A Study in the Philosophy of History
The aim of this book is to explain economic dualism in the history of modern Europe. The emergence of the manorial-serf economy in the Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary in the 16th and the 17th centuries was the result of a cumulative impact of various circumstantial factors. The weakness of cities in Central Europe disturbed the social balance – so characteristic for Western-European societies – between burghers and the nobility. The political dominance of the nobility hampered the development of cities and limited the influence of burghers, paving the way to the rise of serfdom and manorial farms. These processes were accompanied by increased demand for agricultural products in Western Europe
7 Ownership and Revolution in Non-Marxian Historical Materialism
The present chapter offers a presentation of the basic models of socio-economic development in non-Marxian historical materialism. First, it discusses the mechanism of adaptive dependency manifested, for instance, by the dependency of a production organization system on the level of productive forces. Afterwards, it analyzes static assumptions and the evolution of a pure economic society. It constitutes the basic model of the theory of socio-economic evolution in n-Mhm because it aims to include fundamental development trends common for all three types of economic societies – slavery, feudalism, and capitalism. Finally, it offers a concretization of the basic model of a dual society, which purports to conceptualize the development of a feudal society, by including the influence of a periodic evolution of productive forces.
The second part of the chapter offers an expansion of the above models. I will present a non-Christian model of man (hereinafter referred to as n-Cmm), which set some limits to the assumption of rationality. Based on this anthropological presumptions, I will correct some static assumptions of the model of an economic society and modify its dynamic part.
In a common-sense interpretation of Marxism, the global relationships between productive forces and relations of production, a social base and a legal and political superstructure, social and economic conditions and particular states of social consciousness are interpreted in a causal way. That has been giving rise to well-known interpretive difficulties, for it has not been clear how productive forces are to cause the appearance of particular relations of production, a social base – of a legal and political superstructure, and social and economic conditions – of particular states of social consciousness.
Those difficulties have been solved by adaptive understanding of those dependencies. It is assumed that we were dealing with two states of affairs: state of affairs A, (from a set α called the set of possibilities) and state of affairs B (from a set β called the set of conditions). Let us assume that, in conditions B, state of affairs A leads to state of affairs x. The set of those results (e.g. states of things x and y) is ordered according to a particular property k called a criterion of adaptation. ←205 | 206→Therefore, the distinguished states of affairs can be ordered according to the degree of the intensity of that property k. For example, state of things x which is characterized by property k to a greater degree will precede state of things y characterized by k to a smaller degree. The adaptation relationship between the elements from the set α and conditions B of set β with respect to property k is defined as:
Aopt = adk (α, B)
and can therefore be read “out of the set of states of affairs α that one takes place which, under given conditions B, yields the result which has the property k in the maximum degree; that state of affairs in α is denoted as Aopt.”299
Let us illustrate an adaptive dependency with the following example. A new device for increasing work efficiency and, what follows, the possibility of increasing a surplus product has been invented. Owners who compare various systems of the organization of production (traditional, invented by specialists, etc.) select the one, which they believe to be capable of ensuring the growth of a surplus product – with the use of that device. However, if the expected growth does not happen, the owners will still be looking for an advantageous system of the organization of production. If any of them delays the reorganization of production, that owner’s profits from an additional surplus product will shrink and, in the end, the owner will go bankrupt. After a sufficiently long time, by trial and error, and the elimination of those who do not learn fast enough, an optimal system of the organization of production, with respect to the used tool, will become common in the observed economic sector. The mechanism of adaptation of systems of production to the level of productive forces, which operates in the above-described way, has been formulated by Nowak as follows:
(I) that system out of the set of historically given systems of production is adopted on the general scale which for a given level of productive forces ensures the greatest surplus product to be appropriated by the owners of the means of production.300
According to the above-mentioned formula, the criterion of adaptation is the maximization of a surplus product. The state of affairs Aopt symbolizes the ←206 | 207→optimal system of production, conditions B are represented by the level of productive forces.
An adaptive mechanism merely assumes that an owner, who attempts to increase profit, chooses a production system from the available array of systems, which, to his/her knowledge, will ensure the highest profit. Owners, who, for some reasons, decide to postpone introducing the optimum organizational system, do not disappear but they will not acquire the highest profits. As a result, after a certain period of time, they will be eliminated as a result of economic competition.301
There is an analogous adaptive dependency between the superstructure and the economic base. On a mass scale, those systems, from among the various legal and political systems (traditional or invented by philosophers), become common which ensure the most effective introduction of the optimal system of the organization of production, from the point of view of the owners’ class, given a particular state of the base. That dependency is formulated in the following way:
(II) that political system, from a set of historically given politico-legal systems, is adopted on a mass scale in a society, which ensures a system of the organization of production which is optimal for the ruling class, at a given level of the economic base.
The dependency of social consciousness on social being is similarly adaptive in nature. In this case, the interests of the owners’ classes, guaranteed by the legal and political system, function as a selector of individual ideas. On a mass scale, such ideas become common as, in given social and economic conditions, they ensure the durability of a political system. That is expressed by way of the following dependency:←207 | 208→
(III) those ideas, from a historically given set of ideas, become widespread on a mass scale which ensure, in given social and economic conditions, the highest stability of a legal and political system.
The consequence of class inequalities in economy is a division of the newly produced value into variable capital allocated to the class of direct producers and surplus value kept by the class of owners.302 However, the system of appropriation of the surplus value does not necessarily lead to a class conflict in a given society. An economic antagonism understood in the above way results from a gap occurring between the level of economic needs of direct producers and the variable capital that is supposed to satisfy them.
Namely, when the level of an alienation of labor is low that is the majority of needs of direct producers is satisfied, the intensity of economic struggle is also low because the most of workers does not reason to protest. Social peace also prevails in the situation of high alienation of labor. Although most of needs of direct producers is not satisfied, poverty atomizes people, making them unable to any common protest. Therefore in the conditions of high alienation of labor, the intensity of economic struggle is also low. Revolution breaks out when the level of alienation of labor is moderately high. Then, exploitation becomes already painful for the most of the direct producers but it does not destroy their ability to common protests, yet. The dependency of class struggle from the level of alienation of labor can be demonstrated graphically in the following way:
Fig. 9: The dependency of the level of class struggle on the alienation of labor. Explanations: CS– level of class struggle; AL – alienation of labor: cp – interval of class peace; R – interval of revolution, dc – interval of declassation.
To recapitulate the above insight, we could state the following:
(1) a state of class peace prevails when the most of the needs of direct producers is satisfied;
(2) a class struggle enters the stage of the highest intensity when the alienation of labor is moderately high; although exploitation becomes severe but it does not bloc a mass protest;
(3) a state of class peace prevails in the conditions of high alienation of labor because poverty breaks autonomous social ties and destroys the possibility of organizing mass protests.
Furthermore, I find it noteworthy that the statics of economic momentum, differently from the statics of political momentum, includes a single area of a revolution. This situation results from the fact that the statics of economic momentum is based on the assumptions of the “Christian model of man.” The present chapter will offer a waiving out of these assumptions and their substitution with static assumptions derived from the anthropological theses of the “non-Christian model of man.”
