The China Model

In 2009, I compiled some of my articles and lectures into a book entitled The China Model: Experience and Challenges. The book was published in the context of the 2008 global financial crisis.

After the 2008 global financial crisis, this antagonistic stance became even more apparent. Chinese were attracted to the China Model because China had more effectively withstood the financial crisis. Some even inferred from the China Model’s success that the China Model was inherently superior to the Western Model. In fact, both everyday citizens and government officials began to lecture the West about the superiority of the China Model. At the same time, there were also Westerners who began to develop interest in the China Model. However, their interest in the China Model did not so much reflect an understanding of China as a disappointment with the Western Model. Like the Chinese, many Westerners observed both how the Western crisis occurred and how China effectively withstood the financial crisis, even making exciting achievements. For many years after the 2008 financial crisis, China has been one of the most important forces driving the development and growth of the world economy. Because of this, more and more Westerners have begun to discuss how the China Model may pose a threat to the Western Model.

As someone who has long studied China’s reform and economic development, I felt at the time that discussions of both the Beijing Consensus and the China Model were too politicized, and that they brimmed with ideological prejudice. Regardless of whether they were supporters or opponents, too many people brought with them preconceived ideas that were inconsistent with China’s actual experience. As a result, these discussions did not actually help people understand China.

In this context, I decided to collect my previous work on the topic and participate in the discussion by directly entitling the resulting book The China Model. However, as I was to go on to explain many times after the publication of the work, using the term “China Model” did not mean that I was praising or criticizing the China Model through the lens of moral judgments—as so many other theorists had done. Instead, I regarded the experience of China’s reform and economic development as a social object, the experience of which I would make the focus of my research. Therefore, I added the subtitle “Experience and Challenges.” Obviously, in my view, China’s reform and development offer valuable experiences and enormous challenges.

Second, over the past few years, I haven’t ceased to think about this issue simply because I had published a book on it. I have continued to conduct more observations and done some deeper thinking—on which I’ve spilled quite a bit of ink. This new work may well answer the question about whether the world has entered the “Chinese Century” and whether China’s economic reform and development has truly entered its end game. In this revised edition, I’ve added several new chapters to the original text. Of course, in order to control the book’s length, I also had to remove several chapters of redundant content.

Over the years, the China Model has been controversial at home and abroad, but none of these debates have reached any consensus. Generally speaking, in this long-running debate, people have not been concerning themselves with the China Model’s objective existence; rather, they have reduced the whole question to an up-down vote: “China Model, yes or no?” Undoubtedly, the debate has become too politicized—even moralizing. If this continues, people will have difficulty understanding the China Model.

Does a China Model exist? What does this model look like? What internal and external significance does it possess? Where did this model come from, and where is it going? Whether we’re seeking to understand China’s own development, or whether we want to know the impact of China’s development on the world, we must answer these important questions. But answering these questions means we must first de-politicize them.

Over against the Flatterers stand the “Threatists.” The “Threatists” not only observe that the China Model exists but also ruminate on the long-term impact of the China Model on the West. Threatists have observed that, while the Reform and Opening Up has indeed achieved decades of success, China has not developed in the direction that Westerners had hoped for, or in accordance with the Western logic. On the contrary, China has formed its own development model, one which has become quite competitive. These observers believe that, especially in developing countries, the China Model is placing great pressure on the Western Model. Some in the Threatist camp have seen in the China Model a reflection of fundamental values. They hold that the China Model represents values that differ from those held by the West—values that not only compete with Western values but which may even come to replace Western values.

Unlike the Flatterers or the Threatists, many Westerners do not acknowledge the existence of the China Model. We could label this group “Uncertaintists.” Most Uncertaintists have observed the various problems and constraints involved in China’s development, and they don’t believe that China has actually formed anything that could be called a “model.” They also remain skeptical about whether China’s developmental model is sustainable. Some of the Uncertaintists have a greater awareness of China’s development and are able to investigate China’s problems at a deeper level. These Uncertaintists have observed China’s various internal shortcomings and, on the basis of their observations, have assessed whether China may disintegrate or even collapse. However, some of the Uncertaintists are also ideologically hostile to China, and they actively wish for China’s disintegration and collapse. For these, China is simply unworthy of producing a model.

Interestingly, over against the West, within China there are also three different perspectives on the China Model. The first lavishes praise on the China Model, holding not only that it exists but also that it is superior to the Western Model. We might label this perspective “Leftism.” The Leftists are not hesitant to declare that a China Model has been established. Internationally, they want to contend with the West for discursive hegemony. But the conditions within Leftism are complex. Some find the origins of the China Model in Mao Zedong Thought; others find a theoretical basis in the New Marxism of the West; and others still approach the China Model from the perspective of comparative development. In a nutshell, although the Leftists have conducted a great deal of empirical research on the China Model, their evaluations of it are too ideological. As they approach questions from the perspective of a specific ideology, their objectivity is reduced, and their discourse on the China Model loses its ability to explain China.

The third viewpoint might be called “Indeterminism.” The starting point for the Indeterminists, of course, is different from that of the Western Uncertaintists. Indeterminism is most prevalent among government scholars and officials, and Indeterminists hold that China is still in the process of development, and many problems still exist. It is simply too soon to talk about a China Model. However, the majority of Indeterminists have to deal with political considerations, so they follow Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “hiding one’s strengths and biding one’s time” (tao guang yang hui), believing that China itself is not in a position to promote the China Model and fearing that doing so will leave a negative impact internationally.

Logically speaking, a China Model does exist. In building a house, a model must exist before the house can be built. The question is how to examine and evaluate the house. We could employ relatively scientific and objective methods in researching questions about the house. We could ask questions such as: What does the house look like? How was it built? Why was it built this way and not another way? Does the house have a firm foundation? How can it be renovated? But we could also approach the house from an aesthetic perspective. If we adopt an aesthetic approach, then it will become impossible to avoid politicization and moralizing. Unfortunately, up to the present, the vast majority of commentators on the China Model have conducted their investigations from an aesthetic perspective. There is no awareness of the objective existence of the China Model, while there are countless aesthetic criticisms.

The China Model is also objective, but people from any country and any culture all have the right to investigate and interpret it. Because of this, the East-West debate over the China Model will never end. The same dynamic occurs as to Western democracies. Easterners often approach the Western democratic model from their own perspective, and the conclusions they draw are very different from those of Westerners approaching the same model. What’s important here is that we distinguish the objective existence of the China Model from our aesthetic feelings about this model. Excessive aestheticism can lead to excessive politicization or moralization.

Since the China Model does in fact already exist, China needs to answer the question, “Who am I?” That is, China needs to explain what the China Model actually is. This task has become critical. Internally, more and more people within China are becoming increasingly unclear about what kind of state China actually is. Different social groups have begun to define their own understanding of Chinese identity on the basis of their own differing ideological perspectives. The positioning of various ideologies does not help the creation of a Chinese identity, for a Chinese identity must be grounded in an objective understanding of the China Model.

Externally, the China Model touches on questions of China’s identity internationally. Neither traditional nor currently popular ideologies have helped explain to the international community the basic question, “Who am I?” The ambiguity surrounding this question is a major reason why the international community believes that China’s future development is uncertain. At the same time, certainty can only come from an objective understanding of the China Model. Furthermore, if we can’t answer the question “Who am I?”, then we won’t be able to discuss how China should deploy soft power within the international community.

Even more important are questions of improving the China Model. Failure to recognize the existence of the China Model will lead to neglect or disregard of the model’s defects. Only by recognizing the objective existence of the China Model can we seriously study this model or locate its shortcomings and make improvements. In fact, just how to go about improving the China Model is the greatest problem China now faces.

The first is the relation of the China Model to Chinese civilization. I myself prefer to contextualize the China Model within a macroscopic view of history. It is not enough to examine thirty years of Reform and Opening Up; we need to consider the thirty years that came before—and, in fact, a study of those thirty years is still insufficient. We must consider China’s national transformation during the entire modern period. I believe that, in order to study the China Model, we must first identify consistent structural elements. Quite simply, no matter how much China experiences change or reform, China remains China, and China cannot become the West or any other country. Then what elements keep China “forever China”? These elements are at the heart of the China Model. If we cannot identify them, then we will find ourselves unable to understand the China Model, and we certainly won’t be able to identify the China Model’s advantages or disadvantages. At this level, we must pay attention to the civilizational nature of the China Model.

And if we approach the China Model from the wide lens of history, it’s not hard to observe not only the existence of the model but also its main implications. Although the China Model manifests itself in a variety of aspects, at its center is China’s unique political and economic model. The political and economic aspects are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. China owes its achievements to this model, and if the many different elements within this model were imbalanced, the model itself might experience crisis or decline.