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ADAPTING HEIDEGGER’S NOTION OF AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE TO ANALYZE AND INSPIRE EVERYDAY EXPERIENCES OF INDIVIDUALS FOR SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION IN NIGERIA

by Anthony Adani (Author)
Thesis 300 Pages

Summary

This research work examines Heidegger’s (1889-1976) contention that phenomenology can inspire, illuminate, motivate, reinforce and guide (human) individual’s actions. It achieves this by adapting Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to analyze and interpret representative everyday factical experiences of nepotism, selfishness and mass mentality in the (Nigerian) society. Doing this helps to ascertain whether these experiences have any phenomenological link with inauthenticity. Also, it provides a close reading and interpretation of Heidegger’s treatment of authentic existence, and explores the possibility of complimenting it with the phenomenology of Commensality, as a mode of care and a way to authenticity. In this manner, it strategically explores possible ways of inspiring individual Daseins to authenticity, and with it engendering a positive transformation of the (Nigerian) society. Presenting and elaborating the phenomenology of Commensality, the work highlights the relationship and the differences between the phenomenology of Commensality and the ontical or sociological understanding of commensality as obtained in African traditional societies. Phenomenology of Commensality argues for the ‘renaissance’ of Commensality, concretely expressed as Onyenkeanyi, and not just for its ‘revival’. The research work further develops the phenomenology of education for Commensality, discussing the possible content and focus of its curriculum, while differentiating it from ethics. The proper implementation of phenomenology of education for Commensality could inspire and illuminate individual Daseins to authenticity, and thereby becomes an improvement strategy for the positive transformation of the (Nigerian) society. As a phenomenology, it is appropriate that the people and places analyzed take on a definite character, which is why the Nigerian society is used. However, it is expected that the implications of the findings presented here will be general and accurate enough to allow application to any number of similar situations.

Table Of Content

  • Cover
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • About the author
  • About the book
  • This eBook can be cited
  • Acknowledgments
  • Contents
  • Acronyms and Abbreviations
  • 0 General Introduction
  • 0.1 Background of the Study
  • 0.2 Aim of the Research
  • 0.3 Structure of the Research Work
  • Chapter 1 Towards Hermeneutic Phenomenology
  • 1.0 Heidegger’s Way to Hermeneutic Phenomenology: As Employed in Being and Time
  • 1.1 Examining the Question of Being: Ontological Influences
  • 1.1.1 Aristotle: Proto Phenomenologist
  • 1.1.2 Orienting Phenomena to Praxis and Opening up Temporality to the Future—Based on Phronesis
  • 1.1.3 Being as Being-in-the-World—Based on Phronesis Anchored on Praxis (Existence)
  • 1.2 Reviewing the Approach of Phenomenology
  • 1.2.1 Encounter with Medieval Scholasticism: Distaste for Hairsplitting, Theoretical Approach
  • 1.2.2 Encounter with Rene Descartes (1596–1650): Reinforced His Desire to Ensure Indubitable Foundation
  • 1.2.3 Encounter with Edmund Husserl (1859–1938): Dissatisfaction with Arm-Chair Phenomenology
  • 1.3 A Historically Oriented Phenomenology
  • 1.3.1 Encounter with Immanuel Kant (1724–1804): The Place of Experience in Knowledge
  • 1.3.2 Encounter with Paul Natorp (1854–1924) and Emil Lask (1875–1915): Recovery of the Notion of the World (Dasein as Being-in-the-World)
  • 1.3.3 Encounter with Medieval Mystics: Being-in-the-World as Openness to Others and the World
  • 1.3.4 Encounter with Protestant Theology: The Connection between Religious and Historical Experiences
  • 1.3.5 Encounter with Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911): Historizing of Ontology
  • 1.4 Discovery of the Place of Concrete Existence
  • 1.4.1 Encounter with Soren Kierkegaard (1813–1855): Authentic Existence and the ‘They’ Tendency
  • 1.4.2 Encounter with Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900): The Challenge of Religion, Morality and Custom to Authentic Existence
  • 1.4.3 Encounter with Karl Jaspers (1883–1969): Focus on Individual, Particular Concrete Existence—Dasein
  • Chapter 2 Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Being and Time
  • Chapter 2A
  • 2.0 Authentic Existence in Heidegger’s Being and Time
  • 2.1 Departure
  • 2.2 Appropriate and Explicit Way of Restating the Question of Being
  • 2.3 The Hermeneutic Phenomenological Approach and the Analysis of Dasein
  • 2.3.1 The Hermeneutic Phenomenological Approach
  • 2.3.1.1 The Distinctive Features of Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Phenomenological Approach
  • 2.4 Analytics of Dasein
  • 2.4.1 Notion of Dasein
  • 2.4.1.1 Dasein ‘as’ Imagination?
  • 2.4.1.2 Dasein ‘as’ Consciousness?
  • 2.4.1.3 Dasein ‘as’ a Mass-Term?
  • 2.4.1.4 Dasein ‘as’ Particular Individual (Human) in Existence
  • 2.4.2 The Major Characteristics of Dasein
  • 2.5 Dasein’s Modes of Existence
  • 2.5.1 Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-World
  • 2.5.1.1 Explicating What ‘in-the-World’ Means
  • 2.5.1.1.1 The Notion of Being-in
  • 2.5.1.1.2 The Notion of Being-Alongside
  • 2.5.1.1.3 The Notion of in-the-World
  • 2.5.1.2 The ‘Who’ of Dasein in Everydayness
  • 2.5.1.2.1 Dasein as Mineness
  • 2.5.1.2.2 Dasein as Being-with and Dasein-with [Mitsein und Mitdasein]
  • 2.5.1.2.3 The ‘I’ of Dasein’s Being and the ‘They’ Self
  • Chapter 2B
  • 2.6 Existential Constitutions of Dasein as ‘Being-There’
  • 2.6.1 Dasin in Its Own Existence as ‘Being-in’
  • 2.6.1.1 State-of-Mind: As Existential Constitution of Dasein
  • 2.6.1.2 Understanding: As Existential Constitution of Dasein
  • 2.6.1.3 Discourse and Language
  • 2.6.2 The Everyday Being of the There; and the ‘Falling’ of Dasein
  • 2.6.2.1 Dasein’s Being in Its Everydayness
  • 2.6.2.2 ‘Falling’ of Dasein
  • 2.7 Anxiety: As the Most Primordial Way of Disclosure of Dasein
  • 2.8 Being of Care and Dasein’s Authenticity
  • 2.8.1 The Being of Care
  • 2.8.2 Care and Dasein’s Authenticity and/or Inauthenticity
  • 2.8.2.1 Care Unites the Totality of Dasein’s Being
  • 2.8.2.2 Care Calls Dasein to Take Responsibility
  • 2.8.2.3 Care Inspires and Illuminates Dasein’s Encounter with Others in the World
  • 2.8.2.4 Care Opens Dasein up to the Future (Based on Phronesis)
  • 2.8.2.5 Care Roots Dasein’s Being in Historicality
  • Chapter 3 Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Analysis of the Nigerian Society
  • 3.0 Heidegger’s Authentic Existence in Relation to Dasein in Nigerian Society
  • 3.1 Departure
  • 3.2 Analyzing the Everyday Experiences of Individual ‘Daseins’ in the Nigerian Society (Highlighting the Challenges)
  • 3.2.1 Nepotism
  • 3.2.1.1 The Factical Impact of undue Anchor on the Past and Lopsided Understanding of Language
  • 3.2.2 Selfishness or ‘Mineness’ Over and Against ‘Others’: (Herders Clashes with ‘Farmers’)
  • 3.2.2.1 The Factical Impact of Lopsided Understanding of Language and Time
  • 3.2.3 Mass Mentality/the ‘They’ Tendency’: The Boko Haram Experience
  • 3.2.3.1 The Factical Impact of Lopsided Understanding of Language and Time
  • 3.2.4 The Nigerian Society: Held Siege by Inauthenticity
  • 3.2.4.1 Impetus or Exodus
  • 3.2.4.2 Impact of the Everyday Experiences on the Nigerian Society
  • 3.2.4.2.1 The Factical Impact of Lopsided Understanding of Language and Time
  • 3.2.4.3 ‘Rooting’ Inauthenticity
  • Chapter 4 Inspiring Individuals in the Nigerian Society to Authenticity
  • 4.0 From Heidegger’s Care to Commensality
  • 4.1 Illuminating Individuals to Authenticity in Order to Positively Transform the Nigerian Society
  • 4.1.1 Impetus
  • 4.1.1.1 Appealing to One Another in Concern [Besorgen]
  • 4.1.1.2 Re-Orientation for Appreciation of Diversities: Toward Achieving Desirable Attitudinal Change
  • 4.1.1.3 Commensality and Care
  • 4.1.1.3.1 “African Commensality:” What Is It?
  • 4.1.1.3.2 Commensality and Africans
  • 4.1.1.3.3 Commensality: In Need of ‘Renaissance’ not Merely ‘Revival!’
  • 4.1.1.3.4 Phenomenology of Commensality as a Mode of Care
  • 4.1.1.3.5 Commensality and Authenticity
  • 4.1.1.3.5.1 Commensality as Community’s Call of the Individual to Authenticity
  • 4.1.1.3.5.2 Illustrating Commensality as a Way to Authenticity
  • 4.1.1.4 Adopting an Indigenous Notion: ‘Onyenkeanyi’
  • 4.1.1.5 Previous Efforts oward Exploring the African Community Spirit
  • 4.1.1.5.1 Ujamaa
  • 4.1.1.5.2 Consciencism
  • 4.1.1.5.3 Zikism
  • Chapter 5 Towards Phenomenology of Commensality
  • 5.0 A Phenomenology of Education for Commensality
  • 5.1 Impetus
  • 5.2 Renaissance of Commensality through Education
  • 5.3 Toward a Curriculum and Its Implementation
  • 5.3.1 Appropriate and Suitable Curriculum (Hermeneutic Phenomenological Adaptation)
  • 5.3.2 Against Compulsion
  • 5.4 Commensality in Everyday Being-with
  • 5.4.1 Commensality and Nepotism
  • 5.4.2 Commensality and Selfishness (Mineness over Against Others)
  • 5.4.3 Commensality and Mass Mentality (the ‘They’ Tendency)
  • Chapter 6 General Conclusion
  • 6.0 Evaluation and Conclusion
  • 6.1 Hermeneutic Phenomenological Approach and the Question of the Meaning of Being
  • 6.2 Assessing Whether the Research Questions Were Addressed
  • 6.3 Challenges to the Realization of Education for Commensality
  • 6.4 Conclusion
  • Bibliography

←18 | 19→

0 General Introduction

0.1 Background of the Study

Three issues provide the background for this study: Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) contention that phenomenology can inspire and illuminate individual actions; the extreme unrest burdening the contemporary Nigerian society; and my commitment to finding out, based on Heidegger’s submission, whether his phenomenology could be used as an improvement strategy for the positive transformation of the society.

It is to Heidegger’s credit that he sought to recover the question of the meaning of Being for ontology. During the course of his phenomenological development enterprise, Heidegger held he discovered a distortion in the tradition of ontology, which had eclipsed the proper understanding of Being. Techne had replaced phronesis as its basis. The reason for this was that the Greeks had considered techne (understood as a mode of producing [Herstellen]) as the basis and fundamental horizon of their ontology.1 Even the notions of ousia (substance) and aletheia (truth), as unconcealment, which were employed in the transmission of a modern understanding of Being, were based on techne. But this understanding has many implications. Techne is thoroughly oriented to theoria. Ousia as the ‘being in the how of its being’ is ambiguous even in Aristotle. It might mean ‘property’ or ‘possession’, but it also might mean ‘being’ in the sense of ‘being-there’—substance, or beings in their definiteness.2 Apart from techne being thoroughly oriented to theoria with no reference to praxis, ousia portrays an understanding of Being that is definite and closed. But an understanding of Being based on ousia and techne depicts one uprooted from, and with no reference to concrete historical existence, thereby fostering a notion of temporality that is closed and lacking in reference or openness to the future.

This situation led some philosophers to discuss Being without reference to concrete historical existence, and without appropriate reference to temporality, especially in its relation to the future. Heidegger regarded this development as the forgetfulness of Being, because an understanding of Being based on ←19 | 20→ousia—substance, inspired by techne, transforms Being into something present-at-hand [das Vorhandene]. But Being (Dasein) could not be mere presence-at-hand [die Vorhandenheit], since it has self-knowledge and consciousness. It also led to other ambiguous suppositions in relation to Being, among which Heidegger noted three dominant trends.

