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Vietnam, 1968–1976

La sortie de guerre- Exiting a War

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Edited By Pierre Journoud and Cécile Menétrey-Monchau

Avec ses quelque trois millions de morts civils et militaires, et ses innombrables destructions matérielles, la guerre dite du Vietnam reste à ce jour une des plus grandes tragédies humaines depuis 1945.
Une réflexion sur les conditions politiques, diplomatiques et militaires dans lesquelles s’est effectuée la sortie de la guerre, entre 1968, année de l’ouverture des négociations américano-vietnamiennes à Paris, et 1976, date de la réunification administrative du Vietnam, semble d’autant plus opportune que grandit actuellement l’inquiétude sur les perspectives de l’après-guerre en Afghanistan. Inspirés d’un colloque international réuni à Paris, en 2008, les textes rassemblés ici par Pierre Journoud et Cécile Menétrey-Monchau abordent cette étape de la sortie de guerre principalement sous l’angle diplomatique, mais débordant largement le spectre diplomatique traditionnel. Quelques-uns des meilleurs spécialistes croisent ici leur analyse de cette phase finale de la guerre, revenant sur les négociations qui ont mis fin à la dimension américano-vietnamienne du conflit, avec l’Accord de Paris du 27 janvier 1973, avant que les armes ne tranchent l’autre guerre, celle entre Vietnamiens, le 30 avril 1975.
Ce livre est accompagné d’un DVD avec des témoignages inédits sur les coulisses des négociations de Paris qui ont mis fin à la guerre du Vietnam (1968–1973).
With its three million civilian and military casualties and the enormous material destruction it brought about, the Vietnam War remains one of the worst human tragedies since 1945. Growing uncertainty about the potential post-war situation in Afghanistan has renewed interest in the political, diplomatic and military conditions that brought about the end of the Vietnam War – the period covered by the opening of Vietnamese-American negotiations in Paris in 1968 up to the administrative reunification of Vietnam in 1976. The texts collected in this volume by Pierre Journoud and Cécile Menétrey-Monchau, first inspired from an international colloquium held in Paris in 2008, analyse the full range of exit strategies exploited during this period. Although written primarily from a diplomatic perspective, the focus of this publication extends well beyond the traditional realm of diplomacy. Some of the most eminent specialists present their analysis of the final phase of the war, and re-examine the negotiations which brought the Vietnamese-American phase of the conflict to an end with the Paris Agreement of January 27, 1973, before the other war, between the Vietnamese themselves, was decided by the force of arms on April 30, 1975.
Provided with this book is a DVD with new testimonies on the Paris Peace negotiations that ended the Vietnam War (1968–1973).

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LE VIETNAM DANS LAGUERRE FROIDE, 1968-1973 / VIETNAM IN THECOLDWAR, 1968-1973

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LE VIETNAM DANS LA GUERRE FROIDE, 1968-1973 VIETNAM IN THE COLD WAR, 1968-1973 39 1968: Negotiating While Fighting or Just Fighting? LIEN-HANG T. NGUYEN In late January 1968, Le Duan finally saw the realization of his mili- tary plans. Successful at every turn in his career, Le Duan asked for and received war in 1959, bigger war in 1963, and the General Offensive and General Uprising in 1968. As communist forces tied down Ameri- can troops in Khe Sanh, Le Duan ordered a massive, coordinated attack on the cities and towns of South Vietnam that aimed to crush the Saigon army and incite the masses to join the revolutionary soldiers in over- throwing the Nguyen Van Thieu regime. But a general uprising did not occur after the first wave of attacks nor did it materialize in the wake of the second or third. At the time, however, estimates from the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) High Command issued on Decem- ber 12, 1968 claimed that the General Offensive and General Uprising was a resounding success: 630,000 enemy troops were killed in action in the South and 557 planes were shot down in the North.1 But inwardly, Le Duan and his militant faction in the party leadership realized that their gamble had failed and that the Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP) [Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam] would have to shift tactics to save the resistance in the South. Although the writing of history in present-day Vietnam is the intel- lectual and...

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