The Ideological Alignment of Swiss National Socialists

Introduction

Travelers to Switzerland have often observed how strong the Swiss national identity is manifested in the everyday life. Even those who do not look like natives will be likely addressed in the local dialect, which substantially differs from the German language. Swiss national pride, the protection of the local way of life, and the Swiss cultural identity complement the picture of almost any Swiss person. At the same time, the country has one of the toughest immigration laws in the world, which substantially restricts immigration and naturalization.

The acceptance of nationalism in Swiss society lies at the center of the ongoing heated debate among scholars. Contemporary studies generally agree that right-wing forces have extensive political influence, are instrumental in shaping the country’s agenda, and enjoy popularity based on xenophobic attitudes, which, it should be said, are based more in religious or national bias than racial bias.¹ In other words, concerns about immigration, even from neighboring countries, are widespread in the Swiss society.

Any nationalism, or xenophobia, has historical motivation. Switzerland is no exception. At the same time, unique cultural and sociopolitical circumstances imply a unique historical development in this regard, which likely differs from the examples of other European countries.

Switzerland remained neutral during World War I and thus escaped the economic devastation elsewhere in Europe, but its structural social and economic problems were becoming increasingly acute. The socialist movement born in the 1880s with the formation of the first workers’ unions gained momentum, resulting in the nation-wide federal strike of 1918, which was suppressed with the use of deadly force.2 Socialism, closely associated with communism, formed the image of the enemy for the conservatives and bourgeois, who feared the destruction of their way of life, as had happened in Germany and Russia. The protection of democracy from the socialist uprising was a vital point on the conservative agenda of the time. For them, democracy was valued not only as a political system, but also as a crucial element of Swiss national identity.

For a long time, Switzerland was a confederation, with autonomous cantons and an unshakeable democratic system. Direct involvement of the public in the political system through referenda had become a political tradition beginning in the middle of the 18th century and strengthened citizens’ belief in the democracy in general. The development of the political culture promoted activity in the local communities and increased the civil coordination needed to bring initiatives to public attention. This process intensified after the partial revision of the federal constitution through a referendum had been made possible.³ It stimulated democratic political activity and increased the influence of local political associations.

The nation’s identity-building intensified during the same years.⁴ In response to the call of the era’s intellectuals, national festivities were organized to celebrate ←14 | 15→Swiss nationhood. In 1883, more than a million visitors attended the Zurich National Exhibition. Museums and exhibitions bloomed until the end of the century, strengthening the understanding of what it meant to be Swiss, both culturally and politically. The federal government gradually assumed more powers from the cantons, contributing institutionally to the process of the nation-building.

The ethnic diversity of the Swiss population, especially in comparison to the neighboring monoethnic nation-states, posed a certain challenge to this process. The country is divided into three parts, with German-, French- and Italian-speaking cantons.5 The German-speaking population occupies the largest territory and represents the largest linguistic group. Still, the political matters were destined to become an issue of compromise suitable for all the population groups. Moreover, it left only one type of nation to form: a political nation.

Such a compromise could hardly satisfy the far-right forces, which focused on ethnic origin and race. Nevertheless, the obvious contradiction of the existing prospects for a political nation and the much vaguer prospects for the political implementation of ethnic nationalism did not hinder the formation or development of the right and far-right movements. Of course, they assumed a local color. In the 1920s, the conservative right-wing agenda gained a certain strength. Ulrich Wille hosted a lecture by Adolf Hitler in 1923; the federal president Guiseppe Motta and politician Jean-Marie Musy promoted a package of anti-Bolshevist regulations; Conservative Catholic associations struggled against Swiss participation in the League of Nations and prevented the political engagement of socialists.⁶ A number of nationalist organizations emerged, primarily focused on the danger of Überfremdung (“overforeignization”), which had been widely discussed in public since the beginning of the 20^th century.⁷ These organizations did not attempt to reform national identity or the state, but sought rather to preserve the status quo in society. In other words, they attempted to freeze the country in the “golden” 19^th century, but the changes coming were unstoppable.

