This collection of essays examines logic and its philosophy. The author investigates the nature of logic not only by describing its properties but also by showing philosophical applications of logical concepts and structures. He evaluates what logic is and analyzes among other aspects the relations of logic and language, the status of identity, bivalence, proof, truth, constructivism, and metamathematics. With examples concerning the application of logic to philosophy, he also covers semantic loops, the epistemic discourse, the normative discourse, paradoxes, properties of truth, truth-making as well as theology, being and logical determinism. The author concludes with a philosophical reflection on nothingness and its modelling.
VIII. Theology and Logic
VIIITheology and Logic
Is logic applicable in theology? If so, is logic basically relevant for theology or the former has merely a secondary importance for the latter? Answers to these questions require several preliminary explanations concerning both logic and theology. Let me begin with the scientia divina. First of all, there are many theologies, not only because many religions exist. Even if we restrict our attention to three great monotheistic religions (Islam, Judaism, Christianity), we do not find the uniform idea of theology. The situation does not change very much, if we made a further restriction, for example, to Christianity only. The theological tradition of this confession does not appear as uniform. On the contrary, we encounter various conceptions of theology. Two of them are particularly relevant for my further considerations. Firstly, we have the negative or apophatic theology as represented by Nicolaus Cusanus (Nicholas of Cusa), for example. This kind of theology, very popular in the Orthodox Church, says that we cannot say anything positive about God and His attributes. We should abstain from positive assertions and limit ourselves to statements like ‘I do not know what God is like’ or ‘God is not…’. According to this kind of theology, the cognitive gap stemming from such assertions is filled by beliefs as faith. If we believe, we do not need to bother with apparent inconsistencies in the body of theological statements. As Cusanus said, docta ignorantia is sufficient and coicidentia oppositorum are to be accepted. Clearly,...
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