US Cultural Management in 21st Century Foreign Relations
This volume looks at a key component of recent US foreign relations, namely, its emphasis on «hearts and minds» as part of its cultural management of the global Other. The authors collected here analyze to what extent we can frame the intent and consequences of this term as a coherent policy, discussing how to think about foreign policy strategies that involve the management of cultural relations.
«Including fascinating first-hand and deeply-researched accounts of the workings of various US institutions (many of them ‘cultural’), this volume is a must for an understanding of the power the US projects worldwide.» Professor Laleh Khalili, SOAS University of London
«This fascinating collection reveals the nuance and complexity behind a seemingly banal phrase.» Professor David Schmid, State University of New York at Buffalo
No Better Friend: The Outreach Efforts of the United States Marine Corps in Japan and the Asia-Pacific
30 August 2009, was a turning point in U.S.-Japan relations. For the first time since the establishment of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in 1955, voters overwhelmingly went with another party, the Democratic Party of Japan, and two weeks later, Japan saw its first true change in administrations in more than five decades.1 That summer, in the run-up to the general election, DPJ President Hatoyama Yukio had called for the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture, in effect unilaterally canceling a controversial bilateral agreement that had been agreed to by the Japanese and U.S. governments in 1996 but remained unimplemented due to local opposition and delaying tactics. Observers attributed this bold declaration as being the reason for the victory of the DPJ and other opposition parties in Okinawa at the time. It certainly became the focus of the election, and would challenge and eventually haunt Hatoyama’s the administration over the next nine months.
Whether he realized it or not, candidate Hatoyama’s call for the relocation of MCAS Futenma outside of the prefecture essentially meant the same thing as telling the U.S. Marines to leave Okinawa. This is because the Marines operate as an integrated and rapidly deployable organization through the proven doctrine known as the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and these assets are deliberately positioned in the geo-strategically located Okinawa. By late May the following year, however, Prime Minister Hatoyama had come around to supporting the original plan to...
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