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Intersubjectivity, Humanity, Being

Edith Stein’s Phenomenology and Christian Philosophy

Edited By Mette Lebech and John Haydn Gurmin

This volume brings together revised versions of papers presented at the inaugural conference of the International Association for the Study of the Philosophy of Edith Stein (IASPES). The conference papers are supplemented by a number of specially commissioned essays in order to provide a representative sample of the best research currently being carried out on Stein’s philosophy in the English speaking world. The first part of the volume centres on Stein’s phenomenology; the second part looks at her Christian philosophy; and the third part explores the contexts of her philosophical work.
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Edith Stein and Erich Przywara and the Place of Love in Christian Philosophy

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← 228 | 229 →PHILIP GONZALES

ABSTRACT: This paper will seek to investigate Edith Stein’s understanding of Christian Philosophy as expressed in section four of Finite and Eternal Being. The method of investigation will consist in bringing Stein’s conception of Christian Philosophy into dialogue with Erich Przywara’s understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology as seen in his work Analogia Entis. Stein herself states in the Preface to Finite and Eternal Being that there is an ‘agreement in principle’ between her and Przywara concerning the relation between the creature and Creator as well as the relation between philosophy and theology. I will thus seek to elaborate on this ‘agreement’ while, at the same time, asking if there is more disagreement than Stein thinks. My contention is that when Stein admits that she was unable to clearly understand what Przywara meant by union ‘of theology and philosophy within the framework of a metaphysics’, that this admission is a failure to fully grasp Przywara’s project of a ‘creaturely metaphysic’. I will then proceed to raise the following questions concerning Stein’s conception of Christian philosophy. One, why does Stein insist upon holding to the view that Christian philosophy must aim towards the ideal of ‘total knowledge’, while at the same time, acknowledging that such an ‘ideal’ is, in practice, unattainable? Two, why does Stein equate the Husserlian understanding of science with the Medieval Summa? Thirdly, why does Stein not mention that philosophy is first and foremost a love, or, a loving towards...

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