Show Less
Restricted access

Physics without Metaphysics?

With an Appraisal by Prof. Saju Chackalackal

Raphael Neelamkavil

This study discusses the substance-tradition from Aristotle to Kant, Gödel, Quine, Strawson, Armstrong and others, the concept of matter and causation in quantum physics, Being-thinking from Aristotle to Heidegger, and system-building from Plato to Whitehead. It synthesizes the Kantian phenomena-noumena, extends the Quinean ontological commitment, creates a Gödelian foundationalist truth-probabilism, relativizes the Whiteheadian actual entity, extends the Aristotelian-Heideggerian Being to a nomic-nominal, verbal-processual To Be and overhauls perspectival-absolutist, non-foundationalist and relativist concepts of Reality. The resulting scientific ontology is termed Einaic Ontology for maximalist, mutually collusive, categorial reasons. The Appendix explains Heidegger’s anthropologized Being as ontologically and cosmologically defective.
Show Summary Details
Restricted access

Appendix. Beyond Heidegger’s Anthropologized Being: Nomic-Nominal, Verbal-Processual, Universal “To Be” in Einaic Ontology


I begin the critique of Heidegger’s work with a statement of concern. Anyone who attempts to read this Appendix without first reading my arguments in the text of the whole book and without a critical attitude to Heidegger, is liable to misunderstand my arguments here as misinformed or trivial. I think we should get behind Heidegger’s words by chipping his prohibitively poetical and mystifying language off its rhetorically adumbrating shades, in order to get at the senses and implications of his Fundamental Ontology and Being-historical Thinking. True, there is no complete chipping off, nor is there an analysis without already interpreting. Such hermeneutic is basic to all understanding.

This does not mean that we cannot get sufficiently deep into the fundamental implications of his work. I write this Appendix in view of evaluating what I consider as the major ontological imperfection in Heidegger’s thought from the point of view of the categorial demands of the history of ontology and scientific ontology, and of the way in which I conceive of the jolts and peaks in such history. Although Heidegger has not given a categorial scheme, he is one of the few twentieth century thinkers of ontological consequence, after Aristotle (in favour of an abstract concept of Being) and Kant (against treating the concept of Being as an attribute), to have dealt extensively with a very special concept of Being and our already interpretive ability to get at To Be. I present here in gist the difference...

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.

Do you have any questions? Contact us.

Or login to access all content.