Edited By Joao Fonseca and Jorge Goncalves
Empirical and conceptual clarifications regarding the notion of ‘Core-Self’ from Gallagher’s and Merker’s Behavioural-Neuroscientific Proposals
I. Introduction: Conceptual Confusions and Methodological Fragmentation
The notion of Core-Self’ has been used and formulated by several authors in different contexts and with different meanings, using diverse methodologies and approaches ranging from traditional conceptual analysis, Phenomenology, Cognitive Psychology and Neurosciences (Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2000; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Pankseep & Northoff, 2009). This conceptual and methodological fragmentation threatens the very ambitions of the scientific task at stake.
As a result, the current scenario concerning the studies on the nature of the (Core) Self presents us with a confusing profusion of concepts that tends to obscure the intellectual endeavour itself. This problem has recently been identified as such by some of the most prominent authors in the field. (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Praetorius, 2009). I share the authors’ worries and also their diagnosis regarding the main causes of the problem: the proliferation of different methodological and disciplinary approaches to the subject. For instance, Gallagher & Zahavi state that:
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