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Lowell Lectures of 1903 by Charles S. Peirce

A Study Edition

by Charles Sanders Peirce (Author) Kenneth Laine Ketner (Editor)
©2024 Others 268 Pages
Series: A Study Edition, Volume 13

Summary

Table Of Contents

  • Cover
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • About the author
  • About the book
  • This eBook can be cited
  • Table of Contents
  • Editorial Introduction
  • Procedures
  • Acknowledgements
  • Lowell Lectures of 1903 by Charles Sanders Peirce
  • Lecture One: What Makes a Reasoning Sound?
  • Lecture Two: Existential Graphs, Alpha and Beta
  • Lecture Three: General Explanations, Phenomenology and Speculative Grammar
  • Lecture Four: Existential Graphs, Gamma Part
  • Rules of the Broken Cut
  • Gamma Expressions of Beta Graphs
  • Lecture Five: Multitude
  • Lecture Six: Chance
  • Lecture Seven: Induction
  • Rationale of Induction
  • Lecture Eight: Abduction
  • Syllabus of a Course of Lectures at the Lowell Institute Beginning 1903 November 23 on Some Topics of Logic By Mr. C. S. Peirce
  • An Outline Classification of the Sciences
  • The Ethics of Terminology
  • Sundry Logical Conceptions
  • Existential Graphs
  • The Conventions
  • Alpha Part
  • Beta Part
  • Gamma Part
  • Rules of Transformation of Existential Graphs.
  • Archegetic Rules of Transformation
  • The Archegetic Code for Alpha Graphs
  • Additional Archegetic Rules for Beta Graphs
  • Some Modifications for the Rules of Gamma Graphs
  • Rules of Transformation Demonstrable from the Archegetic Rules
  • Rules of Transformation
  • Pure Mathematical Definition of Existential Graphs, Regardless of Their Interpretation
  • I. Alpha Part
  • Code of Permissions
  • II. Beta Part
  • Code of Permissions,—Continued
  • Index: Lowell Lectures of 1903 by Charles S. Peirce

Editorial Introduction

Five projects by Peirce in combination, written on the cusp of the twentieth century, provide a solid account of his mature work as an objective explorer of methods for interdisciplinary science:

  • (1: Early 1890s) Charles S. Peirce, The Logic of Interdisciplinarity: The Monist-series. Herausgegeben von Elize Bisanz. Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie, Sonderband 20. (Akademie Verlag GmbH: Berlin, 2009).
  • (2: Late 1890s) Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898 by Charles Sanders Peirce, Edited by K. L. Ketner, with an introduction by K. L. Ketner and H. Putnam (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1992);
  • (3: 1902) Peirce’s Application to the Carnegie Foundation, for support to complete a set of publications encompassing his life work in logic. This survives as MS L75 as edited by Joseph M. Ransdell as a project within the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism; it may be retrieved at https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/L75/l75.htm .
  • (4: Early 1903) Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism by Charles Sanders Peirce, edited and introduced with a commentary by P. A. Turrisi (State University of New York Press: Albany, 1997).
  • (5: Late 1903) The Lowell Lectures of 1903, as presented in this volume.

The Monist series of articles and related manuscripts, as gathered in (1), mark the beginning of Peirce’s late works. The Cambridge Conferences Lectures, item (2), continues and expands that beginning. Peirce’s production was strong in 1902–3 which saw the effort to obtain financial support from the Carnegie Foundation—item (3) as insightfully organized by Professor Joseph Ransdell—a manuscript that reveals how complex and rich Peirce’s research was at that time. Then came two lecture series in 1903. The first of these lectures, item (4), was sponsored by the Harvard Philosophy Department; it is available in an excellent edition (PPM) prepared by Professor Patricia Turrisi which includes her valuable introduction and commentary. Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903, presented in this volume, is the fifth component that rounds out this important set of interrelated documents. Scholars who study these five items as a single unit will have an excellent overview of Peirce’s mature findings concerning the concepts and methods of objective sciences of either the natural or humanistic variety. Item (1) also includes a biographical summary written by Peirce. That particular document is from this late period, and it features an outline of Peirce’s earlier publications keyed to A Comprehensive Bibliography of the Published Works of Charles Sanders Peirce (CB). There one finds his overview of his System of Science (see also MOS)

