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Philosophical Perspectives on the Self

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Edited By Joao Fonseca and Jorge Goncalves

For the last decade the topic of the Self has been under intense scrutiny from researchers of various areas spanning from philosophy, neurosciences, and psychology to anthropology and sociology. The present volume addresses the Self under different and influent philosophical perspectives: from phenomenology and psychoanalysis to metaphysics and neurophilosophy and discusses several and distinct problems such as personal identity, the core/narrative self-distinction, psychopathologies, the mind-body problem and the nature of the relations between self, consciousness and emotions. The book reflects these different philosophical problems and approaches and aims to provide a map of current philosophical perspectives on the topic of the Self.
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Imagination as a Bodily Pattern: thinking about Sartrean´s account of Consciousness

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Imagination as a Bodily Pattern: thinking about Sartrean’s account of Consciousness

CLARA MORANDO

Sartre’s study called L’Imaginaire. Psychologie Phénoménologique de L’Imagination (1940) is a follow-up to another book named L’Imagination (1936), where we can find a) a clarifying list of the imaginative consciousness’s distinctive traits, b) an extensive characterization of various kinds of images (eidetic, hypnagogic), c) long-detailed descriptions about certain psychopathologies, and finally, d) a perspicuous categorization of the remaining consciousness modes as perceiving and conceptualising. Concerning what draws the specificity of imagination, this book adds to a historical view a phenomenological deepening into a peculiar type of intentionality, ascertained by an eidetic treatment.

The first part of the book, called “Le Certain”, deals with the image’s intentional structure where Sartre proposes a functional meta-psychology claiming that when consciousness works based on an irrealizing scheme connected to non-existent or absent objects, we are then allowed to call it imagination. This particular way of intending things goes on by building up, step by step, the imaginary consistence whose very function is to establish another strand of knowledge constituted by several noetic acts which have in common the imaging movement as a different type of intentionality beyond perceptive knowledge.

In order to make the image’s description as an image possible, it is necessary to embrace a second-order-thought, just because it is imperious to understand how the very same object, the imaged object, occurs in our consciousness. Although the Cartesian view considers...

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