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Professional Military Education

A Cross-Cultural Survey


Edited By Duraid Jalili and Hubert Annen

This book brings together non-Western viewpoints on military pedagogy and professional military education (PME). In doing so, it seeks to provide a counterbalance to the predominantly European and North American bias found within the research field, as well as generating new insights on Latin American, African and Asian pedagogical commentaries and critiques. The collection contains essays from PME researchers and practitioners across fourteen countries, on subjects including large-scale educational reform, civil-military and academic influences on military pedagogy, internationalisation, cross-cultural collaboration, and interoperability within military education.

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The Role of Military Pedagogy and Civilian Academia in the National Security and Governance of Peru

Jorge Serrano Torres / Colonel (Ret.) Juan Carlos Liendo O’Connor

The Role of Military Pedagogy and Civilian Academia in the National Security and Governance of Peru

Abstract: This chapter provides a historical analysis of civil-military relations through the perspective of military pedagogy and the civilian academe in Peru. It reveals how significant fluctuations in PME reform, from the 19th century to the present day, have been influenced by the different approaches, needs and concerns of successive military and civilian governments regarding the role of the armed forces and the importance of educating military officers at the strategic level. This includes an examination of the evolution of the Peruvian military educational system and the conflicts that have shaped this dynamic. As the chapter highlights, although this scenario has resulted in some integration of the civilian academe in military pedagogy in recent history, it has also demonstrated a lack of cohesion between military and civilian academic communities. In line with Peru’s historical contexts and the increasing instability of its political sphere, resulting from the large-scale corruption scandals, the chapter argues that this scenario demonstrates the strategic importance of creating suitable academic spaces for the joint training of civil and military professionals in security, development and defence.

Keywords: PME, military education, Peruvian Armed Forces, civil-military relations, Escuela Militar, Estudios Militares, CAEM


The role of the military in Latin America has been shaped by a strong tradition of interference in domestic politics. In this scenario, the armed forces surpass their natural function of national territorial defence, maintaining internal order and assisting in emergency situations, and instead become leaders capable of defining the destiny of their countries. The available studies of this phenomenon usually focus on the perspective of civil-military relations, without examining the influence of military pedagogy and civilian academia. In Peru alone, out of 76 presidents between 1821 (national independence) and 2016, 51 have been army officers; and ←65 | 66→between 1900 and 2016, out of 29 rulers, 13 have been army officials and graduates of the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos (Chorrillos Military School), including Ollanta Humala Tasso, the democratic leader elected between 2011 and 2016.

This chapter seeks to promote analysis and debate on military pedagogy and the civilian academe within the framework of civil-military relations in Peru, as a way of properly examining politico-military leadership in Latin America. To achieve this, we will approach the role of military pedagogy from its historical perspective and how it has evolved from the Republican warlordism (caudillismo) of the 19th century to the military professionalism of the 20th century.1 This includes an analysis of the evolution of the Peruvian military educational system, the ways in which military pedagogical priorities change, and the internal and external conflicts faced by the military throughout its history that have affected this dynamic. This process will also help us discover the nature and implications of the “Military Professionalism” and “Professional Militarism” that has been developing in the Peruvian Army, in the sense outlined by Frederick Nunn (1983, xi). Finally, we will propose some points of view on the circumstances in which military leadership in defence affairs can help to improve the cooperation required to face regional security challenges.

The Republic and Military Warlordism

During the period of the Bourbon Viceroyalty (from the middle of the 18th century), all viceroys of Peru were military commanders, as were the “Captain Generals” responsible for the various administrative regions within the Viceroyalty (Tauro del Pino, 2001, pp.2767–2769). Thus, at the beginning of the Republic of Peru, the government had a predominantly ‘military-style’ character, philosophy and vision, characteristic of the need to secure the Bourbon reforms. As a consequence, from the beginning of the republic in 1821 until 1899, civil-military relations in Peru ←66 | 67→were defined by the political interaction between military warlords and the nascent liberal-political leadership. Almost all presidents in this interval were army officials (1821–1872).