First, ‘Being’ as a concept is empty because it is universal. Since it resists every attempt at definition, it requires none, and it is an idea that receives nearly universal applicability.3 The second trend resembles a dogma, in holding that because the meaning of ‘Being’ is vague, its neglect is appropriate. Finally, ‘Being’ is, of all concepts, the one that is most ‘self-evident’ and therefore requires no further definition since everyone already understands what it means.4 Heidegger argued that in spite of these assumptions, the precise meaning of ‘Being’ was shrouded in ambiguity, and for further ontological work to be correctly done, it was imperative to return to the basis—to review the understanding of Being by “explicitly restating the question of the meaning of Being.”5

Heidegger regarded the question of Being as a fundamental question [Grundfrage] for ontology. First, because it is a fundamental question, its clarification makes ontology possible. Also, the positive sciences would benefit, because it often happens in their researches, that their basic concepts already presumed the existence of Being.6 Errors may result when such bases are not properly clarified. Again, the meaning of Being allows a clear differentiation between the ontological difference, which is the difference between Being and entities. It helps also to distinguish the two levels of ontical and ontological investigations, and in the clarification of the various categories of ontological inquiries. The proper understanding of the meaning of Being remains also expedient for practical guidance in one’s individual lives, helping people in their choices and decisions to differentiate necessity from importance, what is real from the merely probable, and what is truly authentic from that which is inauthentic. Charles E. Scott noted that the question of the meaning of Being is not a theoretical question for Heidegger, it is a practical question, which answer helps to direct and guide our ←20 | 21→lives.7 Jim I. Unah noted that when Being is not properly clarified and aspects of being or entities are mistaken for Being; the world becomes thoroughly objectified—mere presence-at-hand; things become rigid and inflexible creating room for the unhealthy attitudes of contest, conquest and vengeance.8

Heidegger’s reflection on Being led him to a hermeneutic reading of Aristotle. He was searching for phenomena, a clear and secure basis upon which the entire edifice of philosophy could be anchored. A clear explication of the meaning of Being was central to this enterprise, which could be called ‘phenomenology.’ The word ‘phenomenology’ has two components: phenomenon and logos. It can be understood as ‘science of phenomena’—implying simultaneously the systematic investigation of things ‘as they appear’ and the methodological examination of things as ‘they are in themselves.’9 Indeed it allows “that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.”10 In investigating Being either systematically as it appears or as it is in itself, Heidegger hoped that the clear meaning of the notion of the meaning of Being will be achieved, which is why he regards phenomenology as the most appropriate approach to ontology—the study of Being, precisely as Being. Phenomenology allows Being to show itself as it is in concrete historical existence.

As a result, Heidegger sets out in Being and Time, “to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely […] and further to interpret time, understood in the context of phronesis, as the possible horizon for any proper understanding of Being.”11 This is why his brand of phenomenology is hermeneutic phenomenology. Suffice it to note that it is a brand of phenomenology which investigates Being through the analysis of historical existence or concrete experiences. Hermeneutic phenomenology is oriented to the phenomena, it focuses on praxis and it is open. It contrasts with the approaches adopted by ←21 | 22→Aristotle, whose notion of temporality was not open; the Scholastics, whose approach was categorical, and theoretically hair splitting; and the transcendental philosophers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, including Kant, the neo-Kantians, and the phenomenology of Husserl, whose approaches Heidegger considered transcendental. The contrast could further be seen, not just in the way the approach allowed Being to be investigated as particular and specific (Dasein), in the horizon of temporality, that was open and orientated to praxis, but also in the way it sought access to Being through the analysis of concrete historical existence.

Dasein was chosen for the investigation. It represented particular, specific, individual Being, with the capacity of ‘mineness’, of ‘self-understanding’, of ‘opening-up-to-Others’, and to ‘the-future-as-Being-possible’. Using hermeneutic phenomenology, Heidegger sought access to Dasein and its interpretation, in such a way that enabled it “to show itself from itself [an ihm selbst von ihm selbst her].”12 He noted that hermeneutic phenomenology had the task of making Dasein concretely accessible, accurately disclosed and correctly interpreted in the context of its historical experiences and facticity.13

Facticity had originally to do with the ‘givens’ or ‘facts’ of life, occurring independently of, but experienced by Dasein, as a temporal and historical Being. But Heidegger understood facticity as the ‘thrownness’ [Geworfenheit] of individual existence. Facticity is Dasein in its ‘being-there’ at a particular time, in its existence, moods, thoughts and will. Analyses of these historical experiences allowed Dasein’s Being and its authentic way of existing to be phenomenally accessed and disclosed. For this reason, Heidegger in his early Freiburg lectures talked about hermeneutics of facticity, but in Being in Time, rather than talk about facticity, Heidegger talks about Dasein, since the notion of the ‘Da’ of the ‘Sein’ already implies what facticity stands for, as explained in greater details in Chapter 1. Here, suffice it to mention that to Heidegger, the hermeneutic phenomenological approach does not just attempt to uncover the theoretical truths about the general existence of humanity; rather it attempts to do so in an approach that openly reflects on individual, particular existence in its historical concreteness.

