5. An Axiomatic System of Theodicy: Evil
Observe that propositions using the copula e have no existential import. From p e E or p e G it does not follow that such states of affairs that are evil or good exist as facts. In order to state the evil or the good as a fact, we have to add that the respective state of affairs is the case. This is done by adding p in conjunction with p e E in theorem T75.
The general claim of theorem T75 needs differentiation. To do that we shall distinguish different kinds of evil by describing them roughly and then by providing definitions for them.
MetE consists in different degrees of imperfection and finitude. There are two kinds of imperfection, one bound to nature and therefore necessary of a thing or organism, the other contingent.
(a) Degrees of Imperfection
Organisms which—by their nature—cannot move themselves from one place to another are less perfect than those who can. Or species of organisms that have a much simpler DNA are less perfect than those which have a more complex one. However, this imperfection is not a deficit or privation of some particular good which ought to be present; therefore we cannot speak of an evil of mode E1. Moreover, it is bound to nature and in this sense necessary since it characterizes different species. Therefore, to exclude that kind of imperfectness would be to exclude multitude and differentiation of the...
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