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Physics without Metaphysics?

With an Appraisal by Prof. Saju Chackalackal

Raphael Neelamkavil

This study discusses the substance-tradition from Aristotle to Kant, Gödel, Quine, Strawson, Armstrong and others, the concept of matter and causation in quantum physics, Being-thinking from Aristotle to Heidegger, and system-building from Plato to Whitehead. It synthesizes the Kantian phenomena-noumena, extends the Quinean ontological commitment, creates a Gödelian foundationalist truth-probabilism, relativizes the Whiteheadian actual entity, extends the Aristotelian-Heideggerian Being to a nomic-nominal, verbal-processual To Be and overhauls perspectival-absolutist, non-foundationalist and relativist concepts of Reality. The resulting scientific ontology is termed Einaic Ontology for maximalist, mutually collusive, categorial reasons. The Appendix explains Heidegger’s anthropologized Being as ontologically and cosmologically defective.
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Chapter 1. Ontological Categorial Transcendent of Cosmology



It is archaeological today to recollect that the concept of substance used to be considered as something that needs nothing but itself to exist. Two millennia of scientific and metaphysical reification of concepts has reinforced such definitions. The present chapter re-interprets the concept of substance or matter as ultimately continuous in the values of physical measurements and universal constants in the totality of all real worlds – be the ‘real’ actual or pertaining to the actual. In this manner it prepares the way of subverting the more than two millennia-old over-enthusiasm for substance-absolutism and -particularism (begun at least from Plato and Aristotle) and concludes the ultimate Transcendent category of all ontology: Reality-in-total. It synthesizes beyond the concepts of particularized reality and substance in some select thinkers, in contemporary physics and in the philosophy of science, by presupposing that classificational categories always yield particularism. It begins with classes in general, unifies the phenomenal-noumenal foundation of categories in Kant and derives a realistic non-classificational category (Reality-in-total) from the foundational requirements of the concept of substance in modern science. I take for granted Kant’s concepts of phenomena and noumena as discussed in the asterisked footnote, A249 (omitted in B):

Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, are called phaenomena. But if I postulate things which are mere objects of understanding, and which, nevertheless, can be given as such to an intuition, although not to one that is sensible...

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