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On the (non)existence of the right to religious freedom of persons deprived of liberty

A reconstruction of the normative standard based on Polish and German regulations in comparison with empirical studies

by Jakub Hanc (Author) Olga Sitarz (Author) Anna Jaworska-Wieloch (Author)
©2024 Monographs 280 Pages
Series: Ius, Lex et Res Publica, Volume 32

Summary

This book is the result of research conducted in Polish post-criminal isolation units related to the accessibility of religious practices and services for people incarcerated there. The study covered individuals from 35 units, including prisoners from 15 penitentiary facilities and 4 detention centres, as well as juveniles from 8 youth educational centres and 8 correctional facilities. The research also involved educators from those units who presented the religious life of convicts and detainees from their own perspective. The empirical part was preceded by considerations on the social and individual significance of religion and an outline of international and national (Polish and German) standards of religious freedom, including in post-criminal isolation units.

Table Of Contents

  • Cover
  • Halftitle Page
  • Series Page
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • About the authors
  • About the book
  • Citability of the eBook
  • Contents
  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction
  • Chapter I Social and individual significance of religion
  • Chapter II Religious freedom of adults and children: a reconstruction of international and Polish standards
  • 2.1. Significance of religious freedom
  • 2.2. Religious freedom of adults and children: international standards
  • 2.3. Religious freedom of adults and children: Polish standards
  • Chapter III Religious freedom of adults and children deprived of their liberty in post-criminal isolation units: international standards
  • Chapter IV Religious freedom of adults and children deprived of their liberty in post-criminal isolation units: Polish standards
  • 4.1. Statutory grounds for religious freedom of persons deprived of their liberty in Poland
  • 4.2. Religious freedom of adults deprived of their liberty declared in legal instruments of a lower rank than a law
  • 4.3. Religious freedom of adults deprived of their liberty declared in prison internal rules
  • 4.4. Significance of the registration of the church of a religious association for the scope of prisoners’ religious freedom
  • 4.5. Scope of prisoners’ religious freedom: should faith be manifested only in mandated forms in prison or also in forms recommended by a given denomination?
  • 4.6. Diversity of situations of convicted persons in different types of prisons, including dangerous convicts
  • 4.7. Diversity of situations of convicted persons and pre-trial detainees in terms of scope of religious freedom in prison
  • 4.8. Scope of informing prisoners about the rights relating to religious freedom and the possibility of collecting declarations of faith from prisoners
  • 4.9. Representatives of religion in prisons
  • 4.10. Detailed elements of professing a religion and worship in the prison
  • 4.11. Religious freedom of juveniles placed in post-criminal isolation units
  • 4.12. Summary of the Polish regulations on individuals incarcerated in post-criminal isolation units
  • Chapter V Religious freedom of adults and children deprived of liberty in post-criminal isolation centres in the Federal Republic of Germany
  • 5.1. Constitutional standard
  • 5.2. Religious freedom in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and selected statutory regulations
  • 5.3. Federal system reform (Föderalismusreform I) and its criticism
  • 5.4. Religious freedom of adults deprived of their liberty
  • 5.5. Religious freedom of children deprived of their liberty
  • Chapter VI Exercise of religious freedom in penitentiary facilities, correctional facilities and youth educational centres: results of a survey
  • 6.1. Research objectives
  • 6.2. Methodology
  • 6.3. Characteristics of the study group
  • 6.3.1. Convicted persons and pre-trial detainees
  • 6.3.2. Educators in penitentiary facilities and detention centres
  • 6.3.3. Juveniles in youth educational centres and correctional facilities
  • 6.3.4. Educators in youth educational centres and correctional facilities
  • 6.4. Description of the institutions surveyed
  • 6.5. Survey results
  • 6.5.1. Prisoners in penitentiary institutions: penitentiary facilities and detention centres
  • 6.5.2. Roman Catholic prisoners
  • 6.5.2.1. Catholics before the pandemic while serving a sentence or in detention
  • 6.5.2.2. Catholics during the pandemic while serving a sentence or in detention
  • 6.5.2.3. Participation in practices at liberty
  • 6.5.3. Prisoners of other confessions
  • 6.5.4. Non-believing prisoners
  • 6.5.5. Educators in penitentiary institutions: penitentiary facilities and detention centres
  • 6.5.6. Juveniles in post-criminal isolation centres: youth educational centres and correctional facilities
  • 6.5.7. Educators in juvenile institutions: youth educational centres and correctional facilities
  • 6.6. Discussion
  • 6.6.1. Religion and how it is practiced: a point of view of adult prisoners
  • 6.6.1.1. Opinions of incarcerated Catholics
  • 6.6.1.2. Opinions of prisoners of other denominations
  • 6.6.1.3. Opinions of incarcerated non-believers
  • 6.6.1.4. Issue of providing information
  • 6.6.2. Religion and how it is practiced: a point of view of educators in penitentiary facilities and detention centres
  • 6.6.3. Religion and how it is practiced: a point of view of juveniles in youth educational centres and correctional facilities
  • 6.6.4. Religion and how it is practiced: a point of view of educators of juveniles in youth educational centres and correctional facilities
  • 6.7. Data on chaplains and religious organizations cooperating with the Prison Service
  • Conclusions
  • References
  • Notes on contributors
  • Series