The orientation of this approach to searching for phenomena, with its tendency of allowing Being (or things as the case may be) to show itself forth as it is in its particular, specific, concrete experiences makes it relevant to consider whether it might be effective in analyzing, understanding and interpreting ←22 | 23→specific, experiences or situations in society. The focus of the approach on concrete historical existence in praxis makes it relevant to ask whether it might be expedient in inspiring, illuminating and practically guiding individual lives. And the openness of the approach to temporality and the future makes it reasonable to consider whether it can engender the positive transformation of the society, made possible through the analysis, understanding and interpretation of specific historical situations, with its practical illumination and guidance of concrete individual lives. These considerations become more preponderant, scintillating and engaging, the more I think about the current situation of things in my country—Nigeria.

The deplorable situation of things in Nigeria is evident in many common indices of societal health and life, making experiences of terrorism, hunger and unemployment pervasive. In spite of her rich human and mineral resources, the 2018 Global Hunger Index presented Nigeria as a country with an alarming high level of malnutrition.14 An additional and probably not unrelated observation concerns the instability always associated with widespread violence. Terror groups, clandestine organizations and ethnocentric associations are widespread. The Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen,15 Arewa People’s Congress (APC), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign States of Biafra (MASSOB), the O’odua Peoples Congress (OPC), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) are just the largest groups.16 By preying on vulnerable populations, killing and kidnapping ←23 | 24→women and children, these groups are literally tearing the country apart. Large numbers of Nigerians live in existential fear, and under such circumstances, it is impossible for the country to unite and progress. In 2016, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) reported that violence has forced about 3.2 million Nigerians to flee their homes. The 2016/2017 Amnesty International Report (AIR) observed that Nigeria has a high scale violence index.17 With respect to education, in 2017 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) through its organ—Education for All Global Monitoring Report (EAGMR) reported that Nigeria leads the world in number of youth out of school (school drop-outs) at approximately 10.5 million. In this way Nigeria dominates twelve other countries with which it accounts for 47 % of the global out-of-school population.18 All this, in spite of the fact that Nigeria is the 8th largest producer of oil in the world! What is the problem? Can applying Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenological approach to engage with the proper analysis of specific everyday experiences in the Nigerian society not really avail us of what the problem really is and the root cause(s) of these problems? Can Heidegger’s approach provide the needed plausible tool for understanding, rooting and reviewing these problems/challenges plaguing the Nigerian society?

As expected, the consideration to apply Heidegger’s phenomenology to engage with everyday experiences in the Nigerian society was confronted with two major sensitive challenges: the claim that his neologism and ‘eccentric’ or ‘technical’ use of word makes his phenomenology unclear and therefore unsuitable; and the supposition that if his phenomenology was compelling, it should have been able to inspire its author to authenticity in his private life. Some scholars like Bret W. Davis observed that grappling with major concepts of Heidegger’s thought are for many a source of both fascination and frustration.19 It may be so because his use of language left many of his terms open to varied or conflicting interpretations. These difficulties can be seen in the debates ←24 | 25→over the proper understanding of notions like Dasein, Being-with, the world, understanding, authentic existence, and inauthenticity. One example of importance for this study is the issue of whether authentic existence and/or inauthenticity, for Heidegger, were states or modes of existence, achieved or bequeathed? Another is the proper relationship between authenticity and inauthenticity, and whether the inclusion of Others in the notion and understanding of Being-with, was real or hypothetical? It is then likely that one’s disposition and predilections (as may be opposed to Heidegger’s) will play a role as regards one’s answers to these question. Roger Frie noted that already around 1965; Heidegger himself had publicly charged that the Swiss psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966), had entirely misinterpreted his work.20 On the other hand, Theodore Kisiel held that, although Heidegger’s writing style was difficult to read, ‘which led, among other things, to his being denied a university appointment and to his having an article rejected for publication,’ however, the critical reader should not be too quick to judge the work as philosophically irrelevant.21 Marcella Horrigan-Keller agreed that despite the inherent challenges of understanding Heidegger’s philosophical writings, his influence in shaping interpretive phenomenological research is clearly recognized and utilized.22

