The Illiberal Mission

Heino Nyyssönen

The Illiberal Mission

Politics, History, and Authoritarianism in Hungary and Beyond

New York · Berlin · Bruxelles · Chennai · Lausanne · Oxford

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The German National Library lists this publication in the German National Bibliography; detailed bibliographic data is available online at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Nyyssönen, Heino author

Title: The illiberal mission : politics, history, and authoritarianism in Hungary and beyond / Heino Nyyssönen.

Other titles: Politics, history, and authoritarianism in Hungary and beyond

Description: New York : Peter Lang, [2026] | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2025004339 (print) | LCCN 2025004340 (ebook) | ISBN 9783034350877 hardback | ISBN 9783034350884 ebook | ISBN 9783034350891 epub

Subjects: LCSH: Orbán, Viktor, 1963- | Democracy--Hungary | Authoritarianism--Hungary | Hungary--Politics and government--21st century | Hungary--Relations--European Union countries | European Union countries--Relations--Hungary

Classification: LCC DB958.3 .N985 2025 (print) | LCC DB958.3 (ebook) | DDC 320.943909/05--dc23/eng/20250602

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2025004339

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2025004340

ISBN 978-3-0343-5087-7 (Print)

ISBN 978-3-0343-5088-4 (E-PDF)

ISBN 978-3-0343-5089-1 (E-PUB)

DOI 10.3726/b22862

© 2026 Peter Lang Group AG, Lausanne (Switzerland)

Published by Peter Lang Publishing Inc., New York (USA)

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Table of Contents

Preface

CHAPTER 1 Hungary Today

CHAPTER 2 Democracy, Politics, and Authoritarianism

CHAPTER 3 Politics of Memory and the Use of History

CHAPTER 4 In Europe and Around the Globe

CHAPTER 5 Economy and Living Standard

CHAPTER 6 Media and Propaganda

CHAPTER 7 Conclusion: Soft Authoritarian and National Conservative

Bibliography

Index

Preface

On March 30, 2020 the Hungarian Parliament faced the most extraordinary challenge in its history of its democracy. A majority of Hungary’s MPs heartily adopted a legal order granting the PM the right to rule by decree for an unlimited time. Although COVID-19 had led to even tougher measures in different countries throughout the globe, this case involved Hungary, a member state of the European Union. Soon after, a proverbial Sword of Damocles was aloft over the heads of journalists and others under the guise of a brand new law penalizing the spreading of “fake news,” for which a five-year prison sentence could be imposed. Indeed, the extent to which the entire parliamentary system was jeopardized, provoking harsh internal and external criticism, with some claiming that the first dictatorship in the European Union was established at that moment. In the end, dozens of legal acts were approved, some of which were indeed rather questionable, such as classifying the documents related to a major railway project or prohibiting people from changing their gender on official birth documents.

However, Hungary does not find itself alone in this instance but rather in a group of like nations, which is not particularly pleasing to most Hungarians. According to the famous words of Steven Levitsky, since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have been caused by elected governments themselves: “Like Chávez in Venezuela, elected leaders have subverted democratic institutions in Georgia, Hungary, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Türkiye, and Ukraine.” In this sense, this book is not only a deep analysis of Hungary but also a cautionary tale about the much larger phenomenon of democratic backsliding and the rise of authoritarianism. The events above crowned a longer authoritarian process, the background and international context of which will be depicted in this book. The phenomenon, which I refer to as soft authoritarianism instead of vague “illiberalism,” is suggestive of the politics of present-day Hungary, its political system and leadership. The strengthening of authoritarianism and the concentration of power are at the core of this book. Hungary has been de facto ruled by special legal orders, such the so-called “state of danger” since the migration crisis of 2015.