The seizure of power by Fascists in Italy did not go unnoticed and initiated a discussion. The strengthening of the Fascist regime and the limited success of the NSDAP8 in Germany accompanied the rise of a new kind of far-right movement in Switzerland. Frontism (Frontismus) contrasted with the conservative right because of its unconditional demand for the “overhaul” of all social, economic and political life. Before 1933, the ideological basis for Frontism was laid down by young academics susceptible to racial ideas. Although racial theories thrived from the beginning of the 20th century, they were not implemented as the dominant factor in the political system: European and American governments adopted racist and discriminatory laws and practices, but it was neither the core belief of the political party in power nor the determining factor of the political system. German National Socialists were the first to implement racial theory in the party program and use it openly as a guide for internal policy to build the ethnic “national community” and purify “alien elements.” The rise of Italian imperialism along with Latin (Roman) nationalism and bloody civil war in Spain contributed to the international far-right discourse of the interwar period.

Frontism was born in academic circles as the result of discussions about a possible “third way” between liberalism and Marxism. Later, it split up into several factions, which reflected diverse viewpoints on how the solution to this problem should be found. They shared some common values—above all, anti-Communism and anti-liberalism—but in many regards manifested significant disagreement.

After National Socialists came to power in Germany, it triggered the transformation of the far right in Switzerland, leading to the “springtime of the Fronts” (Frontenfrühling).⁹ Although the appearance of several “Fronts” predated the “springtime of the Fronts,” 1933 saw the creation of around 40 such organizations.¹⁰ The “springtime of the Fronts” turned out to be a turning point when discussion clubs and informal associations sought immediate political implementation. The scale of the process attracted even those who were not previously politically active but saw an opportunity to find a place in the newly founded political milieu, which had rapidly expanded its presence.

Erneuerungsbewegung (“overhaul movement”) was the term broadly used to describe various Frontist groups that demanded the “renewal” of the public life ←16 | 17→and thus were distinct from the conservative right. The most popular movement became the Nationale Front, closely associated with the phenomenon of Frontism until its dissolution. It had limited electoral success and provoked a public response that far outweighed this success. The phenomenon of Frontism, however, cannot be reduced to the history of a single organization. Less popular organizations multiplied the possible interpretative outcomes of the far-right views and contributed to the formation of the field of discursivity.

The arising tensions in Europe provoked by the fascist states forced the Swiss government and public to elaborate a balanced approach to international relations. A major contribution to the principle of neutrality was made when Switzerland left the League of Nations in 1938. That same year, minister Philip Etter called for the defense of the Swiss national identity and launched a campaign called “spiritual national defense” (geistige Landesverteidigung).11 During the war, Switzerland, surrounded by Axis states, was forced into economic cooperation with them.¹² Simultaneously, a number of prominent figures called upon the government and military to cultivate a friendlier attitude toward Germany in what is known as the “Petition of 200.” Generally, however, both the general public and Swiss press remained highly critical of the Nazi regime.

Swiss far-right movements in the period 1933–1945 were extremely fragmented and never managed to form an effective alliance. In fact, cooperation among far-right groups in Switzerland seems much more possible today than in the early 1930s. The leaders of the far-right groups imposed ideological dogmas that thwarted any possible alliances. Their inability to cooperate effectively and mutual hatred facilitated the process of fragmentation.

The leaders acted against each other in attempt to take personal credit for the discourse of the “best” or “most effective” form of Frontism. They also infiltrated the public discourse, trying to re-orient Swiss society to solve the issues they considered important. For Swiss society, Frontist organizations and movements were generally seen as marginal, even if some issues they spoke about were not. Researchers of Frontism have offered some examples of moments when the main political parties had to address the issues that initially were articulated by Frontist movements.13

