A Divergent Foreign Policy Alliance

Abstract

This book examines through the use of archives and oral evidence the role of the Pakistan Army in the context of Pakistan’s foreign policy and domestic politics. Its main purpose is to explore the autonomy of the Pakistan Army in shaping national and foreign policy between the years 1947 and 1965. Focusing on its independent relationship with three instruments of policymaking in the United States – the Department of State, the White House and the Pentagon – the theory argues that the relationship between the Army and these policymaking bodies arose from a synergistic commonality of interests. The Americans needed a country, created in the name of Islam, on the periphery of the Soviet Union to contain Communism while the Pakistan Army needed US military support to check Indian regional military hegemonism in South Asia. This alliance was secured to the disadvantage of democratic political institutions of Pakistan while sowing the seeds of religious bigotry in politics. The Army, which became stronger as a result of US military and economic support, came progressively to dominate domestic politics. This led not only to weakened civilian governments in the period I am examining, but in 1958 to the military seizure of political control of the country itself. The infringement of the Army into civilian spheres of government further caused a deterioration in relations between East and West Pakistan. Religion, the foundation of the creation of country, failed to keep the two wings united. The increasing clout of a US-backed Army whose elite officers had a bias against the eastern wing of the country, the theory argues, thus indirectly resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan itself.

To explain the Army’s ascendancy its transformation from British colonial army into a national political actor is documented. The book explores the influence of the martial-race theory and of Punjabisation in the Army as it developed in the colonial era. Secondly, it reconstructs how provincial politics weakened the Federal Government and allowed the Army to usurp political power to a disproportionate degree. Thirdly, it considers the extent to which the US-Pakistan Army relationship influenced and even took precedence over decision-making within the government itself. It details the military pacts made between the two countries to contain the USSR in this period. Finally, it explores where and how the interests of the US and Pakistan Army diverged, in particular concerning their respective relations with India. The complications arising in Indo-Pakistan relations in consequence of an abrupt tilt of the US towards India after the Sino-Indian war in 1962 are also examined. In reaction to this new Indo-US nexus, it is argued the Pakistani military junta leaned towards China and in 1965 endeavoured to make use of it advanced, US-supplied weaponry before – as they saw it – the strategic balance was to be irrecoverably lost in favour of India.

In conclusion, the book argues that the period under consideration saw a complete failure of the US policy of containing communism whilst at the same time avoiding war between its allies in the region, and that this had tragic consequences for the future of secular democracy in Pakistan.

Acknowledgements

Alhamdulillah, at the outset, all praise be to Allah for granting me courage and help for accomplishing this project. It would not have been possible without His spiritual support. My most respectful thanks, then, go to the ever-patient Crispin Bates for going through the editing and production stages of this book most diligently. Though very busy in his fellowship in Japan, his academic activities at Edinburgh, and presenting papers at international conferences, Crispin helped me in making changes in the text, scanning maps, and editing. I am indeed also thankful to Markus Daechsel for his help and guidance. Markus, in spite of the considerable demands on his time and attention made by his teaching classes at the Royal Holloway and conferences, helped with valuable suggestions. Both of them ensured their help not only with regard to my project, as and when required but also in my broader academic grooming. I must not forget Marina Carter for her generous help in reading and editing the entire text. For this she deserves a big thanks. I am also grateful to Madiha Zafar and Syeda Shanzae Raza for their help in indexing.

Several of my friends were very encouraging and supportive and provided a critical perspective on my work. Hassan Yousafzai, Gajendra Singh, Muhammad Asif, Julie Hartly, Kim Wagner, Saif Shah, Akeel Omer and my brother-in-law Syed Saleem Zafar top this list and hence are thanked a lot. A large number of friends were making earnest inquiries about the book throughout the period I was writing it. Their interest was most encouraging and spurred me on to complete it. Hence, I am especially grateful to Rashid Chughtai, Nasreen Ghufran, Karl Kaltenthaler, my brothers Hassan, Mir Laiq Ali, Masoom Ali, Mukarrum Ali, Syed Makhdum Pirzada, Syed Sami Raza, Kavin Ross, Muhammad Saeed, Nauman Ahmed, Shehzad Hanif, Tim Siddons, Sajida, Tara, Khawar Awan, Hassan Shahzad and Nouman Waheed.

I am also grateful to quite a few serving military officers in Pakistan who provided witnesses and their opinions on the historical and present situation in Pakistan. As they requested anonymity, I am thanking them without their being named. I am also thankful to all those who allowed themselves to be interviewed or conversed with me on the subject. They have all been credited at appropriate places in the text.

This study would not have been possible without the generous help of funding agencies and the indulgence of my own and adoptive university. I am, therefore, thankful to the University of Peshawar, the University of Edinburgh, the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, the Carnegie, Charles Wallace, and Newby Trusts for the generous support given to my research project.

This book has been delayed due to my daughter Laiba’s illness which necessitated her hospitalization frequently. However, I am grateful to Allah for His return of Laiba to us thrice during the book writing and afterwards.

Last but not the least; it gives me immense pleasure to mention the versatile and generous support given to me during the long period that it took to finish the book by my children Laiba, Syed Abdullah Soherwordi and Aleena Soherwordi. Their presence was always an inspiration for me to proceed ahead of time.

List of Tables/Illustrations/Figures

1. Three armies of the East India Company and their recruitment areas in the second half of the eighteenth century.

2. Four commands of the Indian Army and their areas of recruitment in 1895.

3. Areas of Recruitment 1929.

4. Contribution of India to the Great War – Recruitments up until armistice.

5. Defence expenditure – financial year 1927–28.

6. The expenditures on Military Services 1914–47 in India (in Rupees).

7. VCOs equivalent to KCOs.

8. Annual Numbers of Indians to (Royal Military College) Sandhurst.

9. Summary of vacancies for Indians at Sandhurst (till 1929).

10. Organizational chart of Baghdad Pact, 6 February 1958.

11. Pledged military and economic assistance to Pakistan, 1948–65.

12. Loans and grants made to Pakistan under the Agency for International Development and predecessor agencies.

13. Development loans made to Pakistan.

14. The American sectoral allocations for the second and third five-year plan.

15. World Bank commitments to Pakistan during 1961–65.

16. Failure of the US foreign policy in South Asia.

Pashto-Urdu-English Glossary

Introduction

British return from South Asia corresponded with the start of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. The Pakistan Army retained the British Army’s legacy of autonomy and authoritarianism as an institutional inheritance and struggled to muster foreign support to counter any destabilizing move against itself. External security threats – India and Afghanistan – made state survival the primary concern of the government. As a result, state security and a strong federation preceded-over a need for strengthening the political system and institutions. The Pakistan Army, as a custodian of the state, obtained importance in the political schemes of the country. Soon the top military hierarchy became a stakeholder in the decision-making process. Political instability, regional security threat, and economic distress were some of the chronic problems faced by South Asian and the Middle Eastern countries whose stability the US considered so essential to its own security. In the circumstances, the foreign support needed to strengthen the Pakistan Army and the US requirement to contain Communism in South Asia resulted in a synergistic commonality of interests between the US policymaking bodies and the Pakistan military.

This work in the Pakistani realm focuses on the Army, and its internal and external dynamics for gaining power to influence domestic policies. It will look at how and why a professional army in strict British colonial traditions transformed, later on, into a national political actor. It will also document and analyse how and why the Pakistan Army entered in politics, weakened political institutions and formed international connections for prolonging its rule. The thesis explores, in addition, the profound consequences of Pak-US institutional interaction in terms of political, economic and military commitments and their lash back during the middle of the 1960s.