In line with this scenario, military education was reduced to the continuity of some military ordinances from the vice-regal administration, the intellectual self-preparation of the individual officer, and the experience gained from participation in conflicts for the defence of the warlords’ hegemonic interests, the consolidation of liberal-political power and the defence of the borders of the new republic. Furthermore, civilian academies provided absolutely no military subjects; a scenario that would be repeated throughout the nation’s history. Between 1879–1883, the Guerra del Pacífico (War of the Pacitic), which pitted Chile against Bolivia and Peru, produced a military defeat and the loss of Peruvian territory. In spite of the signing of a peace treaty with Chile (the Treaty of Ancón) in 1883, the continued occupation of Peruvian territories and the sense of conflict between Peru and Chile until the border treaty of 1929 became a determining factor in consolidating the idea of a Peruvian republic that had not yet been assimilated, and a national culture of militarism and military pedagogy in Peru.

The Emergence of Military Professionalism

Between 1894 and 1895 a civil revolution (known as the Peruvian Civil War), designed to counteract the rise of militarism in the political arena, resulted in two events that would go on to characterize civil-military relations in Peru. Firstly, it totally separated military warlords from power (specifically, with the defeat of the militarists of the government of General Andrés A. Cáceres). Secondly, it induced the first major reform of the armed forces towards military professionalism. In order to achieve this, between 1896 and 1940 the responsibility for command and administration of the army was given to a French military mission. In 1898, this mission founded the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos (which was the institution responsible for the professional qualification of young cadets for the officer corps), the schools of infantry, artillery, cavalry and engineering, and in 1904, the Escuela Superior de Guerra (Superior School of War), for the formation of staff officers.

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The military pedagogy of the Peruvian Army now followed the ‘French model’ based on the spirit of the French Foreign Legion, which also provided the necessary chiefs and instructors (Masterson, 1991, pp.23–29). These changes meant that the educational system was modernized to the highest European standards, and career progression was structured around a strong cult of values and military hierarchy, displacing the model espoused by military warlordism. The military professionalism founded in the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos was centred around a strict philosophy of behavioural and cognitive learning, which was reinforced throughout an officer’s career.

The deep dedication this engendered towards military knowledge, together with the evolution of officers’ duties in rural areas and their increased awareness of military, political and social issues and realities, produced a whole generation of officers with high intellectual abilities, many of whom continued their studies in Europe. This development of military professionalism forged an efficient, solid and well-trained institution, capable of projecting national power to protect national borders and contributing to the process by which the Republic of Peru was formed (as we will consider later in the chapter). In parallel to this, the constant lack of logistical resources, weapons and equipment would serve to consolidate a spartan and austere character for the officer corps, who originated mainly from illustrious middle classes from the interior of the country.

The wars with Colombia (1932) and Ecuador (1941), validated and reinforced the usefulness of these schools, whilst at the same time raising new requirements. The subjugation of the populist insurrection of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Popular Revolutionary American Alliance) in 1932, the end of the Second World War and the emergence of internationalised revolutionary communism, evidenced the need to face new transnational and asymmetrical dimensions of conflict. These new challenges led to the creation of a new academic institution by the army staff, called the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (Centre for Advanced Military Studies – CAEM). This centre was oriented to the study and analysis of the national reality in all areas of national affairs at the political and strategic levels of national defence. At the end of the Second World War, the French mission was replaced by a U.S. military ←68 | 69→mission (until 1968), which focused on equipment, technical training and fighting against the expansion of Soviet communism (Kruijt, 1996, pp.263–264).

Professional Militarism and the Reformist Officials

Since the first military reforms introduced by the French military mission in 1898, civilian academia in Peru had not developed any types of study related to military or national defence issues. Either despite or as a result of this scenario, until 1968 civil-military relations were characterized by a continuous recurrence of right- and left-wing political groups who sought support from the army and navy to promote coups against their opponents. Unfortunately for these groups, military pedagogy had produced a whole generation of intellectuals, who would become rulers of the country between 1968 and 1980. For these officers, the military career was structured around a strong system of academic and military training oriented towards the use of new technologies. It included training on external and border conflicts at the tactical level (in the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos), on the strategy of military operations (in the Escuela Superior de Guerra) and on geopolitical affairs and state administration (in the CAEM). In this way, a kind of “Professional Militarism” (Nunn, 1983, xi) was consolidated, based on the technological, pedagogical and structural/hierarchical modernization of the army.

