Understanding Peace Holistically

The kind of answer that we are searching for requires various conceptual steps that are not often taken in peace studies. A major theme of this chapter is to take some of these steps. Here is a quick preview. First, we distinguish peace as an instrumental value and as a non-instrumental value. Second, we separate peace itself from the preconditions and means to peace, and from the symptoms, expressions and measures of peace. Third, we characterize the differences between negative and positive conceptions of peace. Fourth, we separate ‘peace’ as a noun and as a verb, and ‘peaceful’ as an adjective and ‘peacefully’ as an adverb.

The overall objective of these steps is to distinguish what is derivative from what is more basic in defining ‘peace’. The more we can isolate the non-derivative, the better our understanding will be. Without it, we would end up with a mere list of what ‘peace’ means in different contexts, without an underlying rationale. Such definition would be superficial and fractured.

In the first section, we shall argue that the fundamental conception of peace is that of peacefulness as a non-instrumentally valuable, positive state defined adjectively in terms of qualities. In the second section, we maintain that this combination needs to be viewed as an aspect of human well-being and flourishing. Finally, we show how this conception of peacefulness forms a unified account of peace in interpersonal relationships, communities, relations to nature, political structures and processes, economic systems and education.

Positive Conception of Peace

To explain a holistic and positive conception of peace requires several preliminary clarifications:

Peace as an Instrumental and as an Intrinsic Value

Peace is good. This doesn’t necessarily mean that it is conclusively, all things considered, good in all circumstances. It needn’t be conclusively good in all contexts and at all costs, which is a critically important point to return to later.

Doing this might appear to be a redundant exercise. A simple objection along these lines might be: If war kills, maims and harms people, what more do we need to know about why peace is good? In reply, there is a lot more to understand, even with respect to war itself. War bequeaths a long-lasting scar of trauma; it usually leaves whole regions unstable and vulnerable; it makes whole communities feel humiliated and maltreated; it poisons international relations. Furthermore, there are forms of violence quite apart from war, including those that are not so overt, such as daily micro-violence. Likewise, things are peaceful and peace is good in a variety of ways. For example, negotiations are peaceful because of what they lead to. Other things are peaceful because of how they are intrinsically valuable, such as a person’s peaceful state of consciousness. Things can be peaceful in both ways: a political demonstration might be peaceful in itself and because it attempts to lead to peace. In short, ‘peaceful’ can indicate both a non-instrumental value, or an instrumental value, or a combination of both.

Peace as Conditions and Symptoms

Aristotle suggested that the word ‘healthy’ can be employed in derivative ways, and also in a basic manner. We are following this recommendation, applying it to ‘peace’ and this indicates that we need to characterize peace as an intrinsic value. Quite apart from this, the Aristotelian recommendation also calls for another set of distinctions.

Some things are peaceful because they are indications or signs of peacefulness. Returning to Aristotle, consider how complexions are part of being healthy. They don’t cause or constitute good health, but they are an expression of it. Likewise, we might think that close trade cooperation between two neighboring countries isn’t a cause or a constituent of peacefulness but rather an indication or sign or expression of that peacefulness.

In the health example, exercise leads to health, but it doesn’t constitute it. Having a healthy complexion expresses health, but it doesn’t comprise it. In the same vein, negotiation processes are conducive to peace, but they don’t constitute it. Likewise, close trading relationships might express a peaceful relationship between two neighboring countries without constituting it. This line of thinking prompts the question: ‘What constitutes peace, quite independently of what causes, facilitates or is conducive to it?’

What Constitutes Peace?

Some things are peaceful because they constitute peacefulness. Means and symptoms are not constitutive of peace; they facilitate peace or express it. Hence, we arrive at the third and central part of the distinction: peace itself as a state. Certain states are peaceful in themselves, and not because they are conducive to or expressions of peace. Instead, they are peace.

The three-fold distinction can be illustrated diagrammatically as follows: