Normativity & Typification
Le rôle de l’intuition philosophique pour l’intelligibilité de la vie
Abstract The Role of Philosophical Intuition for Intelligibility of Life
Is it possible to understand “life” by means of scientific rationality? Is “life” reducible to any other physical/mathematical object? In this article I focus on Bergson, Merleau-Ponty and Patočka’s ideas of life and biological evolution, by pointing out their attempts to present “philosophical intuition” as a model of intelligibility of life phenomena that is quite distinct from scientific rationality. As for Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, between “life” and “scientific rationality” one may grasp an unbridgeable gap: none of the existing theories concerning life and biological evolution provide sufficient explanations for the emergence of novelty and randomness intrinsic to evolution (philogenesis/ontogenesis). Ultimately, the “phenotype determination” is the result of an evolutionary history in most parts characterized by a “scientific” indeterminacy. As we shall see, Bergson and Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on ontogenesis and biological individuation, allow us to shed new light on the ontology of nature, by suggesting a new epistemological apparatus for the scientific inquiry on life and its dynamics.
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