Acknowledgements

This monograph is the end result of a research project: “The standards of respect the religious rights of persons detained in prisons, detention centres, educational and correctional centres for juveniles” (decision no. 2018/31/B/HS5/02233), funded by the National Science Centre (Poland).

Our joy at the publication of this study is all the greater because the road to its creation was extremely turbulent and difficult. The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic forced us to change the strategy of carrying out research and significantly lengthened the process of data acquisition and processing. Therefore, we wish, at this point, to thank the persons and institutions without whose help our efforts and enthusiasm could have been in vain.

First and foremost, we would like to thank the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Poland and the Central Board of the Prison Service for giving consent to conducting our study on the premises of selected penitentiary facilities and detention centres.

Our sincere thanks for their support go to the directors and educators of penitentiary facilities, detention centres, youth educational centres and correctional facilities, where we were allowed to carry out our study. We are grateful for the enormity of your kindness and for your help in distributing and mailing our questionnaires.

Heartfelt thanks to our Mentor, beloved Chieftainess prof. zw. dr hab. Teresa Dukiet-Nagórska, for shaping our research workshop, without which it would be difficult for us to navigate the frontier of written law and its practical application. We also thank her for strengthening our special sensitivity to human rights violations, in particular, the rights of the vulnerable and the rejected.

We express great gratitude to the reviewer of this monograph – Head of the Department of Penal Enforcement Law at the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Łódź – dr hab. prof. UŁ Aldona Nawój-Śleszyński, for the insightful and critical comments that have made this monograph an even better work than it was at the outset.

Special thanks to Mr. Łukasz Gałecki, Peter Lang senior acquisitions editor for guiding us professionally through the entire publishing process.

Many thanks are due to dr Marta Byczek and all the staff of the Law Library of the University of Silesia in Katowice. Thank you not only for help in finding and obtaining the literature necessary for the work on the subject we have undertaken, but also for genuine kindness and selfless commitment.

And last but not least, thanks to mgr inż. Monika Łyczba from the Research Project Team of the Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Silesia in Katowice, for the invaluable and unparalleled support at every stage of our project, without which the day we joyfully receive author copies of the monograph from Peter Lang would never come.

Olga Sitarz, Anna Jaworska-Wieloch & Jakub Hanc

Introduction

Researchers are keen to address the issues of human rights, including those of human beings deprived of their liberty as a result of a committed criminal offence. They are equally keen to address – on the level of sociology, psychology, religion studies or theology – the issues related to religion, religiosity and faith. Even when religious freedom in prisons is analysed, the focus is very rarely on prisoners’ religious practices from the perspective of human rights. Undoubtedly, the leading Polish researchers in this field include Zbigniew Lasocik1 and Jerzy Nikołajew.2 This publication seeks to continue the trails laid down by the designated researchers, adding new issues.

The few studies to date indicate that faith and religion are of great significance for prisoners. A study carried out in the first half of March 2015 among prisoners incarcerated in the External Division in Zabłocie (Penitentiary facility in Biała Podlaska), which covered 95 % of prisoners (101 persons), showed that the religious attitudes were as follows: 6.9 % of respondents described themselves as strong believers, 74.2 % as believers, 12.9 % as undecided, 3.9 as indifferent and 3 % as non-believers.3 Other studies revealed that faith and religion helped 14 % of long-term prisoners the most to serve their long sentence.4 In other words, a huge number of prisoners attach special importance to religious rights and freedoms. The isolation conditions and prisoners’ low efficiency mean that the extent to which these rights and freedoms are exercised must be evaluated directly at the prisoners’ location. Ultimately, the religious reality in post-criminal isolation units is co-shaped by the existing regulations of various levels, the involvement of individuals in the performance of their duties, the attitude of the penitentiary staff, prisoners themselves and their fellow prisoners.

