Roman Catholicism and Neo-Calvinism

In the midst of my 21^st year at Sacred Heart Major Seminary, the archdiocesan seminary of Detroit, I continue to be deeply grateful to the administration, staff, and colleagues of the seminary who provide me with a sanctuary, indeed, a home for teaching, writing, and fellowship. I also wish to thank Msgr. Thomas G. Guarino of Seton Hall University, for his friendship and ongoing spiritual and intellectual support throughout the years. I am grateful for my membership in the ecumenical initiative of Evangelical and Catholics Together, particularly for its practice of receptive ecumenism.

I would be remiss if I did not thank the late Karol Wojtyla, the future St. Pope John Paul II (1920-2005) for his writings, both pre-papal and papal, especially but not only those that play a key role in this book. My intellectual debt also extends to the Dutch neo-Calvinist tradition of theology and philosophy that I have engaged in my writings throughout the last twenty-years. Dutch neo-Calvinism, in particular, refers to a movement within the Augustinian and Reformed tradition that stems from the nineteenth century Dutch educator, theologian, church leader, and politician Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). Especially in this book, this includes systematic theologians Herman Bavinck (1845-1921), Gerritt C. Berkouwer (1903-1996), and philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). Both these sources of intellectual thought, Roman Catholic and NeoCalvinist, continue to be important stimuli to my own philosophical and theological work, my teaching, and, last but not least, the dynamics of fides quarens intellectum.

Last but not least, for endorsing my book, I am grateful to Mickey Mattox, Michael McClymond, Richard Mouw, and René van Woudenberg. I am also grateful to Erika Zabinski, copy editor of this book, and to Lisa Eary for making the Index. I extend my deep gratitude to Nelson Kloosterman for his translation of several Dutch passages into good English.

In his 1995 encyclical letter Ut Unum Sint, the Holy Father, St. John Paul II reminds the disciples of Christ that they have been called to unity by their Lord and Savior. Jesus prays to the Father “that they all may be one, as You, Father, are in Me, and I in you; that they also may be one in Us, that the world may believe that You sent Me … and have loved them as You have loved Me” (John 17:21, 23). Thus, the pope says, “the lack of unity among Christians contradicts the Truth which Christians have the mission to spread and, consequently, it gravely damages their witness.”² In light of Christ’s prayer, and with full recognition that the lack of unity among Christians represents a grave obstacle for the proclamation of the gospel (cf. John 17:21), we should take every suitable opportunity to increase the unity of all Christians. “I appeal to you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that all of you agree and that there be no dissensions among you, but that you be united in the same mind and the same judgment” (1 Cor 1:10). How, then, do we arrive at the unity St. Paul mentions here in this verse, namely, united in the same mind and the same judgment?

Ecclesiastical Epistemology³

In light of Vatican II’s approach to ecumenism in Unitatis Redintegratio, followed up by John Paul II’s Ut Unum Sint, the Church now engages in receptive ecumenism. I have sought to engage in receptive ecumenism in this book. The practice of receptive ecumenism means: “Dialogue is not simply an exchange of ideas. In some way it is always an ‘exchange of gifts’. … Dialogue does not extend exclusively to matters of doctrine but engages the whole person; it is also a dialogue of love.”⁴ There are ecclesial and philosophical foundations for receptive ecumenism. I have discussed the theological foundations elsewhere. I turn now to the philosophical foundation of ecclesiastical epistemology to discuss briefly the relation between unity and legitimate theological diversity.

Philosophical issues of meaning and truth are at stake in ecclesiastical epistemology when discussing legitimate diversity in complementary theological, rather than contradictory, expressions of doctrine. In sum, we must face here the question of “commensurable pluralism,” as Thomas Guarino calls it, meaning, thereby, that different theological systems cannot hold positions that are fundamentally contradictory. In other words, variety in theological expression must not be understood as equivalent to opposition; rather, such variety, Guarino explains, “must be commensurable with the fundamental creedal and doctrinal affirmations of faith. These affirmations are patient of reconceptualization, but always adhering to the ‘eodem sensu eademque sententia.’”⁵ This distinction between unchangeable truths and its formulations has ecumenical significance—“promoting the right ordering of Christian life, paving the way to a full vision of Christian truth.”

More exactly, the practice of receptive ecumenism presupposes the distinction between propositional truths of faith and their formulations in reflecting on the sense in which a doctrine, already confirmed and defined, is more fully known and deeply understood by another Christian tradition. John XXIII drew this distinction in his opening address at the Second Vatican Council: “For the deposit of faith, the truths contained in our venerable doctrine, are one thing; the fashion in which they are expressed, but with the same meaning and the same judgment [eodem sensu eademque sententia], is another thing.”⁶ The subordinate clause, which I have cited in its Latin original, is part of a larger passage from the First Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on Faith and Reason, Dei Filius (1869–70). The phrase is earlier invoked by Pius IX in the bull of 1854, Ineffabilis Deus, and also cited by Leo XIII in his 1899 encyclical letter, Testem Benevolentiae Nostrae. And this formula in Dei Filius is itself taken from the Commonitorium of St. Vincent of Lérins (AD 445), a Gallic monk, and the chief theologian of the Abbey of Lérins:⁷

I have cited this passage from Vincent several times in the fourth chapter when discussing doctrinal development in Berkouwer and Garrigou-Lagrange. This italicized phrase means to say that the truth of a proposition is inextricably connected with its meaning. As to meaning, the way things are is what makes “meaning” true or false. Therefore, a proposition is true if what it says corresponds to the way objective reality is; otherwise, it is false. In the words of Bernard Lonergan, “[m]eaning of its nature is related to a ‘meant,’ and what is meant may or may not correspond to what is so. If it corresponds, the meaning is true. If it does not correspond, the meaning is false.”⁹ Thus, a dogma’s meaning is unchangeable because that meaning is true. The truths of faith are, if true, always and everywhere true; the different way of expressing these truths may vary in our attempts to communicate revealed truths more clearly and accurately, but these various linguistic expressions do not affect the truth of the propositions.

John XXIII intuitively understood that propositions—contents of thought that are true or false, expressible in various languages, but more than mere words, expressing possible, and if true, actual states of affairs—do not vary as the language in which they are expressed varies. He speaks of immutable or unalterable truths, suggesting that truths of faith are more than their linguistic expression. What, then, is the ecumenical import of this distinction for understanding the continuity and material identity of dogma between Roman Catholicism and Dutch neo-Calvinism? Throughout this work the continuity and material identity regarding many judgments made by these traditions will become evident.

Accordingly, this book has been written in a Vincentian light, and hence Vatican II’s Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio provides a justification for legitimate differences in the complementary elaborations of revealed truth. This is the basis for receptive ecumenism.

Berkouwer recognizes the ecumenical import of the distinction between truth and its formulations: “Along with maintaining the unchangeability of dogma, one must simultaneously pay attention to the wording, to the expression and representation of that which is unchangeable and confessed as truth by the church.”¹¹ The import of this distinction between the unchangeable truth of the Church’s dogma and its formulations arises from the recognition that the former is expressed in “thought forms belonging to a definite time, thought forms that naturally bear a human, historically determined and therefore relative character.” John Paul II also recognizes the ecumenical import of the distinction between truth and its formulations in Ut Unum Sint.¹² Both these documents speak to the issue of legitimate, interconfessional diversity in theological expressions of doctrine. John Paul states his support for legitimate theological diversity, in a Vincentian line, quoting the Decree on Ecumenism, no. 17, which I cited above.

Still, receptive ecumenism is not just about having a discussion regarding questions where there exists a common basis of discussion. We must pursue critical discussion on issues for which the common basis is lacking between Roman Catholicism and neo-Calvinism, in particular, John Paul II (aka Karol Wojtyla) and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP, on the one hand, and G.C. Berkouwer and Herman Dooyeweerd, on the other.

Hence, we must engage in polemical philosophical theology. Yves Cardinal Congar, OP, lists the strengths, which in some respects are also weaknesses, of the method of polemic in inter-confessional dialogue, which I think are also applicable to dialogue within the Church:

In particular, the third and fourth point are relevant to the critical discussions in this book. I consider the whole of my adversary’s position and I engage in self-criticism, which involves the questioning of my viewpoint and taking seriously the honest questions posed by the critic. Furthermore, in this polemic, I must ask, “What do I owe the person with whom I disagree?”¹⁴

We owe love to that person. “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Gal 5:14). In practical terms this means that we should treat others the same way that we ourselves would like to be treated (Matt 7:12). For instance, we would like to be treated as a person with intentionality and integrity and hence the other should be similarly treated. By intentionality I mean that our discussion partner has something to say to me, and by integrity that he says what he thinks.¹⁵ Roger Nicole spells out the implication here: “How then do we desire to be treated? First, we want people to know what we are saying or meaning. If we are going to voice differences, therefore, we have an obligation to make a serious effort to understand the person with whom we differ. … The person with whom we differ should have evidence that we have read carefully what has been written and that we have attempted to understand its meaning.” Furthermore, Nicole adds, “beyond what a person says or writes, we must attempt to understand what a person means.”¹⁶ I take this to mean that we should be encouraged to understand a speaker’s or writer’s statements by rendering the best, the strongest possible interpretation of an argument’s meaning.¹⁷ St. Ignatius of Loyola states this point admirably well.

In a word, at the very least avoid “straw men.”¹⁹ Moreover, to maximize our chance of understanding what a person means to say we should seek to understand his aims. “What is it that they are looking for? What is it that makes them tick? What is that they are recoiling against? … Is there not a possibility here to find a point of contact at the very start rather than to move on with an entirely defensive or hostile mood?” So, let’s put these principles into practice in this book as we engage in critical discussion with Roman Catholics and neo-Calvinists on the relation between faith and reason, religious epistemology, moral philosophy, the moral law, epistemology, philosophical anthropology, and the development of Christian doctrine.