Media Literacy, Media Education and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe

Media education and media literacy have been hot topics in both social sciences and social and political practice for quite some time. While disinformation and fake news have been researched extensively, especially in conjunction with the incredible spread of social media, a few recent events have been instrumental in helping them reach new heights. For example, the Covid-19 pandemic which shocked the world and resulted in numerous victims, has been marred from the very beginning by conspiracy-influenced accounts regarding its origins. While the disease spread all over the world, less than credible stories regarding its inception, magnitude and treatment abounded globally. Once vaccines have been created – an incredible scientific achievement in a very short time – disinformation took off, and far-fetched stories referring to the potentially harmful effects of vaccination surfaced everywhere. Another example is the war taking place in Ukraine, where one can see both disinformation propagated through social media “privately”, and also, the more dangerous kind, which is the spread of fake news by particular governments/state actors, in this case, Russia. Examples of fake news do not stop here, but these two are indicative of the level of disinformation that our world increasingly witnesses.

The first question that comes to mind is why these blatant lies or far-fetched stories end up being so popular? Keeping in line with the rationale of this book, one of the main causes for the success of disinformation is the lack of media education often accompanied by low levels of media literacy. Should more people be better equipped to identify fake news, should they be warned that not all information is accurate or objective, disinformation would not maintain such a strong foothold.

In this book, we look into different strategies regarding media education and media literacy in several European countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Germany, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia. The aim is to compare and contrast existing and planned policy measures designed to reduce or stop the negative effects of disinformation, while also emphasizing unique success stories that have reformed the media landscape and the audience’s approach to information sources.

Furthermore, we consider that there is a link between media education and media literacy on the one hand and democratic values and principles, on the other. In other words, if media education is one answer to pressing questions regarding disinformation, one cannot avoid thinking about what topics become most frequently the victims of disinformation. Media education is also directly correlated with counteracting the effects of hate speech, which is widely propagated through social media, and, in some cases, through regular media. Consequently, it is important to think about the main topics that trigger the activation of hate speech. As it will become apparent from our case studies, hate speech, disinformation and fake news are often related to a limited set of issues, revolving around the questioning or rejection of liberal and/or progressist values, contesting or denying minority rights, or intolerance. This is why we consider that it is important to evaluate the state of media education and media literacy in conjunction with the most often identified issues of discord within different societies. Democratic values represent the core of political culture. Democratic consolidation cannot take place without the adoption of these values, and media education can significantly contribute to this process. While the adoption and internalization of democratic (and liberal) values is a complex process, education, and, specifically, media education is one of its key components.

Additionally, we explore media education and literacy policies and projects that focus solely on the youth. The younger generation is not only more susceptible to disinformation because of their extensive use of social media, but they are also the democratic citizens of tomorrow. Through education, understood both in general terms and from the perspective of the media, the youth are responsible for the consolidation and survival of democratic political systems. In this respect, worrying trends abound in North America and Western Europe. According to Mounk and Foa (2016), the youth in the US and Western Europe are more prone to radicalize, and less supportive of free speech than older generations (8). Moreover, the youth are also increasingly dissatisfied with their political systems and display stronger attraction to anti-system or populist political actors (Foa & Mounk, 2019).

The data presented in this book represents the main results of a European Commission funded project implemented by universities and civil society actors in the countries mentioned above. This analysis can be interesting for scholars of media studies - and social sciences more broadly defined - and can be a useful resource for policymakers at local, national or European levels, and for civil society organizations focusing on media literacy.

Throughout the project, we have collected a wide range of data. From interviews with policymakers to online surveys with media literacy experts, from success stories of media literacy projects, to insights into the legislation and the policy context of media education, we have tried to amass as much information as possible.

The choice of countries under the authors’ lens is interesting from several points of view. First, we are exploring media education and media literacy in countries that have a communist past (with the exception of Germany). Although the fall of communism took place more than 30 years ago, successive post-communist political regimes toyed with different views of democracy, which created various ideological and political landscapes. For example, Hungary and Poland, two former success stories of early democratization, experienced significant democratic drawbacks, originating in ultra-conservatism, illiberalism or populism. The fact that democracy as a political system has been significantly altered in some post-communist countries is relevant for the study of media education and media literacy because it is precisely anti-democratic governments that make use of various disinformation techniques in order to secure support from the population. While this strategy is not unique to post-communist countries, we argue that it is more dangerous in these cases because democracy itself has not yet had the time to consolidate, meaning that it has not truly become the only game in town (Linz & Stepan, 1996). As such, disinformation and the lack of media education may threaten the very survival of liberal democracies in some cases.

Media education and literacy are directly related to the broader milieu of freedom of expression, freedom of thought, politicization/instrumentalization of news, and the laws and practices governing media ownership. For the countries included in the MELIA project, media indicators vary considerably. For example, the 2021 World Press Freedom Index, created by Reporters without Borders, depicts a rather bleak story.¹ The index offers a glimpse into the status of journalism in 180 countries (especially focusing on ease of access to information, reporting freedom, state control of reporters, and even chasing and threatening of reporters), a ranking that has been commonly headed by Scandinavian countries (Norway, Finland). In this context, the countries in this project rank as follows (out of a total of 180 countries): Germany 13, Slovenia 36, Czech Republic 40, Romania 48, Croatia 56, Hungary 92, Serbia 93, Montenegro 104 and Bulgaria 112. Bulgaria and Hungary are two of the countries that have the most pressing issues with freedom of reporting, which is extremely worrying, given that they are both EU member states. The situation is not all negative, considering that Slovenia and the Czech Republic are in the first quarter, and they are both post-communist countries, while Germany is the leader of the set. This brief analysis suggests that while communism may have impacted the media landscape, the effect is not the same everywhere. Furthermore, some of the countries in the project have also been included in surveys exploring people’s relationship with mass-media. For example, the 2021 Digital News Report (Reuters, University of Oxford) shows that the percentage of people trusting the news varies in different countries: Hungary 28%, Czech Republic 33%, Romania 35%, Bulgaria and Croatia 40%, and Germany 47%.² The poor status of Hungary in terms of media pluralism and increasing control of Viktor Orban’s government of the media sector are reflected in people’s trust in the media. Once again, Germany is the undisputed leader when it comes to the trust in media dimension.