Practically speaking, Hungary is much “larger,” more well-known and finds itself more frequently in the limelight than its size would justify. For instance, in 2021, for some time the country was globally the very first—or worst—with respect to COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants¹. However, this is not what makes Hungary pertinent for social scientists and why it is worth authoring a book about Hungary’s political turns. It is rather the fact that during the last few decades, or even longer, Hungary has been an exciting laboratory for political ideas, including post-truth and political propaganda, which have strongly resonated in a broader international context. Moreover, alongside Poland, Hungary has long been a political bellwether, playing the ideological role model for national conservatives and the far right in the EU and even the US.² Nevertheless, this is not the entire truth. Hungary, or more precisely its government, has become a metaphorical spittoon for liberal Europe and some liberal circles beyond Europe. This is not least because of its ongoing “cultural war” or attacks on the rule of law or, citing one of the most recent examples, the “homophobic” legislation passed in the summer of 2021. Finally, less known is that Viktor Orbán, currently the longest serving prime minister in the European Union, has had more influence on European discourse than people tend to think. In 2020, Politico chose Orbán as the fourth most influential person in the “Doers” category in its annual ranking of the most powerful people in Europe. The PM was preceded by Emer Cooke, Christine Lagarde and Giuseppe Conte. Surprisingly or not, Orbán exceeded Emmanuel Macron, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in the standings. A hypothetical “what if” question might arise if a person like Orbán had a country like France, Türkiye or Britain under his control rather than Hungary.

Here, I encourage my readers to challenge their own prejudices and hope to provoke them to think more accordingly, to either criticize or defend contemporary Hungary. In the early 2010s, Yanko Tsvetkov published his maps of stereotypes in Atlas of Prejudice, one of which depicted “Europe according to the Future 2022.” It is there where we first had Merkelreich, including Germany and France. The proper European Union, however, covered the former socialist countries including Belarus and Ukraine—the latter being a potential target of the next enlargement of the European Union. While waiting for the future maps of the 2030s, we may remind ourselves that in Tsvetkov’s map, there were a few isolated islands in the Union, such the Czech and Hungarian Empires, which were still confined to their present borders dating from 1920.³

Even if these are somewhat absurd maps, they do draw attention to two different angles of serious problems, the “inner” and the “outer,” both of which are necessary for any advanced democracy. No nation can truly hide behind beliefs that foreigners cannot understand them, because they do not know national history, the people nor the language. For me, the distinction is similar to the one drawn between a journalist and a government spokesman: they both deal with the same phenomenon but from a different perspective.

I first visited Hungary in September 1986 when the country lived under the “soft dictatorship” of János Kádár. I was one of those privileged young European students who were given the opportunity to travel around Europe—including Hungary and Yugoslavia—with a relatively cheap Interrail card. In the autumn of 1986, my destination was Greece, and my route led me through Hungary. To many of my contemporaries, Hungary seemed a strange place despite the fact that older Finnish people spoke often about Finno-Ugric linguistic affinity and looked upon Hungary as a sister country. I later realized that this period, one year after Gorbachev came to power, was to some extent already a year of change and turnaround.

As of today, I cannot even say on how many occasions I have visited Hungary, perhaps several hundred times and I am happy to declare that Hungary has become my second home over the past years. During my career as a researcher, I have been in contact with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the 1956 Institute, the Európa Institute, Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), and Central European University (CEU) universities. Between 2008 and 2010, the Collegium Budapest hosted the Finnish-Hungarian joint research project that I personally headed. Simply put, I witnessed the last thirty years of the country’s history, but further, I have, as a researcher, also studied the major press products of this period and used them in my scholarly works. I also prepared my doctoral dissertation in Hungary.

This book is based on my studies in and on Hungary and east-central Europe over the last three decades. Although I have lived in Hungary for many years, this monograph still represents an “outsider’s view.” At the same time, it aims to provide a response to the more and more prevalent view voiced by the current Hungarian government that “the West cannot understand” Hungary or its media due to an external lack of language and cultural skills. I think that to some extent this problem applies to all small nations, including my own, a distant linguistic relative of Hungary. In what follows I have at least tried to understand Hungarian politics, even if it has become more and more complicated, especially over the last few years.

This study draws systematically to a close in late June and early July 2024. However, the news kept unfolding, and some details and processes were monitored until 2025. During the first weeks of Hungary’s six-month EU presidency, Viktor Orbán surprised many with his actions on the international stage. Several EU countries were already discussing boycotts of Hungary and even the cancelation of its current presidency. In addition to these, even the tenth anniversary of the illiberal mission was to come: Viktor Orbán had launched his illiberal mission, that is, his mode of governing in the summer of 2014.