This publication discusses the issue of the social and individual significance of religion. We believe that experiencing religious freedom by prisoners in isolation units teaches them respect for the law, the rights of others, difference and diversity and it may also, as Jeroen Temperman pointed out, minimize the radicalization of convicts and detainees.5

Isolation arising from the commission of a prohibited act, hereinafter referred to as criminal isolation, is accompanied by numerous limitations and deprivations, which, among other things, may relate to the sphere of performing religious practices. The question we sought to answer is mainly about how much these practices are genuinely restricted, which practices are affected and to what extent these limitations are justifiable. Such findings cannot be formulated in isolation from the adopted normative regulations and prisoners’ opinions. The official prison statistics and those concerning the implementation of measures of education and reform involving juveniles do not have this information.6

The study was carried out on two levels – the first part covered the theoretical and normative issues, the second focused on questionnaires among prisoners in post-criminal isolation units and their educators in Poland.

The theoretical research was based on identifying the significance of religion both in social and individual terms.

The normative study consisted of identifying the international standards of religious freedom and determining how these principles are applied to the Polish and German national legal orders. A further step was to reconstruct the international and national rules relating to religious freedom in isolation facilities that incarcerate individuals in connection with the commission of a prohibited act. The scope of the normative study covered incarcerated adults and juveniles – children who committed a prohibited act. The selection of the Polish and German legal orders, within the previously discussed framework, is justified by the available research material (Poland) and the evident similarity between the two countries, both EU members, in which legal tradition derives from so-called continental law. Detailed and insightful comparative findings have shown fundamental differences in the way prisoners’ universal right to religious freedom is regulated.

The specificity of the study, its applicative value and its universal problems prompt us to present some key terms characteristic of the Polish criminal law system, which in their English translation may not always be understood by everyone.

The following terms are used below:

  • penal enforcement law – a set of legal norms governing the enforcement of penalties and other related measures imposed in court proceedings and in cases involving minor offences;
  • Penal Enforcement Code (PEC) – the law that most fully normalizes the enforcement of judgments in criminal proceedings, in cases involving fiscal crimes and minor offences, and in proceedings involving administrative penalties and coercive measures resulting in deprivation of liberty;
  • penitentiary facility (Polish: Zakład Karny, ZK) – a penitentiary in which adults or juveniles that are held liable like an adult are incarcerated to serve a prison sentence. There are four types of penitentiary facilities: for young adults, individuals serving a first penalty, penitentiary recidivists and soldiers serving a sentence of military detention. Penitentiary facilities may be organized as closed, semi-open and open institutions.
  • detention centre (Polish: Areszt Śledczy, AŚ) – a penitentiary in which adults or juveniles that are held liable like an adult are incarcerated to serve a prison sentence or to enforce a preventive measure in the form of pre-trial detention. Convicts serving a penalty of deprivation of liberty in detention centres serve it in conditions complying with the classification, that is, in accordance with a specified type and kind of penitentiary facility;
  • youth educational centre (Polish: Młodzieżowy Ośrodek Wychowawczy, MOW) – the placement of a juvenile in a youth educational centre is an educational measure that may be applied to juveniles in response to demoralization or a criminal offence;
  • correctional facilities (Polish: Zakład Poprawczy, ZP) – the placement of a juvenile in a correctional facility is a measure of reform that may be applied to juveniles who at the moment of the commission of the act have attained 13 years of age, but have not attained 17 years of age, committed a punishable act corresponding to a crime or a fiscal crime and, simultaneously, the application of such a measure is supported by the high degree of demoralization of the juvenile and the nature of the criminal act, the manner and circumstances of its commission;
  • post-criminal isolation units (PCIU) – units in which the offender is placed in response to a committed criminal act (penitentiary facilities and detention centres in the case of individuals liable under the Criminal Code, youth educational centres and correctional facilities in the case of juveniles);
  • juvenile – an individual who has not attained 17 years of age at the moment of the commission of a punishable act, and simultaneously has attained at least 10 years of age in the case of demoralization and 13 years of age in the case of a punishable act. Where they meet strict conditions, including the attainment of a minimum of 14 years of age, they may be liable under the rules provided for adults by the Polish Criminal Code;
  • adult within the understanding of the Criminal Code – an individual who has attained 17 years of age at the moment of the commission of a prohibited act;
  • young adult is an offender who has not attained 21 years of age at the moment of the commission of a prohibited act and 24 years of age at the time of first instance adjudication;
  • legal adult – an individual who (as a rule) has attained 18 years of age.

