Europe’s Relations with the United States and China in the 21st Century

The northern hemisphere is undoubtedly the dominant region of the world, in which the prevailing majority of population, landmass and economic activity is concentrated. There are areas in the northern hemisphere that traditionally have crucial importance – North America, Europe and the Far East. The United States of America has been the leading state in North America for over 150 years, since they gained superpower status at the end of World War II. Traditionally, over the ages – except for a relatively short period of Japanese hegemony and imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century – the prominent power of Eastern Asia has been China in all its incarnations. Europe dominated the rest of the globe between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, with the culmination of its power and advantage over the rest of the globe in the late nineteenth century. That situation forces any scholar or analyst who wants to predict the future development of global political, economic and military relations to turn their attention to these three geopolitical and geoeconomic centres of the world, which in the twenty-first century still are: the US, China and Europe.

The objective of this book is to succinctly and briefly present some select aspects of Europe’s evolving relations with two foreign powers struggling for primacy in world affairs – the US and China. International relations specialists agree that the United States are the current hegemon of the world and the most serious contender to take this preeminent place in the global hierarchy of states is the People’s Republic of China – the unquestionable emerging great power with enormous ambitions for creating a new world order in which its position would be much stronger than nowadays. In the third decade of the twenty-first century, Europe has become the object of competition between these two major economic, military, and political powers. Moreover, the rivalry between these great powers is intensifying. Even worse, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, interstate war has come to Europe once again, after a peace lasting many decades. Naturally, the attitudes of all three centres of geopolitical and geoeconomic power towards the conflict have become important.

The EU’s general attitude toward Chinese investments has been described in the first chapter of the book. Attention has been paid in particular to the semiconductor and electrical vehicle industry, which have become an object of intensifying contention of major centres of technological and economic power. The specific pressures Europe is subject to were presented based on the example of Germany, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Italy, and France. The German case is particularly important in the context of the China-US rivalry. As the largest country in the European Union, with the greatest sway on decisions taken by the European Commission in Brussels, and as Europe’s biggest economy, Germany has become the object of intensifying competition between Washington and Beijing. Both competing superpowers want to redirect Berlin’s foreign and economic policies in directions favourable to them. They do not hesitate to use typical geoeconomic instruments to achieve this objective. The US wants to convince European partners to de-risk – or perhaps even more ambitiously – entirely decouple their economies from China, thus making them less reliant on this communist Asian power and less vulnerable to China’s economic and political pressure as well as espionage activities. Certain EU countries are reluctant and sceptical about de-risking and decoupling from China, perceiving them as the pursuit of essentially American – not European – interests and a far-reaching interference in the EU independence. For instance, the case of broad anti-Huawei worldwide campaign launched by the US is depicted at the end of the chapter. To some degree Washington attained its aim and indeed managed to stop the expansion of Huawei in European markets.

Łukasz Stach expanded this subject in the next section of the book, portraying the thriving economic relations between Europe, China and the US. In this context there is a risk that Europe may find itself between a rock and a hard place if bilateral U.S-China relations evolve into trade or actual war in the future. Considerable implications of the Sino-American competition for the European Union were scrupulously described. Łukasz Stach accentuated that the EU, due to the fact that it is a supranational political unit and because of its complicated decision-making procedures quite often has serious problems taking quick and effective political action, as well as formulating coherent policies vis-à-vis its main economic partners – the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America. The author did not hesitate to point out the failures of European integration, like the European sovereign debt crisis, prolonged malaise of the Eurozone, and the failure to fully and effectively implement the Lisbon Strategy. All these problems weakened the EU’s position towards China and the US. According to Łukasz Stach, Europe has an issue with adequate adaptation to the new international environment, the most distinctive feature of which is the aggravating Sino-American rivalry. Undoubtedly, any further worsening of bilateral US-China relations would risk the EU being caught between these two struggling powers. Obviously, such a development would not be beneficial to the long-term prosperity of the European economy. Furthermore, the intra-EU differences make it difficult to reach a consensus within the EU itself and to agree with Washington on a coordinated policy towards communist China. It is the approach to cooperation with the Middle Kingdom that seems to be the principle obstacle to the development of a more politically united Western world.

In the third chapter of the book, the same author describes the divergence between expectations and reality as regards the EU’s policies towards China and the US. According to the author, forming a common EU security policy in particular would be a serious challenge in a divided Europe. Łukasz Stach does not hide his scepticism as to the probability of overcoming different existing divisions in Europe and the formation of a viable European army. Though often raised in public political discussions, so far these concepts still mostly remain unrealised. The author notes that the European Union has been ineffective in creating a common security and defence policy, even as the Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed the urgent need to bolster European defence capabilities, both in terms of armed forces as well as the defence industry.

Przemysław Łukasik in turn outlined the similarities and differences between China’s and the United States’ soft power on the European continent. This must be accurately highlighted, because softness in soft power is not tantamount to weakness. Soft power policy is unquestionably a considerable element of great power politics. The author observes that during Donald Trump‘s first presidential term, many European politicians openly phrased their mistrust of the US. At the time, the strength of American soft power in the eyes of some Europeans had somewhat weakened. Przemysław Łukasik argues that Chinese soft power fundamentally derives from the thought of Confucius, who advocated for the pursuit of harmonious relations not only within the state, but also in international relations. Thus, Confucianism became a source of Chinese soft power. The Chinese government goes to great lengths to consolidate the positive image of the Middle Kingdom on the European continent, seeing this also as creating a friendly environment for itself in the broader geopolitical confrontation with the USA. The author pays particular attention to the New Silk Road, Xi Jinping’s flagship project. The chapter lists the distinctive characteristics of China’s soft power policy. Moreover, throughout the chapter, the evolution of the US public diplomacy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries was skilfully presented.

