Israel's New Wars

The Arab—Israeli conflict caused a series of high-intensity wars (1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982).¹ The IDF (Israel Defense Forces) used to be concerned about Arab militaries, particularly the most powerful ones, those of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Egypt has had peace with Israel, a cold one, since 1979. Egypt has the most powerful military in the Arab world. In 2022 the Egyptian military continued to see Israel as “its main enemy.”² There has been a risk of a sharp shift in its policy towards Israel. It might lead to a clash and, worst case, to a war. Yet this scenario seems quite unlikely. Syria has declined following the civil war there, which devastated the country and its military. ³ The latter is much weaker compared to what it used to be before the Syrian civil war. This development significantly reduced the danger to Israel. Unlike Syria and Egypt, Iraq does not have a border with Israel and used to send an expeditionary force when other Arab states fought Israel. Iraq has been at a low point in the last two decades and is busy with its internal affairs. Therefore there was no possibility an Iraqi expeditionary force would reach Israel, which would continue to be the case, at least in the upcoming decade.

Since 2011 there has been turmoil in several Arab countries⁴ that did not involve Israel. Those conflicts demonstrated how fragile some Arab states are. Other Arab states, including those near Israel, such as Jordan, have been struggling with severe political and economic problems. Israel was concerned about Jordan since they share a long border. They managed to keep the border quiet and safe by maintaining effective security cooperation. Israel’s main security challenges are its conflicts with Iran and its Arab partners, NSAs (Non-State Actors), Hezbollah, and Palestinian groups, primarily Hamas. Those groups had a series of wars with Israel. Those new wars, which replaced the old wars between Israel and Arab states, will be examined in the first part of this book.

Hezbollah could be compared to others that conducted non-state warfare.⁵ Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, confronted Israel in the 1980s and the 1990s and again in July—August 2006, a campaign that lasted 34 days. In 2006 Hezbollah relied on its rockets while the IDF depended on the IAF (Israeli Air Force) and artillery. That confrontation ended in a tie.⁶ Since then, the two sides have prepared for another round, which might be more destructive than the former. The IDF seeks a decisive victory, but the next war might end in another draw. The 2006 war exposed the poor readiness of the IDF and Israel’s lack of will to launch a large-scale ground offensive. Israel was concerned then, and not without good reasons, it might absorb heavy casualties and achieve little. The IDF would be better ready for the next war but could not destroy Hezbollah. The scale of the war depends, among others, on how much Hezbollah would risk a full-blown war.

Hamas was established in 1987. In 1994 the PA (Palestinian Authority) was created as part of the Oslo Accords. Despite the effort to end the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, it did not prevent a confrontation from 2000–2005. Israel clashed then with Palestinians, who belonged to various factions, including Fatah and Hamas. This confrontation could be compared to the fight between Hezbollah and the IDF in the 1990s. The IDF struggled despite its apparent advantage in both cases. The IDF carried out two major operations in Lebanon, in 1993 and 1996, which did not bring a significant change. In contrast, Israel’s offensive in 2002 in the West Bank was a turning point in that fight. Eventually, the Israeli retreat, from Lebanon in 2000 and from the Gaza Strip, in 2005, marked the end of those wars, which some saw as a sign of Israel’s weakness.

Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007. Since then, Hamas and other Palestinian factions, such as the PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) clashed with the IDF numerous times. The peak, until the war between Israel and Hamas that started on October 7, 2023, was in two confrontations: December 2008—January 2009 and July—August 2014. Two smaller rounds occurred in mid-November 2012 and in mid-May 2021. Until the war in 2023 the 2014 war was the longest one. It lasted 50 days. Many in Israel assumed it was too long, but it is not necessarily the case, considering it was a limited campaign. It showed, again, Israel’s constraints in fighting in the Gaza Strip. Israel relied on air power and hesitated to carry out a vast attack on the ground. There is also some similarity between the 2008–2009 and 2014 confrontations and the 2006 war. During those new wars between Arab NSAs and the IDF, the latter faced challenges such as suppressing the massive fire of rockets toward the Israeli rear. Hezbollah had more capabilities than Hamas since Hezbollah’s supply lines were not cut off, as it was with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Iran had warm relations with Israel until 1979. Since then, there has been a conflict between them. For Israel, it has been another kind of a new war since it was a cold war with a huge non—Arab Muslim state that used to be a partner. Israel has been worried about Iran’s long-range missile program and Iran’s allies and partners, mainly Hezbollah. Israel’s biggest concern has been Iran’s nuclear program. Israel might have to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites as a last resort. Israel might also join Arab states to ally against Iran.

