Show Less
Restricted access

Platonic Wholes and Quantum Ontology

Translated by Katarzyna Kretkowska


Marek Woszczek

The subject of the book is a reconsideration of the internalistic model of composition of the Platonic type, more radical than traditional, post-Aristotelian externalistic compositionism, and its application in the field of the ontology of quantum theory. At the centre of quantum ontology is nonseparability. Quantum wholes are atemporal wholes governed by internalistic logic and they are primitive, global physical entities, requiring an extreme relativization of the fundamental notions of mechanics. That ensures quantum theory to be fully consistent with the relativistic causal structure, without any spacelike nonlocality and time asymmetry, and makes the quantum blockworld ontology inevitable. It seems that the more internally relativized physics is, the more Platonic it becomes.
Show Summary Details
Restricted access

Chapter 4: ‘Esse est percipi aut percipere’: The Quantum Principle of Relativity and Measurement as a Correlation


| 165 →

Chapter 4

‘Esse est percipi aut percipere’: The Quantum Principle of Relativity and Measurement as a Correlation

4.1 Quantum frames of reference: relativity, the blockworld and the universal relativization of the observer

The application of the Universal Principle of Relativity to comprehend QM may raise many doubts, arising from the commonsense conviction that both the measured (endo)system and the state of the measuring (exo)system of reference cannot be completely relativized, which nonetheless – as I shall claim – leads to a conflict with SR and GR: the conclusions about nonlocality as action-at-a-distance and the supposed preferred foliation of spacetime as an ill-defined arena for quantum theory. Such conclusions are premature, though, in the situation when nonlocal interpretations are decided in advance, while at the same time the radical contextualization of quantum ‘states’ is commonly ignored or trivialized in order to make some connection with the phase space states of the more familiar classical mechanics. A more attentive analysis of EPR argumentation has allowed us to discern that the authors assumed – as opposed to Bohr – a strongly ‘atomistic’ condition [3]E hiding some conservative ontology and the noncontextuality/separability of each physical action connected to it, which Einstein only later presented explicitly in his programmatic statements. Though the ‘reality condition’ [1]E was abandoned by Einstein, as it is not a condition that is logically independent, nevertheless when we analyze it regardless of condition [4]E, it might supply a criterion of ‘objective...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.

Do you have any questions? Contact us.

Or login to access all content.