It is important to consider this late period of Peirce’s work because—like his fellow scientists of the day, known then as “men of science”—he did not drop his early research in favor of a radical new beginning. Instead, his work grew as truthful findings were acquired and employed in revising and developing to steadily grow his conclusions. This process is distinctive within objective research; it stands in stark opposition to changes to suit some egotistical or political purpose. Peirce described it thusly (MS 867, circa 1897, see CP 1.7):

Thus, in brief, my philosophy may be described as the attempt of a physicist to make such conjecture as to the constitution of the universe as the methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that has been done by previous philosophers. I shall support my propositions by such arguments as I can. Demonstrative proof is not to be thought of. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine. The best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of all likelihood, in the general line of growth of scientific ideas, and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers.

It is important to note that philosophy here means the work of figures such as Faraday, or Maxwell, or Darwin, or Bohr; in this case it does not mean the same as it would in a contemporary university department of philosophy. The best translation of this term from the nineteenth century into contemporary usage would be “theoretical scientist,” one who is pursuing science at the edges of research using experimental methods. Moreover, by universe, he did not only mean the physical universe—he included all aspects of reality, especially artistic, cultural, or historic realities. It is distinctive of Peirce that he proposes to experiment objectively both within sciences such as physics or chemistry (Naturwissenschaften) as well as within the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) and cultural sciences (Kulturwissenschaften). (I employ these German terms because it seems that for some time continental researchers have agreed with Peirce’s methodological scientific inclusiveness.) The five components listed above readily show how he proposed to establish a methodology for this kind of objective interdisciplinary research.1

Origination of the Lectures

The early years of the twentieth century were busy times for Peirce. He continued to write reviews for The Nation, a project that produced a living wage. On 15 July 1902 he submitted an extensive proposal for a grant from the new Carnegie Foundation to support an integrated summation of his lifelong project on the logic of science (see Ransdell’s edition of MS L75 for publications of the application). He had been in correspondence with his brother, Harvard professor James (Jem) Peirce, who was organizing efforts toward the Carnegie Foundation grant proposal (CSP-WJ at F-1902, 214). Several highly regarded supporters, including Theodore Roosevelt, the President of the United States, presented enthusiastic letters in support of this project. In connection with Peirce’s Carnegie application, Jem was in contact with Lowell, who confided that while Charles’ proposal was well-suited to the Carnegie Project, he was not expecting favorable results, because, as he said, “The Committee appointed to look after the interests of others have, as you know, simply divided up the money among their own members” (F-1903, 26).

When prospects for the Carnegie application soured, Jem and William James arranged a set of lectures in the Philosophy Department at Harvard. (See PPM, Professor Turrisi’s edition of these lectures preceded by her excellent introduction.)

On 21 February 1903 Jem sent a brotherly letter enclosing a small personal check with hopes that more might follow later in the year, and he also expressed that “there is a probability of some Lowell Lectures on logic, next winter.” Jem confided to William James (27 February) that Charles was hoping to have a Lowell Course arranged for him next winter; indeed, Jem later confirmed (F-1903, 80) that Mr. Lowell wished Peirce to give eight lectures next winter at one hundred and fifty dollars each. On 30 September of 1903, President Lowell gave public titles and dates for the lecture series (F-1903, 03).

Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed

1. 23 Nov. What Makes a Reasoning Sound?
2. 27 Nov. A system of Diagrams for Studying Logical Relations.
Exposition of it begun.
3. 30 Nov. The three universal categories and their utility.
4. 3 Dec. Exposition of the System of Diagrams Completed.
5. 7 Dec. The Doctrine of Multitude, Infinity and Continuity.
6. 10 Dec. What is Chance?
7. 14 Dec. Induction as Doing, not mere Cogitation
8. 17 Dec. How to theorize.

The actual lectures proceeded with some changes in the titles and order. For this study edition, the lecture titles Peirce wrote in his MS notebooks will be used.

Plan of the Volume

Let us consider the excellent, and often workable idea of a critical edition of an author’s corpus. The method is first to ascertain when an author finally completed or published some text, then, based on evidence, identify a proof text that is definitive as to the writer’s final intent and execution. This is a valuable procedure. Yet, it depends upon having a record in some form of the author’s completed project.