Israel does not have an official national defense strategy. The IDF did publish (in 2015 and again in 2018) a document called “IDF Strategy”, which emphasized that NSAs have replaced Arab militaries ‘as Israel’s main military threat.’⁷ Charles Freilich pointed out the shift in Israeli national security policy concerning its conflicts with NSAs.⁸ The IDF was influenced by the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) regarding the IDF’s strategic, organizational, and operational patterns.⁹ It has to do with historical changes concerning the IDF’s way of thinking.¹⁰ Sergio Catignani examined the impact of the conflicts with the Palestinians on IDF’s doctrine.¹¹ Itamar Lifshitz and Erez Seri-Levy explained the Israeli Inter-War Campaigns (IWC), which “utilizes advantageous conditions to formulate continuous military campaigns below the threshold of severe conflict.” The IWC “creates and manages limited competitive conflicts intended to mitigate adversaries’ force buildup in preparation for war “as part of the doctrine’s development.¹² Brigadier General Eran Ortal explained how the IDF had to abandon its “Deterrence Campaigns” that were used in the Gaza Strip.¹³ The IDF also struggled to confront NSAs in urban warfare.¹⁴ Therefore, the IDF had to adjust its doctrine and buildup, which is analyzed in the book’s second part.

Israel might consider a preventive war or a preemptive strike. It could happen if Israel assumes it can’t avoid a war, so she should start it on its terms. The IDF strives for a quick victory, but it may deal with a long war, if it runs in relatively easy circumstances for Israel, such as fighting on one front. The IDF also relies heavily on firepower, which is problematic, because it has a limited effect. The IDF has to invest more in developing its maneuvering capabilities. This was one of the lessons of the 2023 war.

Israel does not seek to seize and hold more territory due to difficulties it creates at the military, political, and economic levels. The IDF would remain in hostile territory, but for a short time, enough to destroy the enemy arsenal, and then the IDF would withdraw. In the naval arena, the IDF faces Hezbollah’s anti-ship missiles and attempts to penetrate Israel by sea, such as by using frogmen.

The text includes hundreds of endnotes supporting my ideas. This book is based on sources published in books, articles etc. The information is always incorporated into the text in a way that does not disrupt the reading flow. The only purpose of the endnote is to reveal the details of the source.

My M.A. thesis and PhD dissertation dealt with Israel’s national strategy and military doctrine. I have been studying this subject for more than twenty-five years. I worked for Israel’s Ministry of Defense, doing research for the air force, Israeli GOC army headquarters, IDF’s Staff and Command College etc. This book is an entirely personal project and is not part of any research I did for the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The book expresses my personal views and does not necessarily represent the opinions of others. Of course, all the errors here are mine alone. My email: Ehudmh2014@gmail.com

Notes

1 David Rodman, Victory, Defeat, or Draw: Battlefield Decision in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1982 (Sussex Academic Press, 2021). Avi Kober, Military Decision in the Arab-Israeli Wars 1948–1982 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1995). Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive—A Critical History of the Israeli Defence Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).

2 On the Egyptian perspective see: David M. Witty, The U.S—Egypt Military Relationship—Complexities, Contradictions, and Challenges, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 176, May 2022, 18.

3 Eyal Zisser, Syria at War—the Rise and Fall of the Revolution in Syria (Maarachot—the IDF’s publishing house and the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2020). Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi, Syrian Requiem: The Civil War and Its Aftermath (Princeton University Press, 2021). Christopher Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East (Yale University Press, 2018)

4 Ariel Ahram, War and Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (Polity, 2020). Noah Feldman, The Arab Winter: A Tragedy (Princeton University Press, May 12, 2020). Marc Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East)New York: Public Affairs, 2016).

5 Stephen Biddle, Nonstate Warfare—The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias (Princeton University Press, 2021).

6 On the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah see: Raphael. D. Marcus, Israel’s Long War with Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation Under Fire (Georgetown University Press, 2018). Meir Finkel, Military Agility: Ensuring Rapid and Effective Transition from Peace to War (University Press of Kentucky, 2020).

7 Michael Herzog, “New IDF Strategy Goes Public”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 28, 2015. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/new-idf-strategy-goes-public

8 Charles D. Freilich, Israeli National Security (Oxford University Press, 2018).

9 Michael Raska, Military Innovation in Small States (Routledge, 2020).