Next time the opposition will challenge PM Orbán in Spring 2026. Even in the case they could win the elections, the “deep state” remains and its dismantling would take years.

At this stage I would like to express my gratitude to all those, with whom I have shared great conversations on Hungary during the last few years, both at home and abroad. Particularly I like to thank about a great assistance of the following persons, in alphabetical order: Nathan Adair, Attila Antal, Philip Dunshea, István Hegedűs, Anna Kronlund, Linda Kunos, Saga Majanlahti, Hajnalka Makra, Jussi Metsälä, Rauli Mickelsson, Vilma Nyyssönen, Antti Pajala, Eino Partanen, Eemeli Vapamaa, Henri Vogt—especially his codirected academic project JuRe, which deals with social impacts of COVID-19 and is funded by the Research Council of Finland. Last but not least, there is my anonymous reader provided by the publisher, and “Mrs. X,” who wishes to remain anonymous, and in this case to be sure of her forthcoming contracts, too.

Budapest, Hungary—Turku, Finland

Autumn 2022–Autumn 2025

Heino Nyyssönen

CHAPTER 1 Hungary Today

In June 2024, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz-KDNP coalition won the European elections, as they have done in all political contestations since the municipal elections in 2006. They are winners in the sense that they remained the largest group in both the European and local elections held on the same day. Nonetheless, the elections were reminiscent of the political mortality and potential turbulence of Hungarian politics. Even though the ruling party gathered more than two million supporters, which in absolute numbers was their best ever result in European elections, receiving only 44.6 percent of the available votes was their weakest result to date. In addition, low turnout in European and local elections cannot be blamed this time as the joint elections were precisely targeted to raise voter turnout. Indeed, the turnout, 59.4 percent, was the highest in both European and local contests since the 1990s. Thus, PM Orbán’s loyalists have in fact lost more than a million voters in the two years since the 2022 parliamentary contests. Consequently, a victory sometimes proves to be a Pyrrhic one.

Yet, the old opposition parties, for their part, had no reason to celebrate either. Their share of the vote had already crumbled to such an extent that there was no longer talk of changing the government but instead the opposition. The reason for such a change was down to Péter Magyar, a politician who had left Fidesz at the beginning of the year. Magyar (i.e., “Hungarian” in English) arrived on the political stage from out of the blue and managed to make a strong impact from out of nowhere. Magyar captured almost 30 percent of the votes and convinced 1.35 million voters to cast their ballots for his new TISZA party. It remains to be seen if Magyar’s party—Tisztelet és Szabadság, Respect and Freedom, an abbreviation referring to the Hungarian river Tisza—will ever offer any real opposition. In any case, the question remains, if Fidesz and its soft authoritarian rule is now essentially weaker than we have thought so far: could a newcomer potentially unseat Fidesz in the 2026 parliamentary elections or will result in the inauguration of an even more unruffled Fidesz 2.0.?

Things looked very different two years earlier: the 3.06 million votes that the incumbent government received represented its best election result to date and resulted in two additional seats in the Parliament. The 2022 parliamentary elections ushered in the fourth consecutive term for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Fidesz-KDNP, as they won the elections with 54 percent of the vote. In his speech, the triumphant prime minister stated that the victory could be seen from as far away as the moon and certainly from Brussels. The prime minister also claimed that the victory had taken place despite opposition from the Hungarian left, the international media, Brussels bureaucrats and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky. The government has a total of 135 seats in the 199-seat parliament, once again providing a two-thirds majority, which guarantees the ruling party’s possibility to amend the constitution. On this occasion, the government received a majority of the party votes cast for the first time since 2010 and the support of about 236,000 new voters. Of the seats in the individual constituencies, the government took everything except Budapest and one constituency in Pécs and Szeged. In Budapest, Fidesz managed to win only one direct mandate. Based on the election results, the capital and the countryside live in different realities, although the division between various constituencies may not be so absolute.