Information Asymmetries and Investment Banking in Mergers & Acquisitions

by Christine Häcker (Author)
©2007 Thesis XIV, 195 Pages


This book examines information asymmetries in mergers and acquisitions, specifically focusing on the role of the investment banker. When capital markets are imperfect, the investment banker may add value as an intermediary by reducing transaction costs and mitigating information asymmetries. Here, a theoretical model is developed, which shows that the investment banker is able to reduce the degree of hidden information between seller and buyer. The model indicates that the investment banker will recommend a specific buyer, taking the nature of the buyer, expected synergy benefits, and the acquisition probability into account. Based on that recommendation, the selling company can obtain maximum value by selling to the highest bidder.


XIV, 195
ISBN (Softcover)
Mergers and Acquisitions Asymmetrische Information Merger Economic Value of Intermediary Buyer type Acqusition Information Asymmetry Investment Banking
Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, 2007. XIV, 195 pp., num. tables and graphs

Biographical notes

Christine Häcker (Author)

The Author: Christine Häcker was born 1977 in Leonberg. She studied Business at the University Tübingen and the California State University. After receiving her MBA (California State University Long Beach) in 2000, she was granted the professional CFA designation in 2003 and graduated with a Ph.D. from the University Tübingen in 2006. In addition, she has 3 years of experience in investment banking (mergers & acquisitions) in the US and Europe.


Title: Information Asymmetries and Investment Banking in Mergers & Acquisitions