During this period, the army General Manuel Odría, who was sworn in as constitutional president in 1950 (two years after having staged a coup d’état), faced serious political opposition that forced him, due to the need to form a functional administration, to resort to the CAEM for strategic support in the management of his government (Masterson, 1991, pp.138–141). As a result of this, Brigadier General José Del Carmen Marín, founder of the CAEM (and the first director of the Colegio Militar Leoncio Prado), became the main academic advisor on matters of national security and defence, and the most influential ideologue in the construction of military professionalism and the reformist mentality within the Peruvian Armed Forces. The combination of these factors led to the admission of civilian professionals as participants in the CAEM’s academic activity, establishing the first link between military pedagogy ←69 | 70→and civilian students. As noted by General Carmen Marín (Villanueva, 1972, p.44), regarding the CAEM:

“We do not therefore constitute an organization with teachers and students, but a team […] that studies the process of comprehensive preparation for the defence of the nation […] this domain of knowledge is beyond our technical training and that is why we have turned to more than 20 civilian professionals.”

This conception of the ‘national level’ that goes beyond the military pedagogical sphere and projects itself upon the overarching strategic scenario of the state, with the purpose of “creating and disseminating knowledge in the areas of development, security and national defence” as well as forming national leaders “with the capacity to make proposals for change which contribute to the general well-being and strengthening of national identity”, was enshrined in the mission and vision of the CAEM (Lazo Lazo, 2016, p.28). These reforms were influenced by the French military, as General Carmen Marín had himself studied in France in both the École Nationale Supérieure d’Architecture de Versailles (as a military engineer) and the École de Guerre in Paris.

However, in 1968 civil-military relations went through a complex period with the establishment of the so-called Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada (Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces). Led by an army general, Juan Velasco Alvarado, they established between 1968–1975 a socialist, authoritarian military regime, in which the legislative power was abolished, the judiciary was subject to the military government, freedom of the press was suppressed, civil rights were restricted, and selective persecution was carried out against those who opposed governmental decisions, regardless of their ideology (Planas, 2016). Although it is true that the CAEM became the fundamental pillar of intellectual support and strategic political decisions for the government, the Velasco regime’s poor management of General Carmen Marín’s original doctrine, undermined the mutually beneficial points of contact that existed between the military institutions in charge of military pedagogy and the civilian academe.

During this period, the military government nationalized the extractive industries (i.e. oil, gas and mining) that had been exploited by transnational companies and expropriated ownership of the agricultural complexes that had formed the basis of local aristocratic power. Unlike the anti-communist ←70 | 71→militarism seen elsewhere in Latin America, the armed forces, and particularly the Peruvian Army, took control of the entire system of public administration. This movement was signalled as the emergence of a new form of reformist officer (Kruijt and Tello, 2003, p.71). Yet, at this time, civil-military relations acquired a new duality. On the one hand, there existed a serious conflict of interest regarding political, economic and social control between the armed forces and the traditional political class that had held power since national independence. On the other hand, the army deployed an effective strategy of ‘social mobilization and participation’ across the working class and the poorer sectors of society who had been removed from politics and kept away from the benefits available to social and economic elites up until that point, which allowed it to build a significant base of popular support.

In 1975, a coup d’état brought about a change in the leftist orientation of the Velasco government, eventually leading to a harmonious transfer of command in 1980 from the Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada to the constitutional powers. Once again, the mandate of the military was reduced to the sphere of national defence and security. However, the next decade brought with it significant challenges for the role of the army and priorities for military education. In 1981, a serious military confrontation with Ecuador broke out, forcing the army to alter programs and curricula related to the study and use of military weapons. This conflict was conducted by the armed forces almost independently of the recently formed democratic government. In December 1982, the new government was forced to install “political-military commands” to deal with an armed insurrection, which evolved into the Marxist-Maoist-Leninist terrorist organization known as the Partido Comunista del Perú - Sendero Luminoso (Communist Party of Peru - Shining Path - PCP-SL). Then, in 1985, the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement – MRTA) emerged, which was connected with the Castroist guerrilla movements in Latin America and which forced the geographical expansion of the political-military commands even further.

