Analogy in Modern Scholasticism

“Knowledge of analogy is so necessary that without it one cannot practice metaphysics and, in other sciences, many faults stem from a lack of this knowledge”¹. This is how Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1468–1534), one of the most outstanding commentators of St. Thomas Aquinas, perceived analogy at the turn of the 15^th and 16^th centuries. The history of later philosophy shows how much this remark turned out to be true. In philosophical cognition analogy lost its meaning to univocity. At the cost of metaphysics, the mathematical-natural science method gained more and more the “right of citizenship”, which in turn led to a cognitive reductionism and to the ruin of the autonomy of philosophy. For analogy guarantees a realistic and rational cognition of things. Its specific character is that in knowledge we take in that which for all varieties of things is common whilst at the same time emphasizing their dissimilarity and uniqueness. Moreover – what is extremely important – the theory of analogy allows for a natural cognition of God. There is no other way to speak of God than by analogy.²

After five centuries, in the same tone as Cajetan, contemporary representatives of the realistic current of philosophy appeal for an appraisal of analogy, not only in philosophical cognition. A significant indication of this was the International Metaphysical Symposium, entitled A return to analogy in philosophy: At the base of a rational cognition of reality, organized in the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin in 2004. The important role of analogy is pointed out by many. Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec maintains: “Analogy and its understanding constitutes an essential key to the philosophical cognition of the world, people and things”³. For Krąpiec the proper understanding of being as being is only possible by applying analogy. “And so – he writes – a full-blooded concept of being qua being will appear when treating of the problem of the analogical unity of the concept of being”⁴. “For analogy is the function of reason’s pronouncements concerning reality, thus the process of cognition and the method of cognition of being is indispensible for the correct solution of debatable questions of analogy”⁵.

In a similar fashion, referring to Cajetan, Andrzej Maryniarczyk ascertains: “The ignorance of analogy will not only reveal a simple lack of philosophical culture, but most of all will become a source of ruin of autonomic philosophical cognition […] which of necessity must lead to a cognitive reductionism. Whereas analogy in philosophy is a gate which leads to a realistic cognition of the world, of people and things. Anyone who does not enter by this gate, walks on the outskirts of philosophy – without a chance of arriving at true philosophical cognition”⁶. In turn, Piotr Jaroszyński writes: “[…] metaphysics will preserve its identity thanks to analogy”⁷. Étienne Gilson too is of the opinion that analogy which, apart from abstraction, is a method of elaboration of the object of metaphysics, that is being qua being, imparts an analogical character to all metaphysical concepts. What is more, metaphysics in explaining reality in the light of final causes, precisely owing to a correct understanding of analogy, may avoid the fatal consequences of agnosticism or monism, as regards the relation of created reality to the First Cause.⁸

The above mentioned representative statements, sufficiently emphasize the importance of analogy to the extent that without analogy there is no possibility of veritable cognition. The acceptance of analogy is tantamount to the development of metaphysics, whereas its rejection is a pushing of metaphysics onto the outskirts of philosophy, and even the erasure of metaphysics altogether.

The authors who tackled problems of analogy, referred most often to Aristotle’s teaching (384–322 BC) and to that of St. Thomas Aquinas (1224/5–1274 AD). In the manner of Aquinas it was invariably connected with the scholastic current of philosophy, especially with its Thomistic version. On its base the problem of analogy was, more often than not, undertaken and altogether elaborated. One may say that the acceptance of analogy became a recognition signal, one deciding whether a given author belonged to the Thomistic school or not. Although Aquinas is in this respect the leading author, it should nonetheless be pointed out that he did not write any special and separate work devoted to the subject. He only wrote on analogy when dealing with other problems.⁹ However, there is no doubt that he clearly and decidedly proclaimed himself in favor of the analogy of being, and his outlined resolutions in this respect constituted a foundation for further distinctions and profound study and were a source of inspiration for authors dealing with the problem of analogy, both in past times, as well as at present. Aquinas will be followed by the whole school with the above mentioned Cajetan fully working out the theory of analogy. Together with his noteworthy work De nominum analogia (1498), he went down to posterity as the main theoretician and classical scholar of the doctrine of analogy. Krąpiec even contended that all scholasticizing philosophers referred to the teaching of Cajetan.¹⁰ One should, however, bear in mind that, in the light of the latest studies, Cajetan was not a faithful commentator of Aquinas, although he was held as the greatest authority of the Thomistic school in the 16^th century and many of his resolutions were ascribed to Aquinas himself.¹¹

The aim of this work is a thorough study of the problem of analogy in the philosophical writings of Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Why such a choice? Why analogy and why that of Francisco Suárez? There are many reasons for this. Let us begin with Suárez who undoubtedly belongs to the circle of great philosophers; he is mentioned alongside Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Descartes, Kant or Hegel. His influence on modern philosophy was enormous, as the ideas contained in the Disputationes metaphysicae (1597) constituted the foundation of teaching in the 17^th century in all the universities of Europe, not only in the Jesuit and Catholic ones, but also in the Lutheran and Calvinistic ones. For people of modern times Suárez’s work was a source of knowledge about the most important philosophers of times past and many professors possessed this work in their own collection of books.¹²

The significance of Suárez was noticeable from the beginning and was significant to such a point that already at the end of the 16^th century he was competitive with the most important and influential philosophical traditions. Apart from the Thomistic (Dominican) and Scotistic (Franciscan) schools, the Suarezian (Jesuit) school already prospered, which – as the name suggests – was founded by its most illustrious representative Francisco Suárez.¹³ In other words, one may say that in these schools Thomistic Aristotelianism, Scotistic Aristotelianism and Suarezian Aristotelianism were suitably represented. This would mean that one should not label Suárez as Thomistic or Scotistic, but that he founded a new and original synthesis owing to which he takes his place in history as the creator of a new philosophical school. Each of these schools valued its characteristic authorities and its own doctrine. Thus in the Thomistic school the theory of the analogy of being was upheld, whereas in the Scotistic school – the univocity of being. Thomists sanctioned the critique of Duns Scotus, his followers and the authors of other philosophical orientations, but did not welcome criticism of Thomas Aquinas and his views. Scotists would criticize Thomas and the Thomists, but never Duns Scotus etc.¹⁴ Who then was esteemed and who was criticized in the Suarezian school? Which models were the guiding principles of this school?