Peace, Safety and Security: African Perspectives

George C. Mbara and Dasarath Chetty

Internal strife in the 1990s presented the global community with an unfamiliar quandary: how could these prolonged crises be managed so that they did not result in the eruption or resumption of violent conflicts? While techniques of conflict management used during the Cold War, such as peacekeeping missions, continue to play a role, most conflicts in Africa today are not entirely military in nature, and cannot be addressed via military means only. In addition to other post-Cold War developments, growing international acknowledgement of the human cost of such intractable conflicts has led the global community to re-define security and its implications for policy planning. The idea of “human security” arose as a result of this shift in international security thinking. Human security covers new ground by looking at perceptions of security in a broader spectrum of human societies than that defined by the contemporary state, combining socioeconomic and developmental issues with acknowledgement of the importance of political stability. Human security may be defined as the protection and empowerment of people caught up in extreme violence and underdevelopment (Owens, 2012). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defined human security as both “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. [UNDP], Human Development Report (1994). These definitions are complementary.

Threats to human security at the societal level are frequently the core causes of long-term internal conflict. To this end, this chapter outlines the trends and scope for peace and security issues in Africa and refers to relative deprivation theory to offer clues to understanding the current trends.

Relative deprivation theory

What began as an idea has gradually evolved into a full-scaled theory that is used across the social sciences to predict a wide range of occurrences (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012). It has also become a significant contribution to the study of social justice (Smith & Pettigrew, 2015: 1) define relative deprivation as “a judgment that one or one’s ingroup is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent, and that this judgment invokes feelings of anger, resentment and entitlement.” Relative deprivation arises when people compare themselves to those who have it better than them, they therefore conclude that their disadvantage is unfair. RD is useful because it explains why persons who should, by objective criteria, feel deprived often do not, and those who are not objectively deprived often believe they are (Smith & Huo, 2014).

People’s emotions, behaviour, and physical health change as their subjective expectations about what they deserve shift as a result of imposed or selected comparisons. The purposeful participation of a country’s populace in self-evident constructive endeavours is central to the core of good government. In Africa, relative deprivation and national instability are inextricably linked to the continent’s resource-rich, colonial history. The relative deprivation nexus of the continent’s insecurity problem does, in fact, profoundly touch on governance difficulties and resource control.

The Boko Haram disaster, according to Vybiralova (2016), also touches on relative inequality, with the sect members frequently pointing out the contrasts between common civilians and governmental elites or Christians perceived to be privileged by colonial practices. The oil industry had also degraded the ecology in the Niger Delta, and the region’s population have remained primarily impoverished (Asuni, 2009). As a result, while ethnic cleavages may still exist in the area, its residents are united by a sense of outrage at the region’s exploitation and neglect in relation to the rest of the country. Particular reference will be made to security developments in Africa in the post-Cold War era.

Methodology

Content analysis and critical discourse analysis of secondary materials were utilised as research methods. This study reflects on the peace and security trajectories in Africa in the 21st century. By critically analysing existing texts on African security, the researchers were able to meet the study’s objectives. Critical discourse research, according to Van Dijk (2006) and Mogashoa (2014), is primarily concerned with and inspired by the desire to comprehend important societal problems. Critical discourse research, according to Wodak and Mayer (2009), emphasises the significance of multidisciplinary study to adequately understand the security trends in Africa. Critical discourse analysis is a long-term examination of underlying causes and consequences of situations. As a result, a detailed analysis of the connections between text, discourse, culture, and society is required.

Security trends in Africa

Since 1946, the total number of war deaths has been decreasing globally in relation to the 85 million lives lost during the Second World War. Despite this, conflict and violence are on the increase, with many conflicts now including non-state players such as international terrorist groups, criminal organisations, resistance movements and political militias. Scarcity of resources, illicit economic gain, absent or co-opted state institutions, a breakdown in the rule of law, and unresolved regional tensions, exacerbated by climate change, have all become major propelling factors of conflict (United Nations, 2020). Since the United Nations was created 77 years ago, the nature of conflict and violence has changed dramatically. Conflicts have become less deadly and more frequently fought between internal groups rather than countries. Homicides are growing increasingly common in some regions of the world, while gender-based violence is on the rise everywhere. Interpersonal violence’s long-term influence on development, especially violence against children, is increasingly becoming more well recognised. Separately, improvements in technology have sparked fears about the profileration of nuclear weapons and cyberattacks, as well as the weaponization of bots and drones and the livestreaming of terrorist assaults. There has also been an increase in criminal behaviour, such as data hacking and ransomware. In the meantime, international collaboration is strained, reducing the global capacity for preventing and resolving all types of conflict and violence (United Nations, 2020).

In addition, new economic blocs, international treaties and commitments to economic development and peaceful coexistence have contributed to a peace trend. Clearly, fatalities between opposing countries’ armed forces, which are trained and prepared for large-scale fatal battle, result in far more losses than minor armed conflict incidents and internal wars, including those involving paramilitary or police forces (Bello-Schünemann & Moyer, 2018). The Middle East, the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rebellions and western power interventions in Syria and Libya and the Russian campaign in Ukraine are seemingly exceptions to the general trend of reducing fatalities due to armed conflict in recent years.

The long-term drop in inter-country violence is visible in Africa, where, following the high that shadowed the conclusion of the Cold War, more wars ended than began (Dupuy et al., 2017). Although a few of armed groups, such as Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army, operate regionally across borders, most warfare in Africa nowadays occurs within states rather than as a result of war between countries. Five countries (Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, and Algeria) witnessed sustained activity from violent Islamist extremism in 2010, that number had risen to twelve by 2018 (Tunisia, Somalia, Algeria, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Libya, Kenya, Egypt, Chad, Cameroon and Burkina Faso) (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2018).

The number of civil wars in Africa increased from 18 in 2017 to 21 in 2018 – the highest number since 1946 – with 21 also recorded in 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, the number of countries with conflict on their territory has increased. Contrastingly, the number of battle-related deaths in civil wars has decreased since 2012, with approximately 6,700 people killed (Rustad & Vik Bakken, 2018). While the number of non-state conflicts in Africa has increased over the last five years, for the first time in ten years, the trend stabilized in 2018; the number of non-state conflicts has not increased. What are we to make of these apparently opposing trends?

As the number of conflict parties in Africa grows, conflict is becoming more complex. Extremist groups are more numerous, and they frequently break up into smaller organizations. The nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism is increasing, and homegrown violent radicals in Africa have transferred their allegiances from al-Qaeda to the Islamic State in the Middle East (Alda & Sala, 2014). Political violence, such as riots, violence against civilians, and other forms of violence, are on the rise, and have recently been responsible for many more occurrences and casualties than in the past.

Terrorism in Africa

Terrorism may be viewed as the calculated use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective. Terrorism has been practised by political organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and religious groups, by revolutionaries, and even by state institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and police (Jenkins, nd).

When notions of terror are discussed, most people think only of particular geographies and countries, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, and Iraq. Less discussed are African countries like Nigeria, where militants kidnapped 317 schoolgirls in February 2021 (Akinwotu, 2021). Headlines are rarely about Cameroon, Ghana, Chad, Kenya, Guinea, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, or Algeria. All these countries are experiencing an uptick in terror activity. The same applies to Mali where ten soldiers were killed in terror attacks in 2021 (Arslan, 2021); little attention is given to Niger, where at least 100 ordinary citizens were murdered in a terror raid in January (Agence France-Presse in Niamey, 2021). Many of them have become extremely dangerous areas, and it would be a mistake to presume that the problems they face have no influence on the rest of the world’s future security and stability.

The pertinent question here is, how did they get started in Africa, and why are they succeeding? To begin with, Algeria gives one a sense of the situation. The Algerian military executed a coup in 1992 in order to thwart the Islamic Salvation Front’s quest to win the country’s first democratic election. Algeria was forced into a civil war by the Islamic Salvation Front, an Islamic political party, that lasted until 2002. During this time, about 200,000 Algerians died and 15,000 more went missing (Gravitas plus, 2021). Islamist fighters who had escaped from the country were among those who went missing. They took sanctuary in a sparsely populated region of northern Mali. The fighters reassembled their resources, collaborated with local rebel groups, and began indulging in criminal activities in these thinly populated areas.

These fighters reorganized themselves into a faction in 2007 and pledged their loyalty to Al-Qaeda. They were known as “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), which translates to “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic West.” The goal of this group was to topple Algeria’s government and establish an Islamic state. To accomplish this goal, the AQIM began collaborating with and funding a lesser militant group in Nigeria, the Boko Haram, which has already surpassed the Islamic State as the world’s most murderous terror group. Boko Haram literally means “Western Education is a Sin.” This organisation was formed in 2002 but gained global attention in 2009 when it became violent (Mbara, Uzodike, & Khondlo, 2019). Boko Haram received weapons from the AQIM. Boko Haram, on the other hand, had a different goal in mind: it wanted Nigerians to reject Western education, secular literature, and science. It began razing communities and murdering people to enforce its will. It kidnapped children and then utilised these kidnapped youngsters in suicide assaults.

What could be the driving force for these militants? Is it merely a matter of religious beliefs and ideology? Yes and no. The issue is both pecuniary and religious in nature. Corruption, poverty and underemployment are all factors in this situation. The Lake Chad Region, one of the world’s poorest places, is where Boko Haram operates.

Fig. 1: Chad and its neighbours

Source: “Africa’s jihadists, on their way” (2014)

It is a part of the Chad Basin which has suffered severe ecological degradation and is geographically vulnerable. Likewise, the Sahel is a region with no stable governance.

