Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy of Religion
Edited By Sebastian Kolodziejczyk and Janusz Salamon
Religious Inclusivism: A Philosophical Defence
The theology of religion traditionally recognizes three affirmative ways of interrelating the multiplicity of divergent religious truth claims: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. The first two positions are related, in so far as they claim the superiority of a single religion. They differ in so far that the exclusivist holds the foreign religion to be completely untrue, whereas the inclusivist holds it to be only partially untrue. Within the theology of religion, the term ‘pluralism’ includes some or all of the following assumptions: (a) the diversity of opinions and world views is actually insurmountable and to be recognized as normative, (b) the conviction of another is neither inferior nor false in regard to one’s own conviction, (c) there is no universally recognized meta position for the evaluation of rival truth claims, (d) religious truth claims are at best only in a mythological or relative sense true.2
The validity of this threefold scheme is debated for various reasons.3 It is said, for example, that this scheme is unusable or that there are more models in addition to these three. Comparative theology4 or religious relativism5 are offered as substitutions for or additions to the previous models. An overall criticism of the offered scheme is, in my view, not valid. It is not the place here to give detailed reasons for this view. I will assume that the threefold scheme contains all the meaningful possibilities of affirmative interreligious relationships and that it...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.
Do you have any questions? Contact us.Or login to access all content.