In the fifth chapter of the book, the same scholar outlined the difficult position of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These smaller, weaker and poorer states of the European family, situated in close proximity to Russia, which in the past has often displayed expansionist and hostile intentions towards them, traditionally seek a protector in a strong external power. These states have found such a defender and ally in the United States. On the other hand, they cannot be indifferent to the flourishing influence and importance of the Middle Kingdom, which they would like to trade and do business with. These quandaries were painstakingly characterised. In the next part of the book, the author discussed the ongoing debate on what the EU’s global policy and the possible power status of the EU should look like. At the same time, Przemysław Łukasik places his argument in the context of various theories of international relations. Hence, the theoretical concept of power and other important categories of international relations were presented in the context of the ongoing process of European integration. This part of the book stresses the evolution of the EU’s power status. The author is staunchly convinced that the EU decisively prefers soft policy methods in its political practices, concentrating much more on advancing mutually beneficial cooperation than competition with other states and global centres of power. Such a delicate approach distinguishes the EU in a positive manner, against the background of belligerent and hard power-loving Russia or Erdoğan’s adventurous and haggling Turkey. This also creates an image of the EU as a stable partner that does not make sudden and abrupt 180-degree political turns to the surprise of its partners. Which of these approaches is more effective and beneficial in the long term is still a contentious issue amongst scholars and analysts today.

The last but not least chapter of the book discusses the joint and coordinated response of the United States and Europe to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One can get an impression that Moscow’s unfortunate move unwittingly reinvigorated the transatlantic alliance. First, the chapter outlines the growing diplomatic consultations and the formation of the foundations of a common coordinated policy towards the conflict on the eve of its second and most acute phase, which was the open invasion of Ukraine in February 2023. Washington’s main aims are briefly outlined, followed by an outline of the key moves in economic warfare – unprecedented in world history. Never before has such a large country and such an important economy – at least in terms of raw materials – been subjected to such harsh and wide-ranging economic sanctions. Undoubtedly, this is an unprecedented situation, unmatched by anything in history. The ramifications of this state of affairs for the global economy and the evolution of the geopolitical and geoeconomic system around the globe will only fully materialise in the future. Already today, however, we can see a sort of progressive disintegration of the global economy into two blocs – a Western bloc led by the USA and an anti-Western bloc, BRICS+, under China’s leadership. This section of the book also presents the considerable and comprehensive assistance that the US and Europe together provided to struggling Ukraine in a quite coordinated and harmonised manner. The volume and comprehensiveness of the aid is indeed immense, in fact, arguably the largest since the Lend-Lease Act. In addition, the war also provided the impetus for a serious empowering of the transatlantic energy partnership between the European nations and the US. In order to compensate for the loss of Russian hydrocarbon supplies on the European market, which is highly dependent on the import of the predominant majority of mineral resources, Washington and Brussels had to step up and deepen their cooperation.

Why did the authors decide to design the book in this way? The book we are handing over to readers is not a full and in-depth discussion of the entirety of European states’ relations with the great non-European powers. Because of the necessarily limited scope of the book, the authors have been compelled to review and depict only painstakingly selected – albeit, in their opinion, quintessential – matters and dimensions of these relations. Economic issues are crucial in the relations between the US, the EU and China. Previous decades enhanced the interdependencies between the main global economies, but in the age of great power rivalry, it became a problem in mutual relations, especially that Western powers underline the fact, that the PRC is the main beneficiary of globalisation and growing interconnections. However, the West unwillingly admits that the prospects of huge profits from access to the Chinese market and cheap labour there have tempted many Western companies to relocate production to China. Nowadays, issues like electric vehicles, the Huawei case, attitudes to Chinese investments, the chips/semiconductors dispute have a significant influence on the EU, the US, and the PRC relations. Moreover, Germany (whose economy is the largest in the EU) is strongly bound both with the US and the PRC economies, which makes the whole thing an even more complicated jigsaw puzzle.

Economic growth and increasing innovation in the economy are allowing Beijing to develop its military capabilities, which is causing concern in Washington. When it comes to the military, the European army is still hypothetical, and it remains in the realm of rhetoric and plans. However, the EU can and should do more to strengthen European defence, especially that full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted the importance of military power in politics, so this factor was also analysed. In international relations, it is not only hard power that counts but also soft power. Therefore, this topic has also been included, especially in terms of how great powers use soft power tools to achieve their foreign policy goals.

This study mostly employs desk research and descriptive data analysis methodology. The authors have used data and information from existing literature and readily accessible sources to critically assess the situation and make a substantive conclusion with a well-grounded foundation. The necessary data has been provided by institutions such as the World Bank (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, GDP and purchasing power parity (PPP) values, GDP per capita, import/export of goods and services, research and development expenditures, etc.), Observatory of Economic Complexity (trade values, trade partners) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (military expenditures, arms trade).