The Constitutional Political Economy Approach
With this book we intended primarily to contribute to Constitutional Economics and, in particular, to its empirical dimension, in order to open the doors for shifting the respective theory to a higher generalization level. The central claim was that constitutional solutions, adopted by post-socialist countries after 1989, which enhanced the credibility and commitment of decision makers in the field of economic reforms conducted by these countries during the transition period, constituted a framework conducive to such reforms. The theoretical model, suggested in Chapter 1 on the basis of the existing Constitutional Economics and Political Economics literature, laying down the fundament for what could be called constitutional political economy of transition, or constitutional political economy of reform, indicated the role of constitutional constraints on discretionary power of political decision makers, as well as building the latter’s capacity to push through difficult reforms, for the constitutional commitment-enhancing mechanism to effectively support the reform process in post-socialist economies. We also suggested to concentrate the focus in this respect on the significance of structural provisions, bills of rights, as well as constitutional enforcement mechanisms. The overview of post-socialist constitutions presented in Chapter 2 revealed considerable variation in the solutions adopted in these areas by post-socialist countries, both in the de iure and de facto dimensions, rendering the studies of potential links between these constitutional rules and performance in the field of post-socialist economic reforms a particularly compelling research problem.
The results obtained from three empirical studies presented in Chapters 3...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.
Do you have any questions? Contact us.Or login to access all content.