However, if the author writes, then constantly rethinks, revises, composes improved or expanded explanations of developing ideas, and leaves no record of a final text or speech, then how does one best achieve an understanding of that author? In cases such as this that lack a proof text, valuable related texts may yet be extant. We might not have any record of what specific order Julius Caesar issued to his troops as they approached the Rubicon. We don’t know if he said, “Cross that river,” or “Onward, and the rules be damned,” but we do know that the river was crossed then and there by those troops under his command. We might possess records of writings or statements from a range of dates, but we might lack information concerning which alternate or revision or re-ordered component precedes or follows some other component. Let us add to this mix of complications that in this case the author’s situation consisted of a mass of important ideas to express in a given project, but there was a lack of resources or time to fully present the mass, so that some method of compression by the author occurred at the historical time of presentation. We should not, as scholars of important communications—written texts, lectures, events comprised of extemporaneous comments—decide to give up on providing an account of the principal sequences that have survived that can be rescued from the great researcher, simply because we cannot produce a perfected account at the level of a proof text.

Such considerations apply in significant ways for the remaining records of Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903. He clearly foresaw additional results during the process of writing down an initial idea. And we have no proof text, no record, of what he actually spoke during the lectures. Yet in reviewing his surviving preparatory notes, we find that the material is valuable and worthy as insight into the mind of a great scientist.

Therefore, the editorial method employed here does not produce or re-create these lectures as actually voiced in actu. But a set of sequencing remarks in Peirce’s hand does provide a partial track through the handwritten pages of his lecture notebooks.

It is clear that his notes and drafts constitute a much fuller scope than could be presented in the allotted lecture times. The principle to be followed here will be to produce a smooth flow of themes based on the surviving lecture notes that were used during his preparation. That approach clearly represents one editor’s judgment as to how such topics could be organized.

Thus, for present purposes this is a study edition of the lectures, not a critical edition. In following this policy, could there be editorial mistakes, biases, or tendencies? Obviously, yes. But strong efforts have been made to minimize these within the bounds of human fallibility. If we must wait for a perfect edition, one might not be able to read the great insightful discussions and research possibilities that Peirce recorded in his notebooks for this lecture series. Humans are not capable of perfected heights of accuracy. Let anyone who wishes proceed directly to the surviving manuscripts as designated herein. This study edition is arranged to facilitate researchers who wish to take that path.

This procedure will yield some textual repetition. Were such repetitions avoided, conceptual unity would be flawed in some discussions. This procedure may help us enter the mixture of insights and ideas that were operative in Peirce’s research at the time. He regarded himself as a pioneer in a new way of organizing and continuing objective interdisciplinary science. Pioneers can be vague as their thoughts come to expression. Note that vague is not the same notion as ambiguous; the former is rich with potential future clarifications or improved interpretations, while the latter promotes confused meanings. And pioneers are humanly fallible. Yet, such work can be exceptionally valuable in continuing research. We propose to be inside such a growing body of insight, using as many clues from records as are at hand, so that perhaps some currently valuable extension or revision of the general approach might be possible and established by later scientific research and experimentation.

Manuscript numbers (see interspersed ISP numbers; also R, pages 57–62) are inserted in the lectures as a guide to assist scholars who may want to further their closer scrutiny of the manuscripts transcribed here (as well as those not used) as a means for further understanding of these path-breaking scientific ideas. Short extract pieces from these lectures were published in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce; editors of those volumes broke up unified manuscripts, omitted relevant parts, and scattered the pieces across several volumes. This book is a study edition of the lecture series displayed in a successive presentation based on one editor’s attempted recovery of Peirce’s compositional efforts.

Details

Pages
268
Year
2024
ISBN (PDF)
9783631907405
ISBN (ePUB)
9783631907412
ISBN (Hardcover)
9783631903858
DOI
10.3726/b21113
Language
English
Publication date
2024 (March)
Keywords
Pragmaticism Logic Existential Graphs Science Peirce
Published
Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Warszawa, Wien, 2024. 268 p., 0 ill. en couleurs, 0 ill. n/b, 0 tabl.

Biographical notes

Charles Sanders Peirce (Author) Kenneth Laine Ketner (Editor)

Kenneth L. Ketner is the Paul W. Horn Distinguished Professor at the Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism, of which he is a co-founder and former director, at Texas Tech University. Among his works are Reasoning and the Logic of Things (1992), Peirce and Contemporary Thought (1995), A Thief of Peirce (1995), Symbol and Existence: by Walker Percy (2019).

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Title: Lowell Lectures of 1903 by Charles S. Peirce