VII. Nietzsche’s Tyranny of Values
1. The new passion
The thesis I defend and argue for below can be briefly formulated as follows: the phenomenon known in axiology as the tyranny of values is powerfully manifested by Friedrich Nietzsche; however, it is not about a certain theorization of it, but the fact that a certain value becomes in its spirit somewhat “absolute”.
We use here the concept of tyranny of values, as defined by Nicolai Hartmann in his famous work Ethics: “Every value – when once it has garnered power over a person – has the tendency to set itself up as sole tyrant of the whole human ethos, and indeed at the expense of other values, even of such as are not inherently opposed to it … It is the tendency to crowd out other values from the range of emotional appraisement. Such tyranny shows itself plainly in the one-sided types of current morality, in the well-known intolerance of man … towards the customs of foreigners, but still more in the individual person’s obsession by one single value. Thus there exists a fanaticism of justice (fiat justitia pereat mundus)”.275
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