Chapter 4: Legal ethics and some theoretical models of law
Chapter 4 Legal ethics and some theoretical models of law 4.1. Preliminary remarks On its highest plane, legal ethics is the ethics of responsibility. Because of this, the professional roles of lawyers may be validly formed on the basis of goals and values, which in turn provide a foundation for the formulation of professional duties. Due to reflective validity of the responsibility principle, its subject is the good of the argumentative discourse itself and of the community in which it is held. In consequence, mere participation in legal practice means taking responsibility for it and accepting the obligation of acting for its good. However, such a view raises some doubts, namely about the extent to which the concepts of discourse and community are connected with the concept of practice; thus firstly, does adoption of the responsibility principle validated in the aforementioned way exact simultaneous adoption of a defined conception of law, i.e. of some version of a discursive view? Secondly, do currently predominant views of law as practice include, more or less implicite, some legal ethics, and if they do then what is the relationship to the multi-dimensional theory of legal ethics, and can it be interpreted and systematically examined with its categories? It seems that the answer to the second question, being a more general one, will at the same time resolve the first problem from the scope of philosophy of law. Therefore, the search for this answer will be the focus of further discussion. This of course requires...
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