The idealizing assumptions of the basic model of an economic society adopt the existence of two social classes: owners and direct producers. Following from this, in this model, the influence of other social classes – rulers, priests, citizens, and believers is not taken into consideration in an explication of social processes. Additionally, the model disregards the impact of politics, culture, the institutions of public life and the collective consciousness of the participants of the economic life, on the social processes under investigation. The analyzed economic society is isolated from the outside, hence the model does not explain social phenomena with the influence of neighboring societies. The subsequent set of idealizing assumptions has an economic character. The adopted assumption is that level of productive forces is constant (technological advancement does not exist), hence, the number of branches of production does not increase and the accumulation fund in society equals to zero (simple reproduction takes place). Naturally, the list of idealizing assumptions is much longer. For instance, the model omits demographic phenomena associated with aa surplus or deficiency of workforce, uneven distribution of rare resources, etc. Generally speaking, the adopted ←209 | 210→assumption is that the model omits those factors, which have not been clearly introduced into it.303
Let us assume that, at the beginning of the phase of the increasing alienation of labor, social peace prevails. Initially, surplus value is increased by introducing more effective systems of organization of production. Under the operation of adaptive mechanisms, owners introduce more and more perfect organizational systems of production. However, the reaching of the optimal level of organization of production for the given level of productive forces is a lengthy process. When optimal, that is ensuring the highest surplus value, organizational system of production, becomes widespread, owners maximize their profit by introducing increasingly rigors systems of appropriation of surplus value. This, in turn, brings about a decrease of global value of variable capital assigned to the class of direct producers. As a result, both a divide between incomes of direct producers and profits of owners increase, a process which leads to the rise of the alienation of labor. When a certain threshold is exceeded – let us call it a threshold of class peace – singular acts of protest take place: productivity of labor decreases, direct producers leave work and strikes outbreak. A further rise of the alienation of labor brings about an intensification of the above acts of social protest. Finally, employees’ mass demonstrations outbreak and the social system enters the phase of revolutionary disturbances. A revolution of direct producers may enforce an evolution of the ownership relations or it may transform into a social confrontation.
Let us now consider the first variant. A class of owners, deprived of the centralized means of coercion, gives way under the pressure of the revolution of the direct producers. However, an increase of variable capital assigned to the class of direct producers does not bring about a significant change. When the masses are calmed, the mechanism of economic competition results in yet another increase of the alienation of labor that, in turn, leads to a next rise of social disturbances.
In a long-term perspective, the only stable solution to a social conflict is a revision of ownership relations, namely, social ties connecting an owner and a direct producer. The level of economic power of an owner and, on the other hand, the level of economic autonomy of a direct producer depend on the number of decisions associated with production taken by an owner and the number of decisions taken by a direct producer. By transforming the ownership relations, owners partially give up their ownership prerogatives. As a result, direct producers receive more economic autonomy. A boost of an economic autonomy ←210 | 211→encourages direct producers to increase productiveness. As a result, they are able to secure higher income for themselves and to ensure an unchanged level of profit for the owners. A revision of ownership relations allows owners to reinstate social peace in their production units and to ensure uninterrupted acquisition of profit for themselves.
Some owners exit the phase of revolutionary disturbances by modifying the ownership relations. They grant more autonomy to direct producers what rises their productivity. In the consequence, the higher newly produced value can be divided into variable capital satisfying needs of direct producers and surplus value. The rise of income of direct producers in the progressive relations of ownership reinstates social peace. The remaining conservative owners also respond with a transformation of ownership relations connecting them with direct producers. Thus, in the phase of evolution in ownership relations, a gradual transformation of ownership relations takes place. As soon as the most of total product is produced within the new progressive ownership relations, a shift into a new socio-economic formation is completed. According to the model of social evolution, the emergence of new socio-economic formation implies a transformation of ownership relations in a given society.
Let us now consider the second variant where a revolution transforms into a social confrontation.304 The absence of the centralized means of coercion does ←211 | 212→not preclude the existence of dispersed means of coercion at the owners’ disposal. If owners decide to violently suppress revolutionary protests, they will allow for a declassation of direct producers. Declassation paralyzes the working class and prevents resistance, allowing owners to advance exploitation. However, in the state of unlimited exploitation and dissatisfaction of the greater part of needs of the direct producers, their productivity decreases. As a result, owners acquire lower profits, which works against the interest of this class. However, a mere increase of income of direct producers restores their readiness to take up social resistance. A repeated application of force brings about another declassation of direct producers and, once more, brings direct producers to poverty, which, in turn, causes a decrease in their productiveness and in profits expected by owners. For this reason, the only possible permanent solution is a revision of ownership relations, which awards an increased productive autonomy to direct producers bringing about a boost of their productiveness. If an economic revolution is lost on the part of direct producers, a society experiences a delayed evolution of ownership relations.
Alternatively, a working class can gain victory in a social confrontation. As a consequence, a class of owners is eliminated and local revolutionary communities acquire control over the means of production. However, under the mechanism of economic competition, the victorious working class will divide internally into new employee elites, which will monopolize control over the means of production, and into masses. By seizing control over the means of production, revolutionary elites transform into a new class of owners. The new class of owners will repeat the actions of the old one. It will increase profit to maximum – initially, by means of organizational advancement, and later by means of appropriation of surplus product. Boost of alienation of labor brings about revolutionary outbursts of direct producers, ←212 | 213→forcing the new class of owners to revise ownership. In other words, a workers’ revolution targeted at the new class of owners ends a labor loop.
To sum up, all variants of the evolution of an economic society – victory or loss of employees’ revolution and revolutionary disturbances enforcing a revision of ownership relations – reach the same social result, namely, an evolutionary transformation of ownership relations. The development of an economic society can be demonstrated in the Figure 12.
Fig. 10: Development of an economic society (the standard no-loop variant). Explanations: cp – threshold of class peace; R – revolutionary area; dc – threshold of declassation; solid line – level of economic alienation; dotted line – evolution of ownership. Henceforth, the above key will be used.
The basic model of an economic society is supposed to explain the most fundamental developmental trends of each socio-economic formation.305
The counterpart of the phase of the increasing alienation of labor in slavery formation is period of patriarchal slavery which gradually transformed into classical one or the exacerbated serfdom of the peasantry introduced in the feudalism. The process of worsening of the economic situation of slaves or peasants brought about social movements, a rise of slaves in the 2nd and the 1st centuries B.C., and peasant wars and riots of urban commoners in the 14th and the 16th centuries in Europe, which, in light of the model, one may interpret as economic revolutions. In the consequence of social disturbances, new ownership relations were emerged. An institution of colonate was prototypic to feudal relations in a slavery society. The owners of great estates settled free people as lease-holders (colonus) on their arable lands. After paying the rent, the coloni could keep the ←213 | 214→rest of income for themselves. Afterwards, a prototype of capitalist ownership in a feudal formation was a tolling agreement system in craft and free lease of land in agriculture. A socio-economic evolution brings about a growing autonomy of direct producers – a capitalist worker is more liberated than an urban commoner or a serf, and the latter two enjoy more freedom than a typical slave.
The basic model of an economic society explains fundamental developmental trends common to all socio-economic formations. However, to acquire satisfactory approximation of a feudal society, one has to further concretize the model of an economic society. The model of a feudal economy within n-Mhm assumes a periodical growth of productive forces and a emergence of new domain of production. The above take place in the final stadium of the phase of the increasing alienation of labor. Let us now present a much-simplified model evolution of a feudal economy.306
In the first stadium of the phase of the increasing alienation of labor, the class of owners maximize surplus value, initially by means of organizational advancements, subsequently by means of a gradually growing reduction of variable capital. For this reason, the alienation of labor increases at this stage of social development. The gradual advancement of exploitation causes an increase of social tensions. However, the stage of growing social conflict and revolutionary disturbances takes a different course in comparison to the corresponding phase of social evolution in a standard economic society. In the final stadium of the phase of the increasing alienation of labor, there occurs a periodical growth of productive forces and a new domain of production is established. Initially, in the new branch of production there is a lower level of alienation of labor in comparison to the old one. Direct producers faced with the choice between migrating to the new production sector, or engaging in a revolutionary confrontation in the old sector of production, migrate to the new economic domain. Migration of the most rebellious workers to new branch of production, characterized by a lower alienation of labor, automatically defuses the conflict situation in the old sphere of the economy.
This results in a creation of a dual society. Owners of the old sphere of economy, in order to prevent further migration of direct producers to the new economic sector, shift the division of live production to the benefit of workers. After a certain period of time, the level of alienation of labor decreases in the old economic sector. Simultaneously, the new production area undergoes a process ←214 | 215→of division into the class of owners and the class of direct producers. Under the influence of the standard mechanisms of economic competition, the level of exploitation increases also in the new economic sector.
The above model assumes that the economy of the society under study is of a parasitic character. For this reason, expanded reproduction depends on the growth of owners’ personal consumption. Thus, an increase of fund of luxury (M) constitutes the fundamental condition for economic growth. One has to assume that after the division of the economy, both economic subsystems become parasitic. The conditions for a development of effective demand in both fields separately can be demonstrated in the following way:
Do= Co + Vo + (Mok + Δ Mok)
Dn= Cn + Vn + (Mnk + Δ Mnk)
Each of the separate branches of production creates effective demand for the second one. The external component of the effective demand for the new branch of production is the increase of the constant capital in the old domain (Δ Con), an increase of variable capital (Δ Von), and the growth of the fund of luxury (ΔMon) manufactured in the new production area. Naturally, the above objects cannot be supplied but the old branch of production. For this reason, the demand for production of the new branch is a sum of external and internal effective demands. Consequently, the effective demand for the production of the new domain of production includes:
Dn = Mn + Do
In a corresponding way, the effective demand on the goods of the old domain of production includes internal demand determined by an increase of luxury fund and external demand determined by the new domain of production:
Do = Mo + Dn
Initially, the old sphere of production visibly dominates the new one. Then, the demand of the old economic sector determines the volume of the effective demand on the goods manufactured in the new production area. Following from this, the growth of its own luxury fund ceases to be the principal stimulator for the new production sphere. In the phase of the splitting of the society, the demand of the old sphere of production becomes the principal stimulator and the owners of the new sector begin to accumulate, instead of consummating. Importantly, satisfaction of the external effective demand (of the old sphere) depends on the level of accumulation. In the old branch of production the external effective demand does not play an equally important part, as the increase of old owners’ luxury fund. Developmental perspectives of each of the ←215 | 216→production areas are determined by the relation between the growth of effective demand DN on goods manufactured in a given domain of production and the production size of a given domain PN. The developmental perspective of the new production domain is manifested by the following ratio:
PN = Δ DN/PN
Correspondingly, the perspective of the old domain of production is manifested by the following quotient:
Po = Δ Do /Po
The production sphere that has a better perspective for development will develop more dynamically and will in time dominate the economy of a given society.
However, developmental perspectives of each of the economic domains influence the evolution of class relations inside separate economic areas only to a small extent. A decrease in income of the class of owners of the old production area brings about counteraction – an attempt at lowering the income of direct producers. For this reason, within this economic system, the alienation of labor grows and, in turn, brings about an increase of social conflict.
Correspondingly, standard economic mechanisms bring about an increase of the alienation of labor in the new branch of economy. Providing the level of exploitation exceeds a certain threshold – a threshold of class peace, social disturbances outburst and soon transform into mass revolutions of direct producers.
Following from this, revolutionary disturbances take pace in both economic subsystems. Revolutions may outbreak simultaneously in both areas, or they may outbreak separately. Since this time, the level of productive forces is constant, a revision of ownership relations may bring a solution of the social conflict. Following from this, progressive rules of ownership relations emerge in the new and old production areas. By granting additional autonomy to direct producers, they stimulate a boost of productivity. However, a shift into the new socio-economic formation does not only depend on an internal evolution of types of ownership in each of the economic subsystems, but also on the process of domination of the progressive ownership relations of one of the economic subsystems over the progressive rules of ownership of the second subsystem. This domination depends on the developmental perspective of a given domain of production. As a result that progressive rules ownership relations become widespread in society at large which domain of production has better developmental perspective. As a result, a dual society retransforms into a unitary society.
The above model is capable of providing a more detailed explanation of some of the developmental trends that characterize a feudal economy. I will ←216 | 217→now present a much-simplified historical illustration of the model assumed by n-Mhm. The final decay of slavery-based economy took place approximately in the 4th and the 6th centuries. Slavery was then substituted with an institution of colonate. Coloni leased farmland from landowners and, in exchange, they paid back with a portion of their crops and money. Additionally, coloni were forced to provide various craft services. The introduction of the institution of colonate on the mass scale brought about a naturalization of the economy and a disappearance of towns in a slavery-based society. The class of feudal lords that emerged from the class of slave owners had subjugated the class of peasants until the 10th century. A feudal lord had land power (he was a landowner of the farmland cultivated by a peasant), personal power (he was in control of a direct producer), and judicial power (he could decide on legal cases involving a peasant).
Together with a number of advancements in the field of craft production, technological advancements at the turn of the 10th and the 11th centuries – such as the invention of an iron plough, the introduction of the three-field system, and the horse collar used for ploughing – laid the foundation for the separation of a new production field of an urban economy. The technological aspect of a dual economy was a growth of productive forces. The social aspect of the process of creation of the new branch of production was merely an acquisition of an adequate size of a productive force. At the turn of the 10th and the 11th centuries, a considerable number of peasants migrated to towns in order to improve their economic situation, since towns offered significantly more beneficial conditions for earning. Initially, towns enjoyed the same privileges, as rural settlements, but during the 10th and the 11th centuries they earned autonomy and self-governance, frequently in the course of bloody battles with the feudal class.
Feudal lords, in order to prevent a mass escape of peasants to towns, decided to mitigate serfdom relationships in rural areas. They substituted corvée with rent and accepted the peasants’ freedom to move. The above concessions beneficial to the peasantry allowed this social class to acquire higher income. However, in a long-term perspective, the above concessions brought about a decrease of income of the nobility.
After the period of transformation of town economy, the mechanisms of economic competition subjected this production area to the processes of growing alienation of labor. In these terms, one can interpret the development of the guild system, which limited the independence of apprentices and gave almost unlimited abilities of exploitation of workers. In some branches of the craft a working day lasted for 15–16 hours. The process of lowering income of the apprentices and prolonging the working day brought about a rise of the opposition of direct producers employed in craft workshops. The protests of this social group were ←217 | 218→manifested in strikes and demonstration of urban commoners that grew in size in the 13th and the 14th centuries.
Corresponding processes took place in the agricultural system. A decrease of income of the feudal lords, enforced by the development of the urban production area, brought about a counteraction of this social class. However, peasants responded with an increased opposition to the repeated attempts to enforce subjugation and to increase the scope of serfdom. A number of riots of rural populations and urban commoners took place in various Western-European countries in the 14th and the 16th centuries. For example, in France peasant riots started in 1358 and demonstrations of urban commoners took place in a number of towns in the years 1381–1382, and in Germany riots of urban apprentices in a number of major towns in the German Reich lead to a peasant war that erupted in 1525. In light of the model of a feudal economy, the above events may be interpreted as an economic revolution of direct producers of both economic subsystems. As the model suggests, these revolutions were supposed to bring about a development of progressive ownership where direct producers would enjoy a higher level of production autonomy. One may perceive the appearance of individual land lease agreements and a spread of a tolling agreement system, together with the subsequent manufacturing system that abolished the limitations of the guild system, as manifestations of a progressive ownership. As a result, the development of capitalist ownership was initiated within a feudal economy. This process was most visible in England. Abolishment of serfdom brought about a deficit of workforce, which was searching for work in towns. As a result, landowners had to resign from producing crops and develop sheep breeding that required a lower number of direct producers. This brought about changes in the structure of agricultural ownership. Land was being fenced, common landownership was liquidated, and poorer peasants were being expropriated. Agriculture became an industrial branch specializing in production of goods sold at a market. This brought about a subordination of the structure of agricultural ownership to the system of ownership of the domineering economic system. Thus, the diffusion of progressive ownership of the domineering economic subsystem determined a transformation into a capitalist economy.
I find it noteworthy that a feudal model in n-Mhm basically approximated only the development of Western European societies. This model does not explain the developmental mechanisms of Central Europe because the conceptual apparatus of this theory is too rough to grasp the developmental trends of the societies in this part of Europe. I am particularly discussing here the issue of dualism in the socio-economic development of Europe and a creation of the manorial-serf system east of the river Elbe. On the one hand, this system ←218 | 219→undermined the evolution of the new economic sphere, while on the other hand, it limited the level of production autonomy of the peasants, by exacerbating serfdom. For a period of time – usually the 16th century is listed in this regard – Central Europe had been evolving in line with other developmental regularities, in comparison to Western Europe. In order to explain these regularities, one has to further develop n-Mhm model of social development.
Macro-social dependencies between rulers and a class of citizens are derived from anthropological presumptions based on non-Christian model of man (hereinafter referred to as n-Cmm).307 This brings about a differentiation of two areas of revolutions in a political theory. On the other hand, a Christian model of man (hereinafter as Cmm) provides anthropological grounds for a formulation of the second type of social dependencies – macro-economic regularities. This way, one can distinguish only one revolutionary area in the statics of the theory of economic momentum. Corresponding differences occur in the dynamics of the theories of the two domains of public life: politics and economy. Following from this, n-Mhm in its current form assumes two models of man – one based on a Cmm and the second adopting the assumptions of n-Cmm. In order to avoid the allegations of internal conflict, I will attempt to draw also the economic dependencies from the anthropological presumptions of non-Christian model of man.
First, I would like to offer a review of the reconstruction of the anthropological assumptions creating a “Christian model of man.” Second, I will provide arguments proving that the critique of the anthropological assumptions of Christianity offered by Leszek Nowak is inaccurate. As a result, the terms “Christian” and “Non-Christian” model of man will become meaningless. Hence, I will substitute them with the terms “rationalistic” and “non-rationalistic” model of man.
The two anthropological conceptions – first, adopted by the Gospel (according to Nowak) and the second that is supposed to offer a positive critique of the first – refer to terms and language of a particular axiological concept.308 I will now briefly present its main ideas. May the relation of preference of person A allow ordering a set of states of affairs in the following way:
p−m, . . ., p−2, p−1, p0, p1, p2, …, pn←219 | 220→
The above sequence is a value W of person A, and the following states of affairs are cases of value W. The states of affairs p1, …, pn are positive cases (good of W type) for person A, and the states of affairs p1, …, pn are negative cases (bad of W type) of person A. The state of affairs p0 is a neutral state for person A.
According to the conception recapitulated above, the benevolence of person B toward person A is B’ tendency to realize the goods of A, whereas the hostility is of person B to realize states of affairs that person A considers to be evil.
Nowak claims that the Christian ethics is founded on the virtue of love for our neighbor, moreover, love for our enemies. In the reconstruction presented above, certain anthropological theses, which originate from the above moral guidelines, are formulated on the basis of the principle of love. According to Nowak:
the foundation of every principle is a recognition of the factual state, thus, some given knowledge of the reality. Only on the grounds of this knowledge, it orders people to behave in a way that is supposed to bring about a transformation of “what is” into “what should be.” One says “don’t smoke” to a person who he/she knows to be smoking and whom, one believes, will benefit from hearing this advice. In more general terms, one who establishes the general principle “all people should do C,” assumes a quite general descriptive statement that people are not willing to voluntarily behave in C way, but that if they became aware of the responsibility to behave this way, they will implement the behavior. These types of statements, particularity the ones associated with universal ethical systems, straightforwardly assume a particular vision of the human nature, or a philosophical anthropology.309
In this regard, the principle of love for our neighbor is supposed to assume: “The mutual attitudes of both considered– arbitrary but typical – individuals are formed on the basis of a linear relationship. The more hostile individual A is toward individual B, the more hostile B is toward A, while the kinder A is toward B, the kinder B is toward A.”310
The author of the reconstruction under investigation argues that this context is necessary to discover the epistemological value of the principle “love your enemies.” Nowak repeats after Gombrowicz that the behavior of other people determines the human nature. Hatred and anger are perceived as a wrong reaction to evil faced in everyday life. According to the analyzed interpretation of the Gospel, everyone can be “saved by God,” or liberated from the condition of hatred in which he/she is entangled if he/she comes across people who will ←220 | 221→show him/her benevolence. In response to the received goodness, the evildoer will respond with kindness toward someone else.
However, Nowak claims that the theoretical concept behind the New Testament has two significant limitations. In particular, hostility is supposed to reciprocate for moderate evil that we face in everyday life. However, in the face of extreme life-endangering enmity, one is not supposed to respond with hostility toward his/her evildoer, but with kindness, since kindness keeps him/her safe. To put it in more technical terms:
Beyond a certain range of hostility of person A to person B, at which the reflexive hostility of B to A reaches the highest level (let us call it the spectrum of rebellion of B against A), any further growth of A’s hostility to B – that is, the tendency of A to produce constantly larger threats to B – entails the decrease of the reflexive hostility, that is, to carry out what oppressor considers to be good, or, in other words, to realize his preferences.311
In the situation of enslavement, person B behaves in accordance with preferences of person A, instead of implementing his/her own preferences. Nowak argues that, in this situation, the principle “love your enemies” is supposed to act as an order consolidating submissiveness and devotion to the malefactor. In this area of interpersonal relations, the ethics of love should be substituted with the ethics of rebellion.
A corresponding situation should occur at the opposite end of interpersonal relations. Kindness is an appropriate response to kindness of others up until a certain point. After a certain threshold is exceeded,
when the size of gift continues to increase, when constantly higher goods are realized for us, the situation begins to change. Our tendency to reciprocate kindness with kindness disappears; we return the growing goodness with a constantly lesser one. Finally, in the truly extreme case, when someone realizes for us the highest good, it turns into the attitude, which, as in the Russian saying “s zyru biesit’sa,” we will call the attitude of satanization. This attitude consists in responding to the greatest benevolence with hostility, or, in order words, acting according to the counter-preference of our benefactor.312
In the area of satanization, the principle of love for our neighbor, designed to forbid people from hurting others, consolidates the attitude of satanization. A satanized person behaves according to counter-preferences of his/her benefactor instead of satisfying his/her own preferences. In this area, as Nowak ←221 | 222→claims, the Christian principle of love for our neighbor should be substituted with the ethics of social severity.
To recapitulate, one can say that the non-rationalistic model of man assumes there are three areas of interpersonal relations and three separate ethical systems. In the normal area the rule of reciprocity prevails. Individual A responds with hostility to the hostile behavior of his/her interacting partner – individual B. The highest levels of enmity expressed by A toward B may be termed a rebellion of individual A against B. For every A there is a threshold of hostility – when individual A faces extreme enmity and he/she becomes inclined to implement the preferences of individual B, instead of continuing his/her hostile behavior toward B. In the area of enslavement, under the influence of extreme enmity, an individual resigns from realizing his/her own preferences and adopts the preferences of his/her partner in a social interaction. In this area, the ethics of love for one’s neighbor should be substituted with the ethics of revolution.
An analoguous situation takes place at the opposite end of the area of interpersonal relations. Individual A also responds with kindness to kindness received from B. However, every A has a threshold of kindness. When faced with extreme kindness, individual A ceases to respond with kindness. In the final stadium of the process, his/her behavior transforms into a “pathological” enmity toward the interacting partner. In the area of satanization an individual does not behave in line with his/her own preferences, but with the counter-preferences of her/his interacting partner. In this area, the ethics of love for one’s neighbor should be substituted with the ethics of social severity.←222 | 223→
The above concept allows for distinguishing a number of peculiar attitudes. A person with a steadfast attitude resists enslavement regardless of the range of the experienced evil. In turn, a person with a pious attitude will not become satanized regardless of the range of experienced goodness. Interpersonal relations described by the non-rationalistic model of man are be demonstrated graphically in the previous page 222.
Fig. 13: Non-rationalistic model of man. Explanations: W(X,Y) – hostility of X toward Y; W(Y, X) – hostility of Y toward X; Z (X,Y) – benevolence of X toward Y; Z(Y,X) – benevolence of Y towards X; sa – area of satanization; ln – area of kindness; rb – area of rebellion; en – area of enslavement.
When commenting on the reconstruction of a Cmm offered by Leszek Nowak, it is noteworthy to consider the methodological status of the conception. According to Nowak, the adaptive interpretation attempts to solve:
the same kind of substantive problems the historical author of the given conception under interpretation was trying to solve. If, then, it is necessary to turn the author’s hierarchization of motives upside down, if it is necessary even to eliminate some of them in order to obtain the solution the historical author failed to achieve, then all that is admissible. For regulative interpretation, the author’s ideas are the intellectual point of departure for making a theory of the world. And normally this regulative interpretation is not very helpful in discovering the contents of the author’s mind when he was engaged in the same type of occupation some time ago.313
However, in this case the question is to what extent the interpreter is allowed to modify the structure of the lines of thoughts of the investigated conception? And how to define the line between a concept that is an interpretation of a viewpoint of a given author and a concept that merely draws inspiration from someone else’s thought material. To help establish this difference, one may assume that the body of works of the interpreted author consists in a number of motives. One may distinguish between principal and secondary threads. In a historical interpretation, an interpreter adopts the author’s standpoint on the structure of his/her own thought. However, in an adaptive interpretation of someone else’s thoughts, an interpreter has the right to modify a hierarchical order of motives. If the modification occurs in the area of motives belonging to the class of principal motives, it is an interpretation. However, if while working on someone else’s body of work, an interpreter modifies motives from the area of motives established by the author to be secondary, i.e. if he/she decides that the motives perceived by the author to be secondary, are indeed principal, than this is not an ←223 | 224→interpretation. One may say that an initial concept is inspiration for a subsequent concept. According to this approach, the Gospel inspired Nowak’s model (due to the reduction of theological motives).
The above differences become apparent in paraphrasing of the two methods of reading someone else’s thoughts. If one paraphrases an interpretation of the views of a given author and discovers them to be false according to the paraphrasing concept, then the interpreted author is held accountable. However, if one paraphrases a concept that draws inspiration from other author’s concepts and discovers it to be false according to the paraphrasing concept, then the source of the inspiration is not held accountable (due to too large discrepancies between the original and the interpretation) but the one inspired by someone else’s views.
Since the Gospel is the sole inspiration for a Cmm, Nowak’s idea that “an ethic universal for the entire area of interpersonal relations does not exist, or, at least, it is not the Christian ethic”314 is unjustified. Thus, in order to avoid worldview implications, I shall use the terms “rationalistic” and “non-rationalistic” model of man to describe the two concepts of man in the further part of the present book.315←224 | 225→
I shall now return to the underlying theme of the present chapter, namely, the macro-social economic dependencies derived from the assumptions of a non-rationalistic model of man.
Let us take a closer look at a political theory. It is capable of expressing the global concept of control and domination.316 It may be stated that B has control over A if he/she is able to impose on every alternative decision of a certain type a sanction unfavorable to person A. The domination of B over A is manifested in social situations crated by B, in which A adopts B’s system of preferences. In political life, social impact is expanded directly – through control over the means of coercion. Static assumptions of a political theory comprise of three areas of the relation between authorities and a class of citizens. In the first, central area social peace prevails. Civil alienation, which demonstrates the ratio of actions of citizens to all actions, is small and revolting people also constitute a small percentage. However, if the sphere of regulation rises, civil social resistance also increases in order finally to enter the area of the revolution of the first kind. A further increase of the sphere of regulation disrupts independent social ties. In an atomized civil class, the ability for resistance disappears completely, which causes the citizens to spontaneously adopt preferences of the rulers. However, as civil alienation continues to grow and a complete totalization of civil society becomes a threat, one of the peculiar attitudes becomes widespread – the steadfast attitude what brings about a revolution of the second kind.
A corresponding situation takes place at the opposite end of the area of the relation authorities – civil class. The level of social alienation, manifested by the “the relation between the number of social actions undertaken in the state of satanization and the total number of actions,”317 is indicative of the state of class peace in the relations between authorities and civil society. In this area, there is also a low level of consensus, indicated by the percentage of citizens in the state of kindness toward the authorities. However, an increase of the number of actions undertaken in the state of satanization raises the level of social consensus – power becomes the sole guarantor of social peace. An increase of social alienation, or a growth of the percentage of satanized actions, disrupts the foundation of all types of social ties, even the autonomous ones. At this stage one of the peculiar attitudes diffuses in a society – the pious attitude, which leads ←225 | 226→to the area of solidarity of the second type, which protects the society from an anomie.318
The above dependencies can be demonstrated graphically in the following way:
Fig. 14: Relation power – civil society. Explanations: W – level of resistance; K – level of consensus; Ca – civil alienation; Sa – social alienation; S II – the second solidaristic area; st – area of satanization; S I – the first of solidaristic area; O – circle of public order; cp – area of class peace; R I – the first revolutionary area; dc – area of declassation; en – area of enslavement; R II – the second revolutionary area.
I would like to apply above-presented anthropological presumptions to an economic sphere. One can formulate the concept of economic control and domination. In an economic sphere, the process of enlarging social impact is indirect because it occurs via system of appropriation of surplus product. A negative sanction imposed on A (a direct producer) is a decrease of his/her income by B (owner). By determining the size of income acquired by A, B brings A to failure or to undertake certain actions preferred by B – i.e. to combine productive forces A with the means of production. On the other hand, the domination of B over A occurs when A is in an economic situation when he/she adopts also the preference system expressed by B. The relations based on economic control or domination are asymmetrical. Control over a certain type of material means allows B to impose on some A’s action negative sanction. A is deprived of such possibilities – i.e. refusal to work (I omit here extraordinary cases of a social revolution).
Hence, if the non-rationalistic concept of man serves as the foundation basis for drawing global economic dependencies, then in the static image of the ←226 | 227→relation of ownership – the class of direct producers – one could distinguish the area of class peace, economic declassation, and revolution of the first and the second kind. I will limit my analysis to the above interpersonal relations.
On a micro-social level, in the area of class peace prevails the principle of reciprocity: “the higher the income, the more productive the labor.” In this area, social peace prevails since the most of the economic needs of direct producers is satisfied.
However, when the income of direct producers drops, their productivity decreases. On a micro-social level, in the area of an increase of intensity of social struggle the principle of reciprocity may be defined as “the lower the income, the lower the effectiveness of labor.” A drop in productivity brings about a decrease of profit of owners. To protect themselves against the decreasing profitability, they introduce further limitation of the variable capital assigned to direct producers. However, a decrease of income of direct producers additionally lowers the productivity of labor and, in a limit case, brings about to a refusal to combine workforce of direct producers with the means of production. Following from this, the revolution of the 1st kind outbreaks when exploitation reaches a moderately high level – it becomes painful, but it does not erase the ability to organize mass incidents.
In the area of declassation, a further decrease of income of direct producers brings about a spread of the attitude of “pathological productiveness.” On the micro-social level, the principle of behavior derived from the above attitude may be expressed in the following way: “the lower the income, the higher the effectiveness of work.” The spread of this attitude among direct producers is, on the one hand, a way of protecting against extreme poverty and, on the other hand, a result of disappearance of the mechanisms of class resistance, since poverty disrupts all autonomous interpersonal relations, which, in turn, obstruct the ability to organize mass incidents.
For this reason, social peace prevails in the area of declassation. However, this is not a permanent state. If the exploitation of direct producers grows substantially and the income ceases to satisfy even the most fundamental needs that determine the biological existence of the class, one of the peculiar attitudes becomes widespread in a society – the steadfast attitude. Let us recall that the steadfast attitude characterizes an individual who, regardless of the scope of experienced evil, does not subordinate to someone else’s authority. The diffusion of this type of attitude brings about a revolution of the second kind, which prevents the threat of biological degradation of a society, namely, an extreme level of dissatisfaction of needs.
In short, social peace prevails in a situation of low alienation of labor, when the most of needs of direct producers is satisfied, and a situation of high alienation, ←227 | 228→when exploitation reaches the extent in which it obstructs the ability for mass protests. Revolutionary protests erupt when the alienation of labor is moderately high (revolution of the first kind) or extreme (revolution of the second kind). In the first case, a revolution begins when exploitation becomes painful, but it does not yet suppress the ability to organize mass protest. In the second case, riots occur when the scope of exploitation endangers biological survival of direct producers. The above dependencies can be demonstrated graphically in the following way:
Fig. 15: The dependency of the level of class struggle on the alienation of labor. Explanations: CS – level of class struggle; AL – alienation of labor: cp – interval of class peace; I R – interval of revolution of the first kind, dc – interval of declassation II R – interval of revolution of the second kind.
Incorporation of the above-presented presumptions of the non-rationalistic model of man to the theory of economic society modifies the its static assumptions. Most significantly, one may distinguish two kinds of revolution in the statics of economic momentum.319 Metaphorically speaking, a revolution of ←228 | 229→the first kind begins under the conditions of an imbalanced relative prosperity with the goal to protect personal possessions, and a revolution of the second kind is a desperate act aimed to protect against the threat of starvation.
A closer consideration should be given to revolutions of the second kind. Such revolutions correspond with so-called “food riots,” a term which appears in historical works. These social disturbances include events, which took place in the North-West England in the years of 1790–1801, and which have been broadly discussed in historical works.320 In the second half of the 18th century, the industry was rapidly developing in the region of Lancaster and the Cheshire County. The developing light industry and the swiftly growing towns caused people from all over England to move to this area. This process was accompanied by another process of decreasing the farmland area and by the technological stagnation of agriculture. Shortly, the region lost its ability to self-sustain in food. At the turn of the 18th and the 19th centuries, two additional factors occurred: a decrease of harvest and an economic blockage of England hampering the purchase of food. Simultaneously, wage levels dropped substantially to the level when it became impossible to satisfy the most fundamental needs:
In 1795 wage levels in the cotton industry were in a steady decline which continued until 1802. Wage levels and unemployment were factors in both Rochdale and Saddleworth riots in 1795, but it was in 1799–1800 that such factors became critically important. By 1800 wages were at their lowest ebb for the whole decade while prices had risen by some 300 per cent. […] The result was great privation and hardship.321
A decrease of wage levels and a rapid increase of prices became a threat to biological survival of the lowest layers of the English society. According to Booth, who relies on the epoch’s diarists,←229 | 230→
[b];y the winter of 1800 and the early months of 1801 the poor literally starving. In March 1801 Richard Hodgkinson, agent to Lord Lilford, wrote to his employer: “The poor are absolutely starving for want of both food and clothing. An industrious family in full work cannot earn more than half meat.” They were willing to listen to anybody proposing a solution.322
A wave of food riots that swept the largest English towns at the turn of the 18th and the 19th centuries brought a solution. The course of these riots was typical. They began with people gathering in public places – squares and streets. Afterwards, someone would initiate plundering homes of wealthy merchants suspected of grain speculation, mills, warehouses for grain exchange, and, less frequently, shops. These acts included breaking glass windows, devastating furniture and equipment. Riots usually ended with a discovery of hidden food supplies. Foot riots were characteristically short-lasting, spontaneous and dynamic.
Perez Zagorin employed the above features to differentiate between a riot, rebellion, and revolution.323 It could be assumed that according to Zagorin’s classification, a riot corresponds with a revolution of the second kind, which has a historical counterpart in food riots occurring at the turn of the 18th and the 19th centuries in the North-West England.
According to Zagorin, a riot is a spontaneous, unplanned or only roughly outlined outburst. It is a brief social movement that last for the maximum of a few of days. Moreover, the riot participants do not have political or long-distanced goals. Their goals are achievable in a short-term perspective only. A riot is predominantly a manifestation of a spontaneous outburst of anger of the people. The expressive aspect of the riot dominates over its instrumental aspect, namely, the realization of specific goals.324 Zagorin recapitulates his reflections in the following way: “Because of these characteristics, riots should be considered as independent phenomena which occur within or separately from revolution and whose connection with the latter is indeteminate.”325
I find it important to comment on the above characteristic in terms of the conceptual categories of n-Mhm. According to the theory, revolutions have three components: material, institutional and consciousness. Social actions, which disturb the normal relations of class subordination, may have a spontaneous and ←230 | 231→a dynamic character. In the analyzed case, they only have a material component. If these actions are structured into state-independent institutions, then a social movement includes an institutional component. If a mass movement is socially self-aware, a revolution receives a consciousness level.326
In comparison to a full-blown revolution, riots are social movements lacking the institutional and consciousness components. For this reason, they are simple revolutions. One may distinguish two types of revolutions – starting under the conditions of relative wealth (the first kind) and starting under the conditions of extreme poverty (the second kind) led to biological starvation. Riots belong to the second kind, since they erupt in the situation of extreme dissatisfaction of even the most fundamental needs. As a result, they do not have any long-distance goals and the fundamental needs are relatively easy to satisfy. These two factors – absence of an institutional and a consciousness level, together with a swift shift from the state of extreme poverty to the state of relative wealth (satisfaction of needs) – influence the growing satanization of the participants of the riot. This precise element determines dynamism, havoc and the puzzling passion for destruction that characterizes the participants of the revolution of the second kind.
Nonetheless, I disagree with Zagorin who claims that the revolutions of the second kind (riots) are an exact opposite of the revolutions of the first kind (rebellions). The common feature of these movements is the material component that undermines the established relations of class ruling. Moreover, revolutionary movements of both types are generated by the same factor – the state of dissatisfaction of needs: elemental (revolutions of the second kind) or determining the level of prosperity (revolutions of the first kind).
I would like to argue that the above analysis convincingly justifies the necessity to distinguish two types of revolutions and emphasizes the specifics of the revolution of the second kind. Let us now analyze the amendments made to the model of development of an economic society with the modifications introduced to the statics of economic momentum.
For this reason, let us assume that there is an economic society comprising two social classes: owners and direct producers, isolated from the outside, not organized into institutions of public life and without collective ways of thinking. ←231 | 232→In this society, the level of productive forces and the number of the branch of production is constant. Moreover, in the economy of this society there occurs simple reproduction. In this model the neighboring aspects of public life, such as politics and culture, do not influence the social processes.
I assume that social processes set out from the state of social peace. However, the class of owners – as result of the mechanism of economic competition – gradually maximizes the surplus product. After introducing the most optimal system of organization of production, the increase of surplus product is possible only by decreasing the variable capital assigned to the class of direct producers. As a result, the gap between the level of needs of direct producers and the size of income assigned to satisfy them grows, which, in turn, brings about the rise of the alienation of labor. And this leads to an intensification of class struggle. Initially, it takes on gentle forms – a decrease of effectiveness of labor, singular riots, etc. – to gradually transform into a mass revolutionary movement of the first kind.
The economic revolution of direct producers may enforce a revision of ownership relations or it may transform into a social confrontation. Let us assume a no loop variant of a social confrontation victorious for the class of owners.
After crushing revolutionary movements in the phase of declassation, owners easily maximize the surplus product at the expense of the variable capital. Under the conditions of growing poverty individuals are forced to compete for income to guarantee survival. Declassation atomizes direct producers and obstructs their ability to organize mass movements. For this reason, the only way to sustain an adequate level of income under the conditions of decreasing variable capital and the disappearance of class resistance is to increase work effectiveness. The attitude of “pathological productiveness” is spread in this phase of social evolution.
However, when the reduction of variable capital reaches a considerable scope, in which it begins to threaten the biological survival of the class of direct producers, the significance of one of the peculiar attitudes – the steadfast attitude – increases in a society, in accordance with the anthropological presumptions. The diffusion of the above attitude brings about an outbreak of the revolution of the second kind, serving as a defense mechanism protecting the society against the state of biological starvation. This revolution may enforce an evolution of ownership relations or it may transform again into a social confrontation. Let us assume, correspondingly to the case of the previous revolution, that a social confrontation is victorious for the class of owners.
Contrary to what one might expect, a social confrontation victorious for the owners does not bring about a significant change. The rebelling direct producers may be eliminated, but it is impossible to force the remaining ones to work more effectively under the conditions of a biological starvation. Therefore, after ←232 | 233→the pacification, owners decide to introduce a number of concessions that are supposed to increase the global level of variable capital. A substantial raise of “starvation rations” awakens a revolutionary spirit among direct producers and causes the alienation of labor to re-enter the area of revolutionary disturbances of the 1st kind. Nonetheless, in a long-term, a raise considerable enough to allow direct producers to climb out of the stage of biological starvation, but small enough to maintain the state of declassation, does not bring about beneficial social solutions. This is due to the fact that the mechanism of economic competition leads back to the increase of the alienation of labor, which, in turn, leads back to the revolution of the second kind. Even if the owners manage to crush the protest of the direct producers once more, they will face the same dilemma as before: How to force employees, under the conditions of a biological starvation, to work effectively so that they bring an increased profit to owners?
The only permanent social solution, which increases higher productivity, is an evolution of ownership. A growth of an economic autonomy of direct producers brings about an increase of the effectiveness of their work. As a result, they can work about a higher income and owners can acquire a higher profit. In the phase of the evolution of ownership relations, gradually an increasing number of owners revise ownership relations established between themselves and the direct producers. As soon as the most of production is manufactured within the new ownership relations, an evolutionary transformation of the socio-economic formation occurs. The image of the evolution of an economic society can be demonstrated graphically in the following way:
Fig. 16: Two types of revolution in the development of an economic society. Explanations: cp – threshold of class peace; I R – area of a revolution of the 1st kind; dc – threshold of declassation; II R – area of a revolution of the 2nd kind; A – variant of a development ending with a compromise – revision of ownership relations; B – confrontational variant of a social evolution; solid line – alienation of labor; dotted line – evolution of ownership relations.
I would like to conclude the present chapter with an overview of the amendments introduced to the standard model of an economic society. The model assumed the following developmental lines:
(1) the growth of the alienation of labor – lost economic revolution – evolution of ownership relations;
(2) the growth of the alienation of labor – revolution won by a working class – economic loop concluded with a lost economic revolution – evolution of ownership relations;
(3) the growth of the alienation of labor – revolution won by owners – decrease of the effectiveness of labor enforcing an evolution of ownership relations.
