Taiwan under Tsai Ing-wen

Leaders and neoclassical realism

Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) won the presidential election in Taiwan in 2016. Taiwanese votes has chosen a politician who, like very few others in Asia, represents the values of the free world. The values such as freedom and individual rights and democracy and the rule of law on which we have built peace in the twenty-first century are not given to us once and for all. They require care and attention so that they are not taken away again by the shadow of violence. As one neoclassical realist, Thomas Juneau, puts it, it is ideas that push leaders to set certain goals and reject others.¹

The importance of individuals in international politics is usually overlooked. When dark clouds of brutal violence came over Ukraine in February 2022, it was not the first time that it turned out that a leader could be an inspiration for his own people, one of the greatest sources of motivation and will to resist. Without the charismatic attitude of President Volodymyr Zelensky, there would not have been such an unwavering will of the Ukrainian people to oppose the aggression of their neighbour, a nuclear great power several times larger, which invaded Ukraine under the pretext of protecting the population speaking the same language. The free world has opted for the weaker, on whose side is the truth. But could this tragedy have been avoided?

Without great leaders, there would not be the greatest turns in international politics. Without George Washington, the United States would not have become independent, and without Józef Piłsudski, Poland would not have gained freedom after 123 years of partitions. Without Tsai Ing-wen, there would be no consolidation of Taiwanese society, not only around the shared values of the free world, but also for the realisation of common goals. These include, above all, responding to external challenges, in reaction to the growing shadow of violence in the Taiwan Strait, alongside an effective response to the internal needs that legitimise any authority. In the modern world, the two revisionist powers: China and Russia, are seeking to change the status quo that was achieved after the Cold War.

←13 | 14→The assessment of international reality should be subjected to research requirements. In the study of international relations, it is difficult to find such a broad perspective as neoclassical realism. More than other paradigms of the theory of international relations, it makes it possible to combine not only different threads, factors, and images of analysis, but also gives an opportunity to highlight the role of outstanding individuals. This is important because thanks to the high degree of the elite cohesion and consensus, the nature of threats is recognized, and decisions are made regarding the selection of adequate strategies to counteract them.²

The greatest scholars of international relations do not agree on whether states seek only security or whether expansion is inscribed in their nature. Kenneth Waltz argues that states are primarily concerned with security. Only in this way can they ensure benefits, power or simple “be left alone.”³ To achieve security, states take various types of measures to balance potential threats. They do this through internal or external efforts. Internal efforts consist in increasing one’s own economic and military capabilities or creating new strategies. External efforts, on the other hand, consist in the formation of alliances and coalitions.⁴ Waltz rejects reductionism and therefore does not deal with the level of the state (second images). Therefore, he is hardly interested in the internal efforts of states in detail. His balance of power theory was developed in the spirit of the Cold War and took into account primarily the balance of power between the two superpowers of the time: the USA and the Soviet Union. Waltz’s balance of power theory does not tell us why a particular country makes a particular decision at any given moment, or how it happens. The possibilities of explaining foreign policy in the perspective of Waltz’s theory are therefore limited.

Meanwhile, an attempt to explain the significance of systemic pressures for the foreign policy of the state was made by neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realists therefore combine the level of the international system (third images) with the level of the state (second images) in their research. They emphasise the importance of the distribution of the capabilities and incentives coming from the international system. In their research, however, they focus on the impact of systemic pressures on the foreign policy of the state. That is because the structure ←14 | 15→of the international system itself will not explain to us why a particular event occurred at a particular time.⁵ The incentives from the international system causes a specific reaction of states in their foreign policy, which, however, takes place through the prism of various types of “filters or transmission belts.”⁶ The natural manifestations of international politics are both cooperation between states and attitudes of hostility.⁷ But in practice, neoclassical realists focus on the rivalry of states and conflict.

In the studies of neoclassical realists, the independent variable is the distribution of power in the international system, the incentives and pressures to which the state reacts. While the dependent variable is the foreign policy of the state. However, neoclassical realists take into account the intervening variables that influence foreign policy at the state level. They play the role of the aforementioned filters or transmission belts.

So far, various intervening variables have been adopted, for example: perception of power,⁸ elite cohesion, society cohesion and government/regime vulnerability,⁹ quality of state institutions,¹⁰ strategic culture.¹¹ In turn, Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro and Steve Lobell generalised the intervening variables found in neoclassical realism, ultimately identifying four: leaders images, strategic culture, state-society relations and institutions at the state level.¹² Whereas Juneau groups them somewhat differently as: ideas, individuals, identity and institutions. In the case of individuals, it is about those political figures who leave a special mark on foreign policy. Juneau understands identity as constructivists, as values ←15 | 16→and beliefs that determine the making of certain choices.¹³ From both proposals emerges the image of neoclassical realism, i.e. a research program covering all three images of analysis of international relations: the individual, the state, and the international system. This can perversely be considered the fulfilment of Waltz’s remark from his first work: to understand international relations, it may be necessary to combine all three images of analysis, and not just to use one of them.¹⁴

A special type of variable intervening in neoclassical realism is the political leader, his views, professed norms, and values, as well as the perception of the international environment, opportunities and threats for his state, the possibility of increasing capabilities and choosing the most effective strategies. A leader, especially a charismatic one, is able to change foreign policy almost alone, especially if he has the opportunity and the necessary resources.

Decisions made by leaders are never a completely free choice, they depend both on the power and structure of the state, as well as on systemic factors.¹⁵ What matters is what part of the power the leaders have. Fareed Zakaria, in his work From Wealth to Power. The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, introduced a distinction between “national power” and “state power.” “National power” is the general power of a society, and the “state power” is the part that remains at the disposal of the government. At the same time, the strength and efficiency of state structures are important; a weak state, i.e. one that is “decentralized, diffused, and divided” is less effective in mobilising “national power.”¹⁶ States, as Taliaferro writes, have the ability to the mobilisation and extraction of the internal resources both through state institutions and nationalism and other ideologies.¹⁷ The possibilities of mobilising and extracting internal resources will therefore depend in a significant way on the efficiency of institutions, the quality of political leadership, or the degree of internalisation of the ideology professed.

In the theoretical layer, the monograph takes the perspective of the program of neoclassical realism. It considers China’s growth as an incentive from the international system, understood as its political, economic, and military power rise, and as a result, the threat of its aggression against Taiwan. The Tsai Ing-wen ←16 | 17→administration responds to this threat by making efforts both internally (for example, in the defence sphere) and externally (in the sphere of foreign policy). President Tsai Ing-wen is the main “filter” of the Taiwanese response. She influences the process of extraction and mobilisation of the nation’s resources by forging the will of the nation to maintain its independence. She also tries to strengthen Taiwan’s informal alliances and partnerships by emphasising the community of democratic ideas and values and the rule of law. We hypothesize that it is thanks to the political leadership of President Tsai Ing-wen that Taiwan vigorously redirects foreign policy and rebuilds its defence policy. It is complemented by two research questions: how is Taiwan trying to strengthen its ties with informal allies and partners and acquiring new ones, and how are changes in defence policy taking place?

Tsai Ing-wen as a leader

The value and strength of a politician determine the circumstances in which he or she has to act. The changes observed today in the international environment require unconventional decisions that are not limited to internal affairs, but also have an impact on the perception of the state externally. The charisma, personality, and ability of a politician to persuade others to accept his reasons is the foundation of the effectiveness of actions taken by states. The “operational code” used by the leader influences the response given by the foreign policy of a given country to international challenges.¹⁸

Tsai Ing-wen fits perfectly into this pattern. She was born in Taipei in 1956 to a family with Hakka roots. She was raised in the south of the island, where her family ran a business. The cult of hard work, determination and consistency in action instilled at that time allowed her to achieve ambitious goals. Her educational preparation and professional development predestined her to take up the profession of a politician. She built her education at Taiwanese and Western universities. Firstly, she obtained a law degree from National Taiwan University in Taipei, then respectively, master’s degree from the Cornell University and doctorate from the London School of Economics (1984). For 16 years, she developed her academic career by teaching at the Soochow University and the National Chenchi University, both in Taipei. At the same time, since the 80s, she has been engaged in work in state administration in accordance with her scientific specialisation in international trade law and competition law. She ←17 | 18→participated in negotiations related to Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), meetings of working groups within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In the 90s, she worked as a security advisor and for the development of Sino-Taiwanese relations, before becoming Chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC; 大陸委員會 Dalu weiyuanhui) under the Executive Yuan (行政院 Xingzheng yuan) from 2000 to 2004. At the age of 48, she joined the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP; 民主進步黨 Minzhu jinbu dang) and in the same year she joined Parliament on behalf of this party. From that moment on, her career gained exceptional momentum. From 2006 to 2007, she served as Deputy Prime Minister in the cabinet of Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌). In 2008, she became the first woman to head the DPP. She holds this position, with breaks determined by subsequent electoral rounds, to this day (2008–2012; 2014–2018; 2020–). The failure of this first female candidate for the highest office in the state in the presidential election in 2012 did not discourage her from continuing to fight. Four years later, she was second to none becoming the first female President in Taiwan’s history, breaking the eight-year hegemony of the Kuomintang (KMT; 中國國民黨 Guomindang).

In Taiwan’s democratic political system, public support for the policies implemented by the authorities, including changes in strategic political direction, is represented by the convincing electoral successes of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP in 2016 and 2020. This was a result of several overlapping trends, and although each of them can be analysed exclusively, they only explain this phenomenon together. The political program of Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party from the beginning focused on the need to carry out internal reforms with an emphasis on generational justice, government institutions, legislation, historical justice, and the political climate.¹⁹ In the period preceding the DPP’s coming to power, Taiwan’s economy was characterised by slow economic growth (1.47% in 2015). The ageing of the population began to be a serious burden on the state budget. Taiwan faced fundamental structural changes conducive to economic growth. No wonder that among the DPP supporters there were many more young people, often voting for the first time,²⁰ than in the ranks of the main rival of the Kuomintang, who was attributed responsibility for the lack of pro-development ←18 | 19→ideas. What’s more, they were more supporters of Taiwan’s freedom and independence, which perfectly fit into the DPP program. Most KMT sympathisers were usually found among the oldest inhabitants of the island.²¹ The increase in social discontent was also the result of too much dependence on economic cooperation with China between 2008 and 2016. The apogee of public opposition was the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA; 海峽兩岸服務貿易協議 , 海峡两岸服务贸易协议 Haixia liang’an fuwu maoyi xieyi) prepared in 2013. Public protests around this issue in 2014 (Sunflower Movement; 太阳花学运 taiyanghua xueyun) determined the lack of ratification of the agreement by the parliament. In addition, these events coincided with the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong (Umbrella Revolution; 雨伞革命 yusan geming) in 2014, directed against Beijing’s attempts to impose rules on the election of the head of the local administration. The unrest in Hong Kong was seen in Taiwan as a warning against accepting the One Country, Two Systems (和平统一 , 一国两制 heping tongyi, yiguo liangzhi) model. This somehow corresponded with the increase in China’s assertiveness towards Taiwan and raised doubts about the interpretation of the 1992 Consensus (九二共識 , 九二共识 jiu er gongshi). The Kuomintang demonstrated its central role in the security of the island, as on this basis it has so far managed to conduct lively economic cooperation with the mainland. This argument has been repeated on many occasions. China itself has also joined in its consolidation. This strategy culminated in a meeting between leaders Xi Jinping (习近平) and Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in November 2015 in Hong Kong. The rhetoric of the success of the Xi-Ma meeting and its affirmation of the 1992 Consensus as the foundation of Sino-Taiwanese relations could not be accepted by the opposition. The latter argued that the government’s strategy of cooperation with China threatens Taiwan’s democracy and closes Taiwan’s ability to shape an autonomous policy. Deepening relations with China was understood as a threat to Taiwan’s security.²² Tsai Ing-wen was very severe on President Ma; in an emotional tone she spoke of disappointment and rage as feelings shared by ←19 | 20→many Taiwanese.²³ By reviving the discussion about the future of the island, the DPP paved the way for itself to gain power. The directions and political choices made by the Taiwanese people, as if in a mirror, reflect their national identity, evolving over the past decades, and especially since the 90s when Taiwan entered the path of democratisation. While in 2016, 58.2% of the island’s inhabitants identified with Taiwanese identity, in 2020, 64.3%. The opposite changed Chinese identity, which was declared in 2016 by 3.3%, and four years later by only 2.6%. These changes were also compensated by a decrease in declarations of dual identity, both Taiwanese and Chinese, from 23.4% and 29.9% respectively (Tab. 1.1). On this basis, it can be shown that the growing strength of the process of consolidating Taiwanese identity in society is evidenced not only by the fact that over the last 30 years it has displaced the Chinese one, but also by the progressive marginalisation of the importance of the dual Chinese and Taiwanese identity.