By 1990, Peru was a failed state facing an increasing threat from the PCP-SL and the MRTA, ongoing risks of a military confrontation on the northern border with Ecuador, declared as an “ineligible borrower” by the International Monetary Fund, while fighting to deal with a grave ←71 | 72→economic crisis, a severe drought and a rapidly expanding cholera epidemic (McCormick, 1990, p.52; Stokes, 1996, pp.546–547; Brooke, 1991). In this explosive scenario, a tacit alliance was established between the new president Alberto Fujimori, a university teacher with no political affiliation, and the Peruvian Army. This alliance once again removed the traditional political class from power, in line with their responsibility for leading the country into bankruptcy. The military dealt exclusively with matters of defence and territorial control whilst a new civilian political class, later known as the ‘Fujimoristas’, emerged to take over state affairs.

In line with its return to exclusively military matters, the armed forces refocused their doctrine and training on counterterrorism. In seeking a solution for the ongoing threat of the PCP-SL, military education took on a more internationalised aspect. For example, in order to address the PCP-SL’s adoption of Mao Zedong’s ideology, insurrectionary doctrine and terrorist techniques, the armed forces sought out training from Taiwan. This was due to the Taiwanese government and military’s involvement and in-depth knowledge regarding Maoism and the People’s Republic of China gained in the Chinese Civil War against Mao Zedong and his guerrilla forces between 1927–1949 under the command of General Chiang Kai-shek. This education in Taiwanese doctrine came in the form of the ‘Course of Political Warfare’ delivered at the Fu Hsing Kang College, which was attended intermittently by hundreds of Peruvian military, police and even civilians linked to intelligence services from 1978 through to the 1990s (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003, pp.191–195). In addition to this, some 900 Lieutenants, as well as cadets from the Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, from Peru took courses at the School of the Americas in the United States between 1980 and 1996 whilst many others experienced education from U.S. military instructors in Peru and at least one Peruvian-American joint exercise in counter-subversive tactics (Ibid., p.325 and fn.85).

This internationalisation coincided with the adoption of the “Low Intensity Conflict” strategy recommended by the U.S. military (Metz, 1995, p.11), from the end of the Reagan administration and throughout the government of George H.W. Bush (i.e. 1988–1993). As noted by Serrano (2009, xxix–xi), this strategy, which was adopted with great enthusiasm by the Fujimori administration from July 1990 onwards,

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“was based on a ‘new social contract’ between the state, law enforcement agencies and the rural population (peasant patrols and self-defence committees), together with the urban population (citizens who supported law enforcement agencies with information and demonstrations to repudiate terrorism), isolating the subversives and undermining the support they had in a sector of the population.

This was possible in turn, with a state policy where strategic and operational intelligence was privileged, but also - unlike in the 1980s - an approach carried out by the armed forces and the national police of gaining support from the poorer population through humanitarian assistance, social aid and security, rather than violence or the indiscriminate use of force.”

By 1997 the terrorist groups had been defeated and Peru was no longer a failed state. Although a new border conflict with Ecuador began in 1995, known as the Cenépa War, President Fujimori was able to sign the Brasilia Act with Ecuador in 1998, which paved the way for peace, by definitively delimiting the border between Peru and Ecuador. At this historical stage, military pedagogy in Peru was almost exclusively oriented towards the external defence of the border with Ecuador, and the internal defence against terrorist organizations. Consequently, the army educational system prioritized tactical and operational military components related to their external and internal conflicts which inherently diminished the focus on strategic and geopolitical education, and training on state administration.

Unfortunately, the government’s success came at a social and ethical cost. Firstly, as noted by Serrano, “there were reprehensible excesses in the fight against terrorism” including, in certain places and times, a dirty or clandestine war contrary to human rights, “but this was never part of the national strategy, nor of a state policy backed by the population” (2009, xli–xlii). Secondly, the strategy of ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ was a matter for the hardened Fujimorist political leadership, the armed forces and the intelligence services, with almost no contribution from the civilian academe. Thus, the few opportunities for collaboration between military and civilian educational institutions were extinguished and the spaces and opportunities for germinating civilian academic initiatives in the fields of security and national defence were reduced even more.

One positive development in the area of civil-military integration did occur during this time. From 1995 onwards, army officers incorporated courses from outside of the military system into their studies. In the first case of this, the army and the Escuela Superior de Negocios (Superior ←73 | 74→Business School) agreed to allow students from the army’s Escuela Superior de Guerra (Superior War School) to participate in a Diploma of Administration. In addition to this, the courses of the Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (Centre for Higher National Studies – CAEN), which had evolved from the CAEM, approved the attendance of numerous civilian students who were members of the public administration.

Despite this, however, there existed a “national culture regarding the military, characterized by mutual exclusion, academic ignorance of military affairs and a secrecy which generated corruption and mistrust” (Tudela van Breugel Douglas, 2011). Indeed, in the period between 1990 and 2000, civil-military relations were marked by significant criticism of the government of President Fujimori, which included prominent accusations of acts of corruption and human rights violations. The effects of President Fujimori’s formal resignation in November 2000 and the subsequent regime change were catastrophic to the structure of the military. President Fujimori, his main ministers and almost the entire military hierarchy were prosecuted and imprisoned. To date, more than 900 army officials have faced a series of prosecutions for proven or alleged human rights violations in the fight against terrorist organizations. The civil administration that replaced Fujimori’s regime removed any military influence over the government and, without performing adequate damage control, started a radical dismantling of the military and intellectual leadership structure. Thus, the generation of reformist officers ended after their active participation in power for nearly 32 years, between 1968 and 2000.

Military Reform and Populist Militarism

Between 2001 and 2016, a process of institutional reform of the armed forces was developed on the basis of the “constitutional precept of military subordination to political power” (Tudela van Breugel Douglas, 2011). The impact on military pedagogy was profound. The educational system significantly changed its orientation, prioritizing the adaptation of the military educational framework to the academic standards of the national university system (Ley N°30220, 2014, pp.64–65). These circumstances have produced a new dynamic in civil-military relations for officers. Specifically, in line with their increased participation in postgraduate ←74 | 75→courses in administration and teaching, officers have, for the first time, been able to approach national realities with an academic perspective separate from the military barracks.

One notable example of this is the Centro del Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Derechos Humanos de las Fuerzas Armadas (Centre for International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights of the Armed Forces), which is considered as one of the “Academic Bodies of the Defense Sector” (CDIH-DDHH, n.d.). This centre has focused its efforts on becoming a leading institution for international humanitarian law and human rights training for military and civilian personnel of the Peruvian Armed Forces (including the army, navy and air force), as well as the national police force, civil professionals of the judiciary and the Public Ministry or Prosecutor’s Office, and other international officials (Viviano Carpio, 2016).

Unfortunately, despite these tentative advances, there are still serious challenges facing military education. Firstly, studies in military affairs (especially geopolitical and military strategic studies) are still lacking in civilian academia and staff courses remain focused on joint operations between the military services and confined to the operational level (which limits officers’ abilities in understanding and designing strategic responses to regional security challenges). Secondly, there is still not enough historical perspective to gauge the damage that may have been caused to the fragile, positive evolution of the civil-military relationship by the negative outcome of the 2011–2016 government of President Ollanta Humala Tasso.

Specifically, Humala is a former army officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Yet serious questions remain regarding his image and role as a former head of state and his military lineage. One of his brothers (Antauro, a former army officer with the rank of Major), for example, was imprisoned through the civilian judicial system, for having conducted a failed and bloody military coup in January 2005 against the democratically elected government led by Alejandro Toledo. Significant criticisms have also been levelled against Humala for the systematic attacks he engaged in against his political opponents during his time in government.

Most notably, however, one year after leaving government, the Peruvian judiciary implemented a preventative detention order for Humala and his wife, for the alleged crime of “money laundering in tort of the Peruvian state” and belonging to “a criminal organization that goes beyond ←75 | 76→national borders” (Sala Penal Nacional, 2017, pp.1–2). Although he was released nine months later, in line with a pronouncement by the Tribunal Constitucional del Perú (Constitutional Court of Peru), Humala was not discharged from ongoing investigations regarding alleged corruption (Anon, 2017). Additionally, there remain allegations and investigations at the political and judicial level, involving “evidence that has become public corroborating longstanding allegations that Peru’s former president Ollanta Humala Tasso […] would be responsible for egregious human rights violations committed by security forces in the early 1990s, during Peru’s internal armed conflict”, as well as “the attempted cover-up of incriminating evidence when he ran for president” (Human Rights Watch, 2017, p.1).

Humala is not alone in facing such accusations. Indeed, since 2016 the unprecedented, trans-national corruption and bribery case entitled Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash),2 has resulted in the implication of four former Peruvian presidents (i.e. Alejandro Toledo, Ollanta Humala, Alan Gabriel García, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski), as well as numerous other political and business leaders who have been in positions of power since the 1990s from across the ideological spectrum (Morales, 2018). In March 2018, for example, the acting president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was forced to resign his post, in order to avoid potential impeachment by congress due to ‘moral incapacity’, in line with his involvement in acts of corruption relating to the Brazilian company Odebrecht. This event produced a new level of rupture in the legitimacy of the Peruvian political system. Indeed, at the time this chapter was completed, in November 2018, the number of serving and retired senior government officials who had been implicated in acts of corruption, as well as wider officials from the political, business, press, non-governmental and judicial sectors, was continuing to increase in line with the successive legal investigations being undertaken as part of Operação Lava Jato. This included the sentencing of Keiko Fujimori, the leader of the main political bloc in Congress, to 36 months of preventive incarceration in October 2018.

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These circumstances have resulted in serious conflicts between the powers of the state, which has led to a scenario of ungovernability and destabilization across the entire Peruvian political system. In line with this, some commentators have again espoused the need for populist, ethnocentric, revolutionary and neo-Marxist principles, similar to those seen in Ecuador’s previous military dictatorships. Indeed, despite being incarcerated in a military prison since 2005, the retired army Major Antauro Humala has even announced his candidacy for president for the 2021 elections, receiving the support of a number of individuals and political organizations (Exitosa Noticias, 2018). Faced with these latest developments, both the military academies and the civilian academe continue to be absent from public discussion and proposals for solutions regarding defence and state security.


As this chapter has demonstrated, in order to comprehend the dynamics of divorce and challenges facing military pedagogy and the civilian academe in matters related to national security and defence in Peru, it is necessary to examine military leadership in the nation’s domestic and foreign politics from the beginnings of the republic (1821) to the present day. Specifically, from the military warlordism of the 19th century to the present, there have been significant fluctuations in military education reform, which have been influenced heavily by the different approaches of successive governments regarding the role of the armed forces and the importance of educating military officers at the strategic level. Although the participation of army officers in the civilian academe has gradually increased and has become a requirement for the assignment of military posts and promotions, civilian academies have not developed initiatives for studies in national security and defence beyond those related to democratic control of the armed forces and respect for human rights. This scenario is a by-product of civil-military distrust resulting from human rights atrocities committed by military officers and recurrent corruption at the highest levels of government throughout Peru’s modern history.

Contemporary threats, such as organized international crime, drug production and trafficking, terrorism, large-scale forced population ←77 | 78→displacement, the illegal gold trade, transnational corruption of officials, human trafficking and contraband, amongst others, should be addressed more intensely within both military pedagogy and civilian academia in Peru, either together or independently. In this context, strategic military schools such as the Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales (née CAEM) could play an important role as postgraduate academic institutions capable of integrating military pedagogy and civilian academia, generating suitable academic spaces that enable civil and military professionals to be trained and educated for effective decision-making in security, development and defence, whilst also strengthening democratic values and institutions.

However, as long as weak, inefficient and corrupt democratic governments exist in Latin America, separated politically, economically and socially from their armed forces, there will continue to exist a divorce between military pedagogy and civilian academia, and the creation of adequate spaces to promote a robust culture of security, defence, development and democracy. In this scenario, any type of acute conflict in the region will constitute a new opportunity for involuntary military leadership in the national political process. Consequently, integrating military pedagogy with civilian academia in Peru and Latin America constitutes an indispensable requirement for addressing the security challenges in the region.


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1 The main focus of this study revolves around the historical and political role of the army. In the case of the navy and air force, the particularities of their scope and impact would require a far broader study that would not necessarily affect the conclusions of this project.

2 An ongoing criminal investigation by Brazilian authorities into a bribery and corruption network reaching across Latin-America and beyond, perpetuated by the Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht.