The Exercise of the Right to a Fair Trial in the Era of the COVID-19 Pandemic
Summary
Excerpt
Table Of Contents
- Cover
- Title
- Copyright
- About the author
- About the book
- This eBook can be cited
- Table of contents
- Introduction
- 1. European Convention on Human Rights
- 1.1. Introductory remarks
- 1.2. Scope of application of Article 6(1) of the ECHR
- 1.3. The right of access to court
- 1.4. Access to an impartial and independent court established by law
- 1.5. Fair trial
- 1.6. The principle of openness of justice
- 1.7. The principle of promptness
- 2. The right to a fair trial under the law of the European Union
- 2.1. Introductory remarks
- 2.2. Scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
- 2.3. Protocol No 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
- 2.4. Rights and principles in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
- 2.5. Admissibility of limitations to fundamental rights
- 2.6. Right to an effective remedy and access to a fair trial
- 2.7. Relation between Article 47 of the CFR and Article 19(1) of the TEU
- 2.8. The principle of effective judicial protection as a general principle of EU law
- 2.9. Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights
- 3. Constitution of the Republic of Poland
- 3.1. Introductory remarks
- 3.2. The constitutional and the European standards of the right to a fair trial
- 3.3. Access to court
- 3.4. The concept of ‘court’ in Article 45(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland
- 3.5. The right to a fair procedure
- 3.6. The principle of openness
- 3.7. Efficiency of judicial proceedings as an element of the right to a fair trial
- 4. Impact of selected guiding principles of civil procedure on the implementation of the right to a fair trial
- 4.1. Introductory remarks
- 4.2. Principle of equality
- 4.3. Principle of promptness
- 4.4. Principle of openness of proceedings
- 5. The COVID-19 pandemic as a premise for the limitation of civil rights and freedoms
- 5.1. Declaration of the state of epidemic and the state of epidemic threat on the territory of the Republic of Poland
- 5.2. The principle of proportionality in the context of the timeframe of restrictions of the right to a fair in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic
- 5.3. Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on civil proceedings in the Member States of the European Union
- 5.3.1. Introductory remarks
- 5.3.2. Remote court hearings
- 5.3.3. Suspension of time limits
- 5.3.4. Eviction orders and public auctions of real estate and property
- 5.3.5. Electronic communication tools
- 6. Remote court hearings
- 6.1. Introductory remarks
- 6.2. Remote court hearings after 3 July 2021
- 6.3. Conducting a remote hearing
- 6.4. ‘Hybrid’ hearings
- 6.5. Public participation in a remote hearing
- 6.6. Remote hearings and the right to a fair trial
- 6.7. Remote hearings after 14 March 2024
- 6.8. Assessment and further legislative proposals for remote hearings
- 7. Hearing of the case in a closed session
- 7.1. Article 15zzs1 of the COVID-19 Special Act – legal status before 3 July 2021
- 7.2. Legal status as of 3 July 2021
- 7.3. Closed sessions pursuant to Article 15zzs2 of the COVID-19 Special Act
- 7.4. Judgments in a closed session and the right to a fair trial
- 7.5. Closed hearings after 1 July 2023
- 7.6. Assessment and further legislative proposals for judgments in closed sessions
- 8. Court composition in civil proceedings in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic
- 8.1. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the composition of the court (until 3 July 2021)
- 8.2. Composition of the court in the COVID-19 Special Act
- 8.3. Composition of the court after 28 September 2023
- 8.4. The court composed of a single judge and right to a fair trial
- 8.5. Conclusions and further legislative proposals concerning the composition of the court in civil proceedings
- 9. Service of judicial documents via the Information Portal of the Common Courts
- 9.1. Introductory remarks
- 9.2. Scope of application of Article 15zzs9 of the COVID-19 Special Act.
- 9.3. The waiver of the service via the Information Portal
- 9.4. Personal scope of service via the Information Portal
- 9.5. The effect of service of a judicial document
- 9.6. Service of a court document under Article 15zzs9 of the COVID-19 Special Act and the right to a fair trial
- 9.7. Conclusions and further proposals for electronic service
- 10. Suspension of procedural time limits in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic
- 10.1. Period of validity of Article 15zzs of the COVID-19 Special Act
- 10.2. Material scope of application of Article 15zzs of the COVID-19 Special Act
- 10.3. Suspension of procedural time limits and the right to a fair trial
- 11. Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the course of enforcement proceedings
- 11.1. Suspension of judicial auctions of housing properties
- 11.2. Suspension of enforcement orders to vacate residential premises
- 11.3. Suspension of judicial auctions and eviction orders concerning residential premises and the right to a fair trial
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
- Series index
Introduction
In the early months of 2020, the world was faced with a challenge of unprecedented scope and magnitude in the 21st century: the rapid development of the SARS-CoV-2 virus epidemic. The first case of COVID-19 disease caused by this pathogen was reported in Poland on 4 March 2020. In turn, the COVID-19 epidemic was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation on 11 March 2020. The epidemiological situation forced a number of significant social changes. Face-to-face human contact had to be minimised, including the closure of many public institutions and a shift to remote working wherever possible. A number of far-reaching changes had to be made to the existing legal system, including the adaptation of the rules governing the operation of the judicial system, which had also been significantly affected by the pandemic.
The judiciary has been subject to significant restrictions. The regulations most relevant to the civil procedure model were adopted in the so-called COVID-19 Special Act, i.e. the Act of 2 March 2020 on Special Solutions Related to the Prevention and Control of COVID-19, Other Infectious Diseases and Crisis Situations Caused by Them1. In the early stages of the pandemic, all procedural time limits were suspended, effectively freezing the functioning of the judiciary. Court buildings were partially closed to the public and emphasis was placed on the computerisation of civil proceedings to allow remote participation in court hearings and the introduction of solutions for electronic communication with parties to proceedings. Undoubtedly, the new instruments introduced by the legislature to combat the spread of the coronavirus also had a significant impact on the work of the courts.
In the public discourse, representatives of the academic and legal communities raised a number of objections to the solutions introduced. They were also raised by the courts and the Polish Ombudsman. The most important of these concerns related to the possible impact of the new rules