However, some scholars like Raymond Tallis justified Heidegger’s ambiguity as necessary by calling to mind the peculiar nature of the ontology that Heidegger attempted to elaborate. And perhaps this can be seen as a ‘happy accident.’ He theorizes that while it might not have been deliberate, the ambiguity surrounding Dasein, for example, turned out to have served Heidegger’s purpose: “He needs the ambiguity. Da-sein is not fully or clearly a ‘mass-less’ mass, nor clearly or fully a countable number of instances--of things or un-things, nor both. Da-sein survives as a plausible foundation stone for the ontology at the heart of his philosophy by sliding between one persona and the other.”23 Dreyfus ←25 | 26→pointed out that Being and Time was notoriously hard to translate because Heidegger was consciously determined to avoid the mistaken ontology built into traditional philosophical terms. He was convinced that language as conventionally used was misleading and contributed to ambiguity […] (and had) been corrupted by philosophy.24

Heidegger himself, attempting to be fair to both his supporters and his critics, did acknowledge that perhaps the fundamental flaw in his ontology had been that he had ventured forth too far too soon.25 One however, with the benefit of hindsight, may be permitted to observe that it is not normally considered unusual for a trail-blazer to be venturing forth ‘too far’ and perhaps as well, ‘too soon’. It is commonly held that ‘geniuses often live ahead of their age!’

However laudable it is to say that an ontology that seeks to clarify the meaning of Being, to present what was lost, forgotten, distorted, confounded or glossed over, needs clarity, and therefore should use terms that are clear, precise and distinct; nevertheless, the challenge associated with the ambiguity of Heidegger’s terminologies adds a new impetus to the present study. In this case, the study becomes not just another genuine effort toward the clarification of these notions, but also uniquely one that through its engagement with praxis can make the understanding of these notions clearer.

As regards illustrating how ineffective, inadequate and perhaps unsuccessful Heidegger’s phenomenology is; some critics have looked past the works to the author behind them: how did his phenomenology inspire and guide what people know of his life? It has been observed that his life did not appear to reflect his public and published positions on authentic existence.26 As a person known mainly for his elaborations on examinations of authenticity lived through ←26 | 27→experience, some have extrapolated from this an expectation that a failure in praxis might reveal weaknesses in the philosophy which informs it. From his sympathetic viewpoint, Kisiel noted that the temptation to throw the baby away with the bathwater ought to be resisted.27 In this case, I stand firmly with Kisiel. The practical application of philosophy is desirable, but can often be accompanied by many challenges. Failures to meet the requirements imposed by desirable ideals are sometimes cushioned by the regretful acceptance that human efforts often fall somewhat short of the ideal. To Marcella Horrigan, Heidegger’s ontology paved the way for explication and understanding of the human lived experience; often theoria is different from praxis.28

In view of the foregoing, while Heidegger’s failures are sadly noted; leading to a meticulous reading of his work by the present researcher to expose his exaggerations, avoid his pitfalls and compliment his shortfalls, where possible. His efforts are nonetheless appreciated as having been beneficial for prompting and promoting enquiry in so many important directions, including the present study. For instance Bret W. Davis still in summarizing Heidegger’s legacy noted that Heidegger radically rethought basic philosophical notions such as time, space, the self—(Dasein), interpersonal relations, things, the world, language, truth, art, technology and the divine, with such an originality that was matched only by the thoroughness of his engagement with the texts of the history of philosophy, and the radical nature of his reinterpretations of their key concepts. As a result of its originality and radical nature, it has exerted and continues to exert monumental influence on subsequent developments in philosophy and in related disciplines of intellectual enquiry.29

Details

Pages
300
ISBN (PDF)
9783631828151
ISBN (ePUB)
9783631828168
ISBN (MOBI)
9783631828175
ISBN (Softcover)
9783631825815
Language
English
Publication date
2021 (February)
Tags
Hermeneutic phenomenology Dasein Care phenomenology of Commensality Onyenkeanyi and authentic existence.
Published
Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Warszawa, Wien, 2020. 300 pp.

Biographical notes

Anthony Adani (Author)

Anthony Chinweike O. Adani hails from Ohodo (Nigeria) and is a priest of the Catholic diocese of Nsukka (Nigeria). He holds bachelor’s degrees in Philosophy and Theology from University of Uyo, (Nigeria) and Urban University Rome. He holds Diploma in Education and Masters in Education from the University of Nigeria Nsukka. He also researched at the Catholic University of Vallendar, specializing in Philosophy.

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Title: ADAPTING HEIDEGGER’S NOTION OF AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE TO ANALYZE AND INSPIRE EVERYDAY EXPERIENCES OF INDIVIDUALS FOR  SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION IN NIGERIA