This book analyses India and Pakistan’s decision to ‘go nuclear’ against the odds of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty-based nuclear order. It reflects upon the key factors that contributed to, and the process that prompted India and Pakistan’s nuclear programmes to take a military orientation, which eventually culminated in the May 1998 nuclear tests. It also explains the motivation which underscored both India and Pakistan’s determination to advance nuclear postures in 1998 that appeared to be inconsistent with the post-Cold War global strategic environment. Further, this book explains why international and regional nuclear non-proliferation regimes were ineffective in preventing India and Pakistan from going nuclear.
Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien, 2004. XIII, 309 pp.
Contents: Proliferation Debate, Nuclear Weapons and Security – Road to Pokhran I: From Nuclear Infrastructure Building to
‘Nuclear Option’ – Politics of Nuclear Infrastructure Building – Politics of ‘Nuclear Option’ – Toward Pokhran II: From ‘Nuclear
Option’ to Nuclear Weapons – Evolution of an Indian Nuclear Force – Road to Chagai: Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme, Its Sources
and Motivations – Politics of a ‘Conditional Nuclear Option’ – Politics of Weapons Capability Acquisition – Regimes, Politics
of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and India – Regimes, Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Pakistan.