1 Z. Lasocik, Praktyki religijne więźniów, Warszawa 1993.

2 See: J. Nikołajew, “Specyfika duszpasterstwa więziennego w Polsce. Prezentacja badań własnych”, Teologia w Polsce, vol. 3, no. 1, 2009, pp. 153 et seq.; J. Nikołajew, Duszpasterstwo więzienne. Tradycje, teraźniejszość, perspektywy, Lublin 2009; J. Nikołajew, “Reguły Minimalne i Europejskie Reguły Więzienne a prawo więźniów do wolności sumienia i religii w Polsce”, Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego, vol. 16, 2013, pp. 111 et seq.; J. Nikołajew, Wolność sumienia i religii skazanych i tymczasowo aresztowanych, Lublin 2012.

3 W. Romanowicz, D. Tomczyszyn, “Stosunek do religii osób odbywających karę pozbawienia wolności a miejsce religii we współczesnym świecie”, Rozprawy Społeczne, vol. 9, no. 3, 2015, p. 96.

4 A. Polak-Krusznik, “Doniesienia z badań nad wykonywaniem długoterminowych kar pozbawienia wolności”, in K. Mrozek (ed.), Z problematyki badań empirycznych w prawie karnym wykonawczym. Część 2, Wrocław 2021, p. 141.

5 J. Temperman, “Freedom of Religion or Belief in Prison. A Critical Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence”, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, vol. 6, no. 1, 2017, pp. 48 et seq.

6 See: https://sw.gov.pl/dzial/statystyka (accessed 29.08.2023).

Chapter I Social and individual significance of religion

It is a truism that the phenomenon referred to as “religion” has been studied for a long time, using various methods and perspectives. It is equally obvious that the concept of “religion” has not been uniformly defined. The history of the study of religion has seen many definitions of religion, some standing in opposition to each other, others being complementary. A very popular definition, which in the opinion of many researchers has the greatest potential for universality, was proposed by Max L. Stackhouse (1935–2016). He characterized religion as “a comprehensive worldview or metaphysical moral vision that is accepted as binding because it is held to be in itself basically true and just even if all dimensions of it cannot be either fully confirmed or refuted.”7 It is fair to say that no definition of “religion” has gained universal acceptance. Today, it is recognized it is impossible to construct a definition of religion that would include all the (intuitive and scientific) phenomena considered as “religious” and separate religious from non-religious phenomena completely. This is because the ambiguity of the term “religion” is due to the cultural richness of religious phenomena. Religion is an area of personal experiences of everyone and also a socio-cultural phenomenon. Both the existing religions and those that have disappeared have been determined by tradition and the place (geographic criterion) and time (temporal criterion) of their occurrence. The inability to develop universal definitional criteria generates different ways of capturing the essence and scope of religion and, consequently, leads to the existence of multiple definitions of the term.8

Constructing nominal definitions, a religious scholar will search for the meaning of the noun ‘religion’. However, the etymology of the word is not unequivocal. The term ‘religion’ does not appear in all current and extinct cultures and it has no equivalent in many languages.9 In the dispute over the origin of the term, reference is most frequently made to the reflections of the Roman philosopher Cicero (106–43 BCE), who derived the feminine noun religio from the verb relegere/religere, meaning “to re-read”, “to go over again in thought”. After Lactantius (250–330 CE) (Divinae institutiones, IV, 28), Christian tradition links the noun to the verb religare, meaning “to tie up, to bind” The trail was followed by Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE), who pointed out in his work Retractationes that: “To one God we aspire and with him we bind our souls (animas nostras religantes), from which the name of religion is derived” (Retractationes 13, 9). The word was written down for the first time in English in the 11th century.10

Notably, Christianity initially applied the term religio exclusively to itself (Christian centrism), setting itself against other beliefs and cults jointly referred to as ‘pagan’. That opposition formed part of the European culture for many centuries. For a very long time, other forms of religiosity were viewed and evaluated through the prism of Christianity. The situation changed only after the contact with non-European cultures. Even during the Renaissance, when references were made to antiquity, ancient beliefs were more frequently called “mythology” than “religion”. A range of factors contributed to the abandonment of the indicated dichotomy. Immense importance should be attributed to archaeological works, which discovered the religions of primitive, Chinese and ancient peoples, in particular, the ancient Egyptian, Assyrian-Babylonian and Sumerian beliefs. A significant contribution was also made by philosophy (questions about religious language and beliefs, the problem of evil and suffering, concepts of God, including the arguments for and against His existence and the phenomenon of miracles), sociology (religion is perceived as a social fact) and psychology (religion is a mental act, a form of human consciousness, encompassing various mental experiences, including cognitive and emotional ones).11

As is the case with the definition referring to the origin and significance of the word, no satisfactory results are produced by other reference definitions, including inductive (Socratic) and intuitive ones.12 In turn, definitions derived from empirical sciences, which are real definitions, seek to characterize religion by its origins or structure. Thus, definitions with philosophical features emphasize faith-related aspects, psychological definitions focus on the significance of psychological factors, and sociological definitions point to institutional and ritual functions.13

The systemic and holistic approaches to religion comprehend it as a cultural system, consisting of symbols for communication and interpretation of cultural phenomena. What distinguishes lighting a candle on a restaurant table from lighting a candle on an altar in a Roman Catholic church is an attribute of the ritual act. It is not constituted by its content but by the symbolic significance by followers of a particular religion. A systemic and holistic approach to religion was presented, among others, by Clifford Geertz (1926–2006), who pointed out that religion is “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”14 On a similar note, Antoine Vergote (1921–2013) emphasized the cultural reality of religion, defining it as “the entirety of the linguistic expressions, emotions and, actions and signs that refer to a supernatural being or supernatural beings.”15

Genetic definitions are in turn obtained by an indication of the source and origins of religion (origin analysis).16 The intellectual sphere may be one of such sources. Then religion becomes an imperfect and non-empirical attempt to explain the incomprehensible phenomena occurring in the world around man. This approach is highly visible in the criticism of religion coming from Herbert Spencer (1820–1903).17 He argued that the knowledge of phenomena requires only empirical proof. This is because we cannot know something that we have not learned. Since we cannot know the nature of reality, it is certain that there is something, in principle, unknowable. We do not know whether God exists or what his nature may be. Spencer believed that science forced religion to abandon its dogmas, that is, the fundamental beliefs that it could not justify. However, he concluded that religion and science were in agreement about one thing – the human mind is only capable of gaining “relative” knowledge. This is due to the limitations of the human mind, capable only of gaining knowledge of phenomena and but of the reality underlying the phenomena. Both science and religion must recognize that the force the universe reveals to us is completely unexamined. Adopting an agnostic attitude, he argued that theism cannot be recognized because we have no method of acquiring knowledge of the divine and cannot verify it. We do not know whether religious beliefs are true or false.18

The emotional sphere is another source of religion. Religion is, in this spectrum, an attempt to respond to the deepest and most crucial human needs. This approach is favoured among others, by Rudolph Otto (1869–1937), who introduced the term numinous, understood as “non-rational, non-sensory experience or feeling whose primary and immediate object is outside the self”.19 The theologian supported the argument that religious emotion is very specific and different in qualitative terms from other emotions. He based his argument precisely on the notion numinous, which is specific only to religion – it is its sui generis emotion. Although Otto adopted a more theological and less pragmatic and utilitarian approach to experience, he did not limit his research on religion solely to emotions and their social and individual impact. In his approach, rational elements (God within the theological meaning) and irrational elements (emotional and empirical part of divinity) make two complementary halves.20 Similar views can be found in Friedrich Engels (1820–1895): “All religion, however, is nothing but the fantastic reflection in men’s minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces.”21 Therefore, religion is a mechanism that worked in man who did not accept the fact that he or she is not infinite. Given that infinity – by virtue of mortality – is not their attribute, humans locate infinity through a projection mechanism in a personified and transcendental being. This procedure results, among other things, in alienation because in that case man cannot live to the fullness of his or her essence.

The objective definitions of religion define it in terms of its structure (beliefs, moral imperatives, forms of worship, modes of social organization), whereas functional definitions focus on fulfilled functions.22

Details

Pages
280
Year
2024
ISBN (PDF)
9783631918647
ISBN (ePUB)
9783631918654
ISBN (Hardcover)
9783631903711
DOI
10.3726/b21807
Language
English
Publication date
2024 (June)
Keywords
religious practices freedom of religion penitentiary facility detention centre youth educational centre correctional facility
Published
Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Warszawa, Wien, 2024. 280 pp., 12 tables.

Biographical notes

Jakub Hanc (Author) Olga Sitarz (Author) Anna Jaworska-Wieloch (Author)

Olga Sitarz is an associate professor at the University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland) and a specialist in criminal law, criminology and penal enforcement law. She is a former judge of the District Court in Katowice and an active mediator at the Silesian Centre for Arbitration and Mediation. Anna Jaworska-Wieloch, PhD, is an assistant professor at the University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland) and a specialist in criminal law, criminology and penal enforcement law. Jakub Hanc is a PhD student at the Doctoral School, University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland).

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