Judicial Objectivity:

Table Of Contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• About the author
• About the book
• This eBook can be cited
• Table of Contents
• Introductory Remarks
• i. Methodology and Theoretical Perspective
• ii. The Structure of the Book
• Chapter I The Conceptions of Objectivity
• 1.1. The Realism vs Antirealism Debate
• 1.2. The Typology of Objectivity with Regard to the Object
• 1.2.1. Persons Recognized as Objective
• 1.2.2. Objectivity of Different Types of Statements
• 1.2.3. Objectivity with Respect to Knowledge
• 1.2.4. Elements of Empirical Reality: Objectivity of the External World and the Ontology of Brute and Institutional Facts
• 1.3. The Explanation of Objectivity with Regard to the Subject’s Determination
• 1.3.1. Overcoming the Subjective Perspective
• 1.3.2. Rejecting the Influences of Individual Elements
• 1.3.3. Esse Obiectivum
• 1.3.4. Forms of Expressing the Essence
• 1.3.5. The Dichotomy Given to the Subject
• 1.4. The Explanation of Objectivity with Regard to Intersubjectivity
• 1.4.1. Intersubjectivity and Communicative Context
• 1.4.1.1. Wittgenstein’s Argument
• 1.4.1.2. ‘Thought Communities’
• 1.4.1.3. Intersubjectivity as Agreement/Disagreement
• 1.4.1.4. The Emphatic Communication
• 1.4.2. Epistemological Intersubjectivity as a Condition for Knowledge Creation
• 1.4.3. Proximity of Objectivity and Intersubjectivity
• 1.4.4. Separation of Objectivity and Truth
• 1.4.5. Conclusions
• 1.5. The Characterization of Objectivity Due to Its Different Extent/Gradation
• 1.6. Objectivity and Truth/Correctness/Validity
• 1.6.1. Objectivity as not Equal to Truth
• 1.6.2. Objectivity Versus Correctness and Validity
• 1.7. Universality
• Chapter II Objectivity in Law Versus Objectivity of Law
• 2.1. Is Objectivity Fit for Law?
• 2.2. The Objectivity of Law
• 2.3. Objectivity in Law
• 2.3.1. Metaphysical Objectivity of Law and in Law
• 2.3.1.1. M. Kramer’s Conception
• 2.3.1.1.1. Mind –Independence
• 2.3.1.1.2. Determined Correctness
• 2.3.1.1.3. Uniform Applicability
• 2.3.1.2. J. Coleman’s and B. Leiter’s Conception
• 2.3.1.2.1. The Strong Objectivity
• 2.3.1.2.2. The Minimal Objectivity
• 2.3.1.2.3. The Modest Objectivity
• 2.3.1.3. Summary
• 2.3.2. Epistemological Objectivity of Law
• 2.3.2.1. Methodological Conception of Legal Objectivity by G. Postema
• 2.3.3. Semantic Objectivity of Law
• 2.3.3.1. Kripke-Putnam Semantic Theory
• Chapter III Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the Court Rulings
• 3.1. Introduction
• 3.1.1. Basic Meanings and Families of Meanings
• 3.2. Methodology: Discourse Analysis
• 3.2.1. Critical Discourse Analysis
• 3.3. From the Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the Court to Classification of the Meanings of Objectivity
• 3.3.1. The Subject-Determined Camp of Objectivity (A)
• 3.3.2. The Object-Determined Camp of Objectivity (B)
• 3.3.3. The Intersubjective-Determined Camp of Objectivity (C)
• Chapter IV Objective Judgments and General Clauses
• 4.1. The Notion of General Clauses in the Context of Judicial Discretion
• 4.2. Some Examples from Justifications of Legal Decisions
• 4.2.1. General Clauses and the Objective Point of View
• 4.3. General Clauses as Individual Measures
• 4.4. Models and Patterns of Behaviour as an Objectification Process
• 4.5. The Concept of ‘Reasonable Person’
• 4.5.1. Reasonable Person in International Law
• 4.5.2. The Polish Example
• 4.5.3. English, German, and French Examples
• 4.5.4. Common Law Tradition
• 4.5.5. The Notions of Objectivity in Interpretation of Contracts: a Summary
• 4.5.6. Reasonable Person or Reasonable Man?
• 4.6. The Observed Aim of ‘Objective’ General Clauses
• 4.7. From the Judges’ Point of View
• Chapter V Objectivity of Legal Facts
• 5.1. The Definitions and Various Types of Legal Facts
• 5.1.1. Facts Determined Descriptively
• 5.1.2. Facts Determined by Evaluation
• 5.2. Objective Legal Facts according to the Polish Judicature
• 5.2.1. Facts Extracted by Description
• 5.2.2. Facts Extracted by Evaluation
• 5.3 Narrative and Normative Coherence of Law
• 5.4. The Relation Between Brute and Institutional Facts
• 5.5. The Relation Between Facts and the Paradigm of Interpretation
• 5.6. Objectivity of Legal Facts: Semantic Reflections
• 5.6.1. Meaning
• 5.6.2. Wittgenstein and Kripke
• 5.6.3. Kripke’s Sceptical Position
• 5.6.3.1. Kripke’s Non-Sceptical Interpretation of Wittgenstein
• 5.7. Objectivity of Legal Facts
• 5.7.1. Legal Definitions
• 5.7.2. The Semantic Theory of Kripke and Putnam
• Chapter VI Conclusions
• 6.1. The Ceremonial Function of Legal Objectivity
• 6.1.1. The Analysis of the Style of Objectivity as Performing the Ceremonial Function
• 6.2. The Relationship Between Objectivity and Subjectivity
• 6.3. Does Intersubjectivity Fit the Law?
• Bibliography
• Name Index
• Series Index