Ethnic Conflict in FYR Macedonia and the Balkans
Chapter 6Strategic Coercion and the Backlash Ef fect 197
Chapter 6 Strategic Coercion and the Backlash Ef fect Coercive settlements are generally risky, and often fail to produce long- term peace and stability ( Jakobsen, 2004; Brown, 2003). We have seen that coercive approaches, when properly applied, may constitute an ef fective tool for the termination of violence, and generally succeed in bringing about a negotiated end to conf lict. Yet analysts regard the use of pressures, an essential part of coercion, as a highly risky method in the resolution of conf licts, and a potential source of renewed conf lict and instability (Dugan; 2003; Burgess, 2004; Brown, 2003; Stedman, 2001). This is evident in Jakobsen and Carlson’s accounts of the long-term ef fects of coercion in the resolution of conf licts: the enforcing and pressurizing nature of coer- cion aggravates inter-ethnic grievances, despite the provision of incentives and guarantees. Systematic external coercion risks producing winners and losers, thereby stimulating revenge and the rectification of perceived injus- tices, and triggering a dangerous backlash ef fect. Enforced compromises can produce victors and victims, and help cultivate win-lose perceptions, especially at the grassroots level. In order to highlight the potential dangers of coercive settlements, this analysis will point to the renewed grievances and “negative peace” in FYR Macedonia after the settlement. This chapter explores the crucial indicators of negative peace, and presents the emerg- ing antagonisms in the post-crisis political system between the perceived victims and beneficiaries. 198 Chapter 6 Political Antagonism The Ohrid Framework Agreement was an enforced settlement, reached with...
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