Frontists had to act in social circumstances that differed from those of the fascist movements abroad: despite their economic difficulties, the Swiss did not have the kind of economic crisis that the Germans did. It had a functional democracy, solidified not only by the law but also by a long democratic tradition. In such circumstances, it was particularly hard for any radical movement to seize power. There was a shadow of a communist threat inspired by the recent events of 1918, but it gradually faded, because government institutions were able to tackle the growing workers’ radicalization. In general, Frontists could not appeal to the existing crisis, which would justify the radical transformation of the society and state that their political agenda advocated. Most of them, however, attempted to replace the conservative movements with the “new” far right, normalize their views just as the conservative views had been normalized, and potentially could succeed at that. The existing conservative movements resisted this process distancing themselves from the Frontist agenda. Their goals, however, sometimes coincided by nature, but the cooperation was limited by the very fact that they had to offer a competing worldview to the same audience.

The reasons for the Frontists’ failure have been investigated in the numerous history books.¹⁴ Historical research has covered the major milestones in the process of the development of Frontism from its emergence to its apex and slow decay. In such a political climate, it is extremely difficult for any radical political movement to plan groundbreaking reforms to change the Swiss political system. Any attempt to decrease the local autonomy of the Swiss cantons would doubtlessly have provoked huge resistance from the local population. Unsurprisingly, Frontists faced major resistance when they attempted to change the ←18 | 19→Swiss political system significantly. Frequently, Frontists were blamed by their political enemies for “copying” German National Socialism or Italian Fascism. At the same time, the question of the extent to which the ideology of the Frontist organizations was copied from the German or Italian regimes remains open. The answer to this question is located in the sociological analysis of the Frontist ideology.

The history of Frontism includes movements with varying degrees of radicalism and pro-German attitudes. The Nationale Front, the most well-known Frontist organization, participated in democratic elections, and its leaders were not tried for violating the Swiss sovereignty. Several smaller organizations, like BTE15 and NBS¹⁶, were considered pro-German, and some of their leaders were, in fact, charged with violating the Swiss sovereignty and expatriated.

These organizations did not have much influence on Swiss society, but they competed for the same supporters: the conservative citizens prone to far-right views. Authoritarian movements as such do not necessarily have to come to power legally; they simply need to accumulate a certain degree of popular support to seize power. In this regard, the threat was very real: the leaders of the organizations influenced the discourse of what it meant to be “national socialist” or “Frontist” to compete for the radical audience.

History usually approaches the subject of Frontism as a monolith. Instead, I propose that we dissect history and turn to the singular stories of prominent personalities to investigate how they constructed their worldview, given the innate contradiction of their far-right views and Swiss identity.

In my hypothesis, I argue that the ideology of Frontism was extremely fragmented, and I cannot imply the homogeneity of the far-right views of the individuals who acted under this label. Moreover, I surmise that the process of forming these individual ideological alignments came largely independently of foreign examples, producing unique hybrids of far-right views and Swiss national identity that were distinct from other types of fascism or national socialism. To prove this hypothesis, I will analyze the thought patterns of the Swiss Frontists. I will analyze their beliefs, trace the evolution of their views over time, investigate the possible influence of German National Socialism (since my sample is limited to the German-speaking far right, I expect only a moderate influence from Italian Fascism), and conclude on the differences between the cases.

Swiss Frontists represented a peculiar form of the far right that attempted to replace the existing right-wing forces. I limit their discourse to the ideology of Swiss national socialism, which in the beginning of my research was an empty label designed to sample a particular discursive community. “Swiss national socialism” is defined as “a group of the German-speaking Swiss far right in the zone of influence of German National Socialism, particularly inclined to the application of racial theory, including segregation or the elimination of the Other”. The ideological alignment, above all, signifies a coherent set of views. They can be formed arbitrarily but should have an inner logic I aim to identify. In this regard, I study Swiss national socialism “on its own terms,” attempting to re-construct the logical coherence as presented by an individual.17 Thus, the ideology of Swiss national socialism will be presented not merely as a definition but as a coherent set of views shared by the individuals from the sample. The key issues relevant to ←20 | 21→the ideological alignment are grouped into several thematic blocks. Primarily, I address the following topics.