On the foreign policy front, in the broadest sense, this study addresses a set of issues that are of fundamental importance to those who are concerned with post-independence Pakistan and post-Second World War US foreign policies interaction. It asks how Pakistan came into the US national security orbit? Why did American policymakers move to the GHQ to muster support for the containment of Communism? Why did institutional interaction possessing few of the essential prerequisites of strong friendship between two countries become an object of intense concern for the Pakistan Army? And what combination of political, economic and strategic variables explains the national security essentials that compelled the Pakistan Army and the US to seek friends in virtually at such a remote distance from each other. The effects of the Pak-US institutional interaction on weakening democratic and political institutions will be a continuous subject of debate throughout the study.

In the pre-partition era, the British Army, the strongest armed wing, worked autonomously under the British Empire. After independence, the post-partitioned Indian security threat to the newly carved out Pakistan as well as the first Kashmir war of 1948 resulted in an increase in Pakistan Army’s strategic importance in the country. Security against India became the raison d’etre of the Army. The military leadership and political administration considered it necessary to strengthen the army against any potential security threat. This encouraged the Pakistan Army to borrow pre-partitioned autonomous and authoritarian features from the erstwhile British Army. As the country was a security-oriented entity, any important decision taken by the initial governments of Pakistan needed a nod from the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ). The meeting of the Corps Commanders turned into a kind of a domestic and foreign policy reviewing committee. Dictations from the GHQ became a norm of the country’s polity. Pakistan obtained independence but its Army’s modus operandi was still colonial.

Pakistan, sought in the name of Islam and democracy, but governed by the military dictatorship, provides an unusually apt test for investigating those broad questions. Indeed, in some respects, an examination of the Pakistan Army’s political actions in domestic and foreign policy of the country reveals more about weakening democratic and political institutions than does an examination of its institutional animosity against India. During the same period covered by this study, the perceptions held by the Army such as ‘the people of Pakistan were not ready for democracy’, remained largely consistent. In striking contrast, the political movements remained very strong throughout the country and especially in the East Pakistan during the military rule.

It is a major theme of this study that American policymaking bodies and the Pakistan Army misunderstood, intentionally or unintentionally, each other’s objectives of alliances. In 1953, Pakistan was at the verge of economic collapse but strangely, Americans provided military assistance much earlier and much more than economic aid. With security relations and military assistance, Americans literally brought Pakistan in terms of military comparison to India. However, they always hesitated to give any security commitment to Pakistan against India. America was more concerned for its global war against Communism, whereas Pakistan was worried about regional security paradigm. Countering India was not an American concern as containment of the Soviet Union was not Pakistan’s preference. Americans wanted to foster regional stability to diminish the spread of Communism without succeeding to resolve the Kashmir issue. Hence, their cooperation was based on an ambiguity that, perhaps, no party was ready to clear.

American policymaking bodies always had a soft corner for India. However, her non-aligned policy kept them at a modest distance. Probably, it was Indian rejection to orbit of the containment of Communism that compelled the US to have alliances with Pakistan. However, the moment American strategists observed India’s failing economy during the late 1950s, and the rise of Indian Communist Party, they expanded their economic assistance programme to India. This was also an effort to curtail growing Soviet influence in South Asia. After the China-India war of 1962, the Kennedy administration, without looking at repercussions, at once and sharply provided massive military assistance to India. It was hoped that India would leave her non-aligned policy and would join the US in its efforts to contain Communism.

Support to India was a clear contradiction to the already US policy of alliances with Pakistan in the region. Pakistanis felt betrayed as they considered it Kennedy’s moral responsibility to be consulted as a regional ally before offering military aid to their arch-rival India. Thus they moved away from their unreliable ally and found a new friend-China. This was a complete failure of the US policy of containment in the region. However, Pakistan allied with China though claiming that she was part and parcel of the containment of communism in the region. The Indo-Pak war of 1965 was fought with US arms on both sides supported each by a Communist country-Soviet Union and China. Poor Americans who knitted the net of alliances, security and military assistance stood outside the region like a silent spectator and could not play any role during the crisis.