An evolution of an economic society founded on the assumptions of a non-rationalistic model of man increases the number of possible variants of a social development. Most importantly, there is a shift in the transformation of ownership relations. According to the standard model, the revision of ownership is an inherent consequence of an economic revolution (identified with the revolution of the first kind). I will present the possible variants of the social development in the modified model using the following scheme, in order not to overcomplicate the structure of the argument:
(1) AL + 1REV0 + EVOL
(2) AL + 1REV+ + AL + 1REV0 + EVOL
(3) AL + 1REV+ + AL + 1REV- + DECL + 2REV0 + EVOL
(4) AL + 1REV+ + AL + 1REV- + DECL + 2REV+ + AL+1REV + EVOL
(5) AL + 1REV+ + AL + 1REV- + DECL + 2REV- + EVOL
(6) AL + 1REV- + DECL +2REV0 + EVOL
(7) AL + 1REV- + DECL + 1REV+ +AL+ 1REV0 + EVOL
(8) AL + 1REV- + DECL +2REV- + EVOL
Key: AL – phase of a growing alienation of labor; 1REV0 – revolution of the first kind ended with a class compromise: an evolution of ownership relations; 1REV- – revolution of the first kind concluded with a loss of the class of direct producers; 1REV+ – revolution of the first kind concluded with a victory of the class of direct producers bringing about a temporary decrease of the alienation of labor; DEC – declassation bringing about disappearance of class struggle; 2REV0 – revolution of the second kind concluded with a class compromise – an evolution of ownership relations; 2REV- – revolution of the second kind concluded with a loss of the class of direct producers; 2REV+ – revolution of the second kind concluded with a victory of the class of direct producers and ←234 | 235→bringing about a temporary decrease of the alienation of labor; EVOL – evolution of ownership relations.
For this reason, even if we exclude the chance of additional loops, the economic development of a given society has at least eight possible developmental lines.←235 | 236→←236 | 237→
299 Leszek Nowak, “The Theory of Socio-Economic Formations as a Theory of Adaptation Processes,” in: Social Classes Action and Historical Materialism, ed. Leszek Nowak (Amsterdam-Atlanta GA: Rodopi, 1982), p. 115.
300 Nowak, “The Theory of Socio-Economic Formations,” p. 113,
301 For a development of adaptive dependencies, see: Andrzej Klawiter, “Adaptation and Competition. A Contribution to the Classification of Adaptive Relationships,” in: Dimensions of the Historical Process, ed. Leszek Nowak (Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1989), pp. 129–146, Andrzej Klawiter, Krzysztof Łastowski, Leszek Nowak and Wojciech Patryas “Adaptation, Learning, Praxis. Some Applications of the Adaptive Conceptual Apparatus,” in: Dimensions of the Historical Process, ed. Leszek Nowak (Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1989), pp. 121–129; Michał Witkowski, “On Adaptive and Functional Dependencies. An Attempt at a Categorial Approach,” in: Dimensions of the Historical Process, ed. Leszek Nowak (Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1989), pp. 147–156.
302 Nowak, Property and Power, p. 47.
303 Nowak, Property and Power, pp. 39–42.
304 Nowak, Własność i władza, pp. 315–316.
305 For alternative models of a socio-economic formation constructed on the basis of the idealizational method, see: Piotr Buczkowski, “Toward a Theory of Economic Society. An Attempt of at the Adaptive Interpretation,” in: Social Classes Action and Historical Materialism, ed. Leszek Nowak (Amsterdam-Atlanta GA: Rodopi, 1978), pp. 158–210; Krzysztof Łastowski, “The Theory of Development of Species and the Theory of Motion of Socio-Economic Formation,” in: Social Classes Action and Historical Materialism, ed. Leszek Nowak (Amsterdam-Atlanta GA: Rodopi, 1978), pp. 122–157.
306 Nowak, Property and Power, pp. 78–100.
307 Nowak, Power and Civil Society, pp. 3–20.
308 Nowak, Power and Civil Society, pp. 8–10.
309 Nowak, Dynamika władzy, pp. 28–29, see also: Nowak, Power and Civil Society, pp. 6–7.
310 Nowak, Power and Civil Society, p. 10.
311 Nowak, Power and Civil Society, pp. 11–12.
312 Nowak, Power and Civil Society, p. 13.
313 Leszek Nowak, “Remarks on the Christian Model of Man and the Nature of Interpretation,” Social Theory and Practice. An International and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy, No. 1 (1989), p. 110.
314 Nowak, Dynamika władzy, p. 41.
315 For a critical discussion of a non-Christian model of man, cf.: Wojciech Lamentowicz, “Kilka uwag polemicznych,” in: Nowak, Władza. Próba teorii idealizacyjnej (Warszawa: In Plus, 1988), pp. 184–191; Adolfo Garcia de la Sienra, “The Christian Model of Man: Reply to Nowak,” Social Theory and Practice. An International and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1989), pp. 89–107; Robert Egiert, “Toward the Sophisticated Rationalistic Model of Man,” in: Social System, Rationality and Revolution, eds. Leszek Nowak and Marcin Paprzycki (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 215–233; Katarzyna, Paprzycka and Marcin Paprzycki, “How Do Enslaved People Make Revolutions,” in: Social System, Rationality and Revolution, eds. Leszek Nowak and Marcin Paprzycki (Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 251–265; Marcin Paprzycki, “The non-Christian Model of Man. An Attempt at a Psychoanalitic Explanation,” in: Social System, Rationality and Revolution, eds. Leszek Nowak and Marcin Paprzycki (Amsterdam – Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 205–215; Mieszko Ciesielski, Zagadnienie ograniczeń racjonalnego modelu działań ludzkich, Próba ujęcia działania nawykowo-racjonalnego (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2012), pp. 72–99, and Mieszko Ciesielski, “Leszek Nowak’s non-Christian Model of Man and Inderdisciplinarity of Humanities,” Studia Europea Gnesnensia, No. 7 (2013), pp. 87–111.
316 Nowak, Power and Civil Society, pp. 21–23.
317 Nowak, Power and Civil Society, p. 32.
318 Nowak, Power and Civil Society, p. 37.
319 We may assume that similar macro-economic dependencies occur on the left side of the image of statics of economic momentum. The equivalent to social alienation in political momentum is “consumption” alienation in economic momentum expressed by a ratio of satisfied needs to overall needs. Initially, the increase of satisfied needs consolidates social peace. In the area of social peace of the 1st type, on the micro-social level still applies the principle: “the higher the income, the more effective the work.” However, the overunning of a certain threshold of “consumption” alienation brings about growing satanization of the class of direct producers: effectiveness of work decreases, absence increases, strikes and outbursts of dissatisfaction become more frequent. In the area of satanization, on the micro-social level the so-far prevailing principle of behaviour transforms. The new principle can be described as: “the higher the profit, the lower the effectiveness of work.” In this area, after exceeding a certain threshold of prosperity, the number of satanized individuals who refuse to subject themselves to any rigours of production grows. This state causes decay of cooperative ties, threatening with future degradation of economy of the given society. The mechanism preventing against a further increase of economic anomie is spread of one of the peculiar attitudes – the pious attitude. Let us remember that an individual by adopting this attitude regardless of the size of the received good, does not become satanized. Thanks to this, grows the number of individuals who voluntarily agree to the rigours of the production process and protect the society against the decay of economic ties.
320 Alan Booth, “Food Riots in the North-West of England 1790–1801,” Past and Present, Vol. 71 (1977), pp. 84–108.
321 Booth. “Food Riots,” p. 91.
322 Booth. “Food Riots,” pp. 102–103.
323 Peter Zagorin, “Prolegomena to the Comparative History of Revolution in Early Modern Europe,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, No. 2 (1976), pp. 151–174.
324 Zagorin, “Prolegomena,” p. 168.
325 Zagorin, “Prolegomena,” p. 168.
326 Grzegorz Tomczak, “Struktura ruchów masowych. Przyczynek do problematyki rewolucji,” in: Filozoficzne i metodologiczne podstawy teorii naukowych, eds. Jerzy Brzeziński and Krzysztof Łastowski (Poznań: PWN, 1989), pp. 253–263.