Fig. 2: Sahel region, Africa

Source: Centre for Security Studies Analysis in Security Policy (CSS), (2013)

The Sahel is a small strip of territory that runs from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east. It is vast, scorching hot, and arid. It is also the world’s most abandoned geography, with an average temperature of 35°C. This has a significant impact on food production because there is nothing to grow and sell. Food shortages are common, and poverty is ubiquitous. The climate makes it an excellent breeding ground for terrorist organizations. These conditions make individuals susceptible to radicalisation. Boko Haram and the AQIM, for example, take advantage of this situation. They entice young men to pick up arms, join their ranks, and make a quick buck in the absence of governance and secure employment.

How does Boko Haram accomplish this? What is their source of income? kidnapping for ransom, imposing taxes, looting banks and extortion are some of the methods used. According to Centre for Security Studies Analysis in Security Policy (2013), “In recent years, the number of Kidnappings for Ransom (KFR) has increased globally. Especially for Islamist terrorist groups in the Sahel, kidnapping has become a lucrative source of income.” Boko Haram was responsible for 26% of global kidnapping instances in 2013. According to the same research, the AQIM in Mali earned an average of US$ 5.4 million in ransom per hostage in 2011. This excludes high-profile kidnappings. In the same vein, the former US Ambassador to Mali, Vicki Huddleston, notes that France was forced to pay a $ 17 million ransom in 2010 to free four French people held hostage in Mali (CSS Analysis in Security Policy, 2013).

Terrorist groups have used kidnapping as a political tool since the 1960s. They mostly went after well-known people. The majority of the time, the goals were political, such as the release of prisoners, rather than financial. Kidnapping “ordinary” foreigners for the goal of ransoming them for money has only gotten more common in recent decades. Such criminally inspired kidnappings have previously been limited to individual countries such as Pakistan, Iraq, Mexico, or Colombia, and were thus considered as unique rather than a worldwide concern. That has altered in recent years, as evidenced by the rising frequency of kidnappings for exorbitant ransoms in the millions of dollars, such as those carried out by pirates off the coast of Somalia or targeted kidnappings of foreigners in Nigeria and Yemen.

The Covid-19 global pandemic struck when the terrorist groups were raking in the cash. For them, the year 2020 turned out to be a blessing in disguise. The pandemic confined most people to their homes, but it provided an opportunity for terrorists in West Africa to consolidate and proliferate (Gravitas Plus, 2021). Boko Haram already controls a vast area of land in Nigeria, and it is expanding its reach into Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in collaboration with other terror groups.

The security situation in Africa has a direct impact on the rest of the world’s future security and stability. Although the African continent may not possess the same strategic importance as other regions at the moment, and it may not have the same quantity of oil, but Africa is the continent with potential because it accounts for 17% of the global population (1.3 billion people). It is expected that by 2050, its population will have nearly doubled to 2.2 billion people, with more than 60% under 25 years of age (Gravitas plus, 2020), half of the world’s gold supply, 90% of global platinum supply, 9.6% of the world’s oil output, 90% of cobalt supply globally, 2/3 of the world’s manganese supply, 35% of the world’s uranium supply, and 75% of the world’s coltan supply (Gravitas plus, 2021). Similarly, Africa accounts for 54 votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which reflects significant leverage on matters surrounding the UN Security Council (UNSC) reform and expansion (Mbara, 2019; Mbara et al., 2021).

The African continent is crucial to the global economy and to its security. But terrorists in West Africa are establishing new fronts in failing states. While the rest of the world looks the other way, they are expanding in every direction, posing a significant danger to Africa’s economic powerhouses. They can soon control or destroy these resources, putting Africa’s economy in jeopardy, with repercussions being felt around the world. This is so because the violation of human rights in the continent have long failed to sway world opinion towards meaningful intervention. The apparent lack of concern regarding security trends in Africa is something that requires far more serious analysis and intervention especially by those committed to non-violence, democratic participation and human dignity in secular societies. The next section unravels the drivers of these problematic security trends in Africa.

Resurgence of coups in Africa

While terror groups are a big threat in many African countries, not every country that has recently witnessed a coup is grappling with a violent insurgency from terror affiliates. The recent attempted coup in Guinea-Bissau, for example, is one of dozens since the country earned independence from Portugal in 1974. The country has struggled to develop democratic institutions and traditions; for example, President Umaro Sissoco Embaló – who survived an unsuccessful coup attempt – was elected in 2020 following a controversial election that was still being evaluated by the country’s Supreme Court at the time. Last year’s successful coup d’état in Guinea, a distinct country bordering Guinea-Bissau, happened when President Alpha Condé amended the constitution and conducted a power grab that handed him a third term in office. Despite winning a democratic election in 2010 – the first in Guinea – his power grab, along with profound inequality and corruption, appears to have given the fuel for the military to stage a coup last September (Loanes, 2022).