The Problematic Status of Truth in Politics

Here, I should explain the key terminology of the main hypothesis. What is the strong or weak status of truth in politics, or the separation of the political from truth? This book does not subject the status8 of truth in politics to an ontological or epistemological approach. Instead, I focus on the political-moral level. Therefore, I refrain from discussing the meaning of truth (Greek alétheia, Latin verum, German Wahrheit, French la vérité). Whenever possible, I also try to avoid any metaphysical-ontological and gnoseological conclusions about truth, except those explicitly included in the discussed theories of political philosophy. With this perspective as a point of departure, we should understand the strong status of truth in politics as a high rank of truth in politics – the fact that truth forms a fundamental value in the political world and serves a fundamental and always positive purpose. Such an approach to the subject assumes that politics equals truth or that politics is subject to truth – not only to the judgement of truth – and serves the truth.

Weak status means a low rank of truth in politics. This status forms part of the beliefs on the continuum between the acceptance of the relative autonomy of truth and politics and the acceptance of truth’s subjection to politics. The supporters of the former stance believe that truth exists, but a full incorporation of truth into politics remains impossible. This may result in indicating several types of truth – for example, the truth of religion, philosophy, or science, or the truth of judgements about facts; several aspects of truth; or the presence of only part of the truth in politics. Proponents of these variations do not exclude a conflict between truth and politics – a conflict that stems from the two concepts’ affiliation with different domains. This position includes the belief that truth does not assume a central position among political values and virtues but remains present in politics. In the case of the latter stance, the supporters prove that truth depends on politics or is a form of power. We can refer to the first variation of the weak status of truth in politics as the problematic status of truth in politics, as it indicates difficult and complex relations between truth and politics, including tensions and conflicts between them. Those conflicts and tensions remain absent from the other variation, where truth depends on politics. In either variation, the characteristic of the weak status of truth in politics is also a certain ambivalence regarding the evaluation of truth’s function in politics. The supporters of this approach indicate both positive and negative implications of truth for politics. Therefore, the weak status is weak when compared to the strong status but strong when compared to the separation of truth and politics. The third approach to the position and role of truth in politics indicates a lack of common points between politics and truth. This approach claims that the presence of truth in the political sphere only results in negative, evil, unfavourable, or undesired consequences. Therefore, this stance either affirms full autonomy of truth and politics or postulates this autonomy and advises excluding truth from politics.

A superiority-inferiority or superordination-subordination relationship between truth and politics may occur in the approaches of strong and weak status of truth in politics. This relationship manifests itself in three ways. First, the relationship may result from the location of truth and politics on different tiers of the hierarchy because of their different levels of perfection. The second type of dependence relies on indicating a different level of generality of truth and politics within one entirety. In this sense, ‘superiority’ denotes a higher level of generality, and ‘inferiority’ means a specification of the general. Thirdly, the ‘inferior’ may serve as a means for reaching the ‘superior’, and therefore a tool for achieving a goal.

The above outline follows the principle of moving from one extreme to another, using the criteria of autonomy, position, and role. Moreover, the outline determines the references to types of political values and the kinds of their functions.

This monograph aims to present the concepts of the problematic status of truth in politics present in contemporary political philosophy. Thus, I do not analyse all the relevant ideas within contemporary political philosophy. Instead, I focus on the most important philosophers in the most recent political philosophy – philosophers affiliated with different schools of thought who had unquestionable influence on the theory and practice of political life. I chose the authors who indicate new paths of reasoning, studying, and acting, and whom we may consider to rank among the most commentary-provoking philosophers of the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. These philosophers have become reference points, provided sources of inspiration, and provoked critical reception. Importantly, some political philosophers fascinate their contemporaries, but their later input in the development of philosophy proves less impressive than expected. Other philosophers fail to win recognition among their contemporaries, but later generations appreciate them.

However, certain philosophers have already gained some prominence in their lifetime, and their work gradually grew in importance and popularity in political philosophy and practice. I believe that this last small group includes Strauss, Rawls, and Habermas. Together with Carl Schmitt and Michael Oakeshott, Strauss ranks among the most important contemporary representatives of conservatism. However, out of these three philosophers, only Strauss ‘established’ a philosophical and political school that has continued to develop his thought since his death. The most excellent contemporary liberal is Rawls, whom we can consider a ‘savior’ of political philosophy in general. Rawls’s teachings demonstrate the grandeur and relevance of political philosophy; he also created the latest stage of this branch. Habermas is currently the most influential representative of the Frankfurt School. His broad theory of communicative action eliminates the differences between the continental and Anglo-Saxon traditions of thought and the differences between socialism, republicanism, and liberalism. Habermas’s theory expresses ideas that affect aesthetics, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of law, sociology, social communication theory, rhetoric, psychology, theology, pedagogy, and sociopolitical life. This influence results from the grandeur of Habermas’s thought and from his engagement in publicist discussions and philosophical debates with figures such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hilary Putnam, Michel Foucault, John Rawls, Jacques Derrida, Robert Brandom, and Peter Sloterdijk.

Metaphorically speaking, Strauss’s, Rawls’s, and Habermas’s books prove more dangerous than those of other authors. These books are cannibals that consume their weaker brethren, viruses that contaminate other texts, and leaders that guide human thought. In other words, books by these authors not only describe but also change the world.