Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), one of Husserl’s closest students and friends, ranks among the most eminent of the first generation of phenomenologists. His magisterial Controversy over the Existence of the World, written during the years of World War II in occupied Poland, consists of a fundamental defense of realism in phenomenology. Volume II, which follows the English translation of Volume I from 2013, provides fundamental analyses in the formal ontology of the world and consciousness as well as final arguments supporting the realist solution. Ingarden’s monumental work proves to be his greatest accomplishment, despite the fact that outside of Poland Ingarden is known rather as a theoretician of literature than an ontologist. The most important achievement of Ingarden’s ontology is an analysis of the modes of being of various types of objects – things, processes, events, purely intentional objects and ideas. The three-volume Controversy is perhaps the last great systematic work in the history of philosophy, and undoubtedly one of the most important works in 20th-century philosophical literature.
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- Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, 2016. 775 pp.
- Title Page
- Table of Contents
- Part II/1
- VII. The Problem Pertaining to the Essence of Form and its Foundational Concepts
- § 34. Distinction of the Foundational Concepts of Form and Matter
- § 35. Relations among the Various Concepts of Form or Matter. Reduction to a Few Basic Concepts.
- § 36. The Problem of the Connection between Form and Matter
- § 37. Form I as Proper Object of Formal Ontology
- VIII. The Form of the Existentially Autonomous Object
- § 38. Introductory Remarks
- § 39. The Basic Form of the Primally Individual, Existentially Autonomous Object
- § 40. The Constitutive Nature and the Properties of the Individual Object
- § 41. The Properties of the Individual Object
- § 42. Restriction of the Concept of Property
- § 43. Individual Existentially Autonomous Object and the Whole. Higher-Order Individual Objects
- § 44. The Individual Existentially Autonomous Object and the Material
- § 45. The Class Conception of the Individual Object and Its Critique
- IX. The Form of the Purely Intentional Object
- § 46. The Intentional Act and the Purely Intentional Object
- § 47. The Form of the Intentional Object that Corresponds to a Straightforward Act of Meaning
- a) The Two-Sided Formal Structure of the Purely Intentional Object
- b) Spots of Indeterminacy in the Content [Gehalt] of the Purely Intentional Object
- § 48. Survey of the Various Concepts of Transcendence
- I a) Structural Transcendence in the Weaker Form
- I b) Structural Transcendence in the Stronger Form
- II. Radical Transcendence
- III. Transcendence of the Plenitude of Being [des Seinsfülle]
- IV. Transcendence of Inaccessibility
- X. The Form of the Idea
- § 49. Introductory Remarks
- §50. The Disparity of the Form of the Idea from the Form of the Individual Object
- § 51. The Relationship of Ideas to Autonomous Individual Objects
- XI. The Form of the State of Affairs. State of Affairs and Object
- § 52. The Form of the State of Affairs and Its Relation to the Form of the Object
- § 53. The ˹Autonomous˺ State of Affairs and the Intentional Correlate of the Sentence.Are there Negative States of Affairs?
- § 54. The State of Affairs and the Temporally Determined Objects
- XII. The Form of the Relation. The Relative and Non‐Relative (Absolute) Characteristics of the Individual Object
- § 55. The Formal Essence of the Relation. The Non-Relational Objects
- § 56. Various Problems Pertaining to the Relation
- § 57. Relative and Non-Relative (Absolute) Characteristics (Properties). Various Concepts of Relativity
- XIII. The Essence of the Existentially Selfsufficient Object
- § 58. Various Concepts of the Essence of the Individual Object
- § 59. Problems Associated with the Essence of the Individual Object
- a) The Essence of the Object and Its Individuality
- b) The Problem of the Mutability of the Object’s Essence
- c) Positive Qualities and Performance Capabilities (Capacities) within the Essence of the Object
- Part II/2
- XIV. The Problem of the Identity of an Individual Temporally Conditioned Object
- § 60. Introduction
- § 61. The Formal Differences and Existential Interconnections between Event, Process, and Object Persisting in Time
- § 62. Problems Pertaining to the Essence of the Identity of Temporally Determined Objects
- § 63. The Conditions of Identity for the Object Persisting in Time
- § 64. The Identity of a Process and the Identity of an Event
- § 65. The Problem of the Identity of the Purely Intentional Object
- XV. The Form of an Existential Domain and the Form of the World
- § 66. Introduction
- § 67. The Form of the Domain of Being in General and the Formal Problems Associated with It
- § 68. Various Problems of the Form and Mode of Being of the World (of the Object-Domain)
- § 69. Some Attempts at a Solution of the Indicated Problems
- § 70. The Individual Object as Component of the World
- § 71. The Existential Selfsufficiency of the Object-Domain (of the World)
- § 72. Various Types of Object-Domains. More about the Selfsufficiency of the Domain
- § 73. Concerning Domains of Existentially Heteronomous Entities
- § 74. The Phenomenon of the Intertwining of Two Object-Domains and the Problem of the Existential Selfsufficiency of the Domain
- § 75. The Formal Problem of the Totality [Allheit] Of What Exists [des Seienden]
- XVI. The Problem of the Form of Pure Consciousness
- § 76. Some Remarks concerning Pure Consciousness
- § 77. The Form of the ˹Pure Experience˺ and the Form of the Stream of ˹Consciousness˺
- § 78. The Formal Problem of the Existential Selfsufficiency of the Stream of Consciousness
- § 79. The Connection Between the Controversy over the Existence of the World and the Body-Soul-Problem
- XVII. Application of the Formal‐Ontological Results to the Problem of the Existence of the World
- § 80. Summary of the Formal-Ontological Results that Are Significant for the Controversy between Realism and Idealism
- § 81. Outlook on the Possible Ontological Resolutions of the Controversy over the Existence of the World with the Findings Obtained Taken into Account
- Index of Names
§ 35. Relations among the Various Concepts of Form or Matter. Reduction to a Few Basic Concepts.
Analyses of “form” can only be conducted in conjunction with analyses of “matter” (“content”). Their concepts are strictly correlated. They represent pairs whose members can only be elucidated and characterized by means of contrast.˺
Let us first assemble the concepts of form and content that we have acquired in the course of our considerations. They are the following:
I.a)Form: the purely qualitative for itself (Platonic idea), the pure ideal quality [Wesenheit]. Matter: an individual thing (object)
b)Form: the determinant [das Bestimmende] as such (Aristotelian form). Special case: “substantial form,” essence of something, and its antithesis: “the accidental form”; Matter: either 1. that which is devoid of any determination, but undergirds the determination (the pure “first” matter in the Aristotelian sense), or 2. the subject of properties, qualitatively determined in accordance with its nature.102
c)Form: a determining of something which [determining] is in itself unqualitative  (a special case of form in the formal-ontological sense); ←43 | 44→Matter: the pure subject of determinations (properties) – in Aristotelian terminology: τó ύποκείμενον (a different special case of form in the formal-ontological sense, the necessary counterpart to103 “determining”).
II.Form in the sense of formal ontology: the radically unqualitative as such in which the quality stands [steht]; there are many different forms in this sense, among them Form Ic) as a special case; Matter: the qualitative in the broadest sense, the pure quality as something that fills-out a form.
III.Form: the relation or...
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