by the activists of the interwar illegal Polish Communist Party (KPP)10 - the Polish branch of the Comintern. Although the PKWN was joined by several members of the Polish government in exile on 31 December 1944,11 most of the PKWN departments were headed by activists of ←26 | 27→the Polish Workers Party (PPR).12 The significant role of propaganda agents, the activity of whom will be analysed in this book, gained or expanded their experience in those organisations.

In January 1945, after the Red Army entered Warsaw, the PKWN was transformed into the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland (RTRP) and following the end of World War Two into the Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN), which again was joined by representatives of the government in exile.

At the beginning of July 1945 the TRJN was officially recognized by the USA, Great Britain and France under the condition of arranging democratic parliamentary elections within a year. The People’s Referendum in June 1946 and the corrupt Parliamentary Elections in January 1947 grounded the communist dictatorship in Poland. During both of these events the communist propaganda apparatus substantially supported the activity of the Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego - MBP)13 and the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego - KBW),14 the task of which was to intimidate and dispose of all the opponents of the communist authorities.15 While on the military level the MBP and KBW aimed at combating such underground anti-communist organisations as the Wolność i Niezawisłość (WiN)16 and Narodowe Siły Zbrojne (NSZ),17 on the political level their main target was the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe ←27 | 28→(PSL),18 which was violently suppressed as it was the most important rival of the communist authorities in the struggle to win and legitimise their power in postwar Poland. In this strategy propaganda played a central role. Apart from praising the social and economic benefits of socialism, the communist media was supposed to justify the oppressive activity of the MBP and to create an atmosphere of hostility towards the PSL, the WiN and the NSZ by accusing them of an anti-Polish and pro-German attitude.

The important targets that the propaganda apparatus was supposed to fulfil were implemented by a complex network of institutions, the activity of which will be analysed in this book. The first central institution responsible for introducing communist propaganda discourse was The Propaganda and Information Department (Resort Informacji i Propagandy - RIiP) of the PKWN headed by Stefan Jędrychowski, communist journalist and activist of the KPP.19 The RIiP was responsible for coordination of the propaganda production and distribution on the central and local level. It had the task of controlling all the publishing houses, radio and film production.20 In December 1944 the PKWN propaganda department was renamed the Ministry of Information and Propaganda (MIiP). In June 1945 MIiP, headed by Stefan Matuszewski,21 became part of the TRJN. The MIiP, in its mission of the production and circulation of propaganda materials, was supported by the central and local propaganda units of the Polish Army and propaganda structures of two of the most important political parties. The Polish Workers Party (PPR) - the Communist Party, and Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the PPR’s ←28 | 29→closest ally, established the new system of the city and regional committees. In the spring of 1947, after victory in the corrupt parliamentary elections, the Ministry of Propaganda and Information was liquidated, transferring most of its competences to the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the PPR (WP KCPPR). From December 1948, when the PPR and the PPS were unified into the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR),22 most of the decisions regarding the propaganda policy were taken by the Propaganda Department of the PZPR Central Committee. As Dariusz Stolla aptly put it in the monograph dedicated to the PZPR, this formation was a transmitter, interpreter and agitator of communist ideology. The PZPR having complex apparatus of publishing houses, press titles, public schools under the governance of the party with media and all other means of propaganda in its scope hired up to twenty thousand agitators.23 Analysing archival documents produced by the PZPR and all above mentioned institutions I was able to formulate reflections on the propaganda production but also on its reception, which one may find in reports on social moods prepared by propaganda officers.

After 1947 all those institutions were focused on retaining the power which had been seized by the imposed communist regime. In this policy, a vital role was played by the governmental tactic of shaping the consciousness of Polish society through confronting propaganda receivers with a precisely selected set of rhetorical tropes, representing threats and offering them internal and external protection.

Obviously one must be aware that the above presented process of the seizure of power by communist authorities to a large extent was possible thanks to various forms of social acceptance. As Krystyna Kersten put it in her classic study, the communists were able to capture and consolidate power and to build a homocentric political system thanks to the support (even if limited) they received.24 Although the majority of Poles were traditionally both anti-Russian and anti-communist, a considerable minority collaborated with the Soviets for various reasons. Five groups of collaborators who assisted the communists in their seizure of power are illustrated by Kersten as: compromised figures, easy to be blackmailed; pre-war civil servants and intellectuals; some returning emigrants; a group of right-wing radicals and pre-war nationalists; leftist activists previously dominated by the pre-war communists.

In all six chapters that constitute the body of this book I am examining the variety of propaganda means and techniques employed by the complex team of communist propagandists (mainly recruited from one of the groups indicated by Kersten) in order to mould the popular perception of reality in the desired direction. The analysis is based on the exploration of a wide range of historical sources, ←29 | 30→as well as on a broad panorama of literature dealing with the three main issues constituting the core of this book.

1 State of the art

1.1 Fear

Fear was and still is an inseparable companion of people facing various forms of crisis. The emotion of dread is a subject of research performed by representatives of numerous fields of science, mainly psychiatry and psychology. With their publications, psychologists like Rosenhan, Seligman, Walker, Klichowski, Leary, Kowalski, Fajkowska and Szymura25 (to name but a few) interpret the nature of fear, discussing physiological mechanisms responsible for the creation of this emotion in the human brain and examining social dimension of fear. Psychologists point to three basic categories of dread that are crucial for this book: anxiety, fear and panic. Among those emotions anxiety is usually characterised as an unpleasant state of inner turmoil, often accompanied by nervous behaviour and somatic complaints. Whereas anxiety is the expectation of a future threat, fear is a response to a real or perceived immediate threat. The emotion of panic is often defined as a mixture of anxiety and fear. Panic is a sudden feeling of fear, which is strong enough to dominate or prevent reason and logical thinking replacing it with overwhelming feelings of anxiety and frantic agitation.

Aside from the psychological discussion of fear, this emotion is also a subject of research and analyses of the more practical and social aspects of this emotion. In her essay, the Italian philosopher and writer Michela Marzano interpreted the fear of unemployment, dread of losing a sense of safety, fear of immigrants and climate changes as an emotion, the omnipresence of which is reminiscent of a plague.26 Marzano suggests that fear is a natural human emotion which becomes dangerous when it is being used to win control over society. Discussing various types of governmental attempts to soften social concerns Marzano concludes that in most cases such efforts turned out to be counter-efficient.

The emotion of fear has also been analysed in an historical perspective, i.e. as an integral component of stress tormenting people struggling with serious material or health problems. For instance, the American historian Ira Katznelson interpreted fear as the central context in which the complex issue of the Great Depression and its consequences must be discussed.27 On the other hand, British philosopher ←30 | 31→Gareth Williams presented the image of society fighting with the epidemic of polio as paralysed with fear.28 Traumatic as the experiences of the economic crisis and a peril of the unknown illness were, naturally the most depressing source of stress and dread itself was war. The emotional stigma of terrifying war horrors was imprinted so deep in the consciousness of those who survived, i.e. Great War or World War Two, that it did not evaporate with the end of those conflicts.


ISBN (Hardcover)
Publication date
2019 (July)
Communist propaganda German threat Anti-Americanism Nuclear threat Propaganda reception History of emotions
Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Warszawa, Wien, 2019., 388 pp., 48 fig. b/w

Biographical notes

Bruno Kamiński (Author)

Bruno Kamiński studied History at the University of Łódź and was awarded his PhD in History by the European University Institute, Florence. He is the author of several scientific articles, book reviews and translations.


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