Appendix B [Ch. III, § 17, n. 280]
⌜However, the attempt to resolve the question in accordance with this interpreta- tion poses the danger of committing all kinds of errors in the entire constellation of problems pertaining to idealism and realism, errors that would at once lead the investigations astray. In particular, the existential-ontological problem of actuality in this interpretation is in danger of being transformed into a termino- logical issue, which is simultaneously intertwined in a peculiar fashion with a particular metaphysical commitment. Hence, e.g., various “idealists,” commenc- ing with Berkeley, assure us that by adopting an idealist position they accom- plish nothing beyond eliminating a certain false usage of the word ‘actuality.’ Presumably this word is employed in everyday, prephilosophical discourse in a sense that idealist theory rejects as unfounded. In its proper, correct interpreta- tion “actuality” means – so it is said – nothing other than the mode of being of the world factually given us in experience, and in particular – the mode of being of the things we perceive through the senses. At the same time, this mode of be- ing is to be nothing other than what the given idealist theory proclaims it to be, and thus – in the sense of Berkeley’s position – esse = percipi923. In this way, one forestalls in advance the objection that theory clashes starkly with everyday experience – by simply calling “actuality” something entirely different than is ordinarily done, and denying the charge of any sort of conflict between theory and the prescientific, everyday view. On the other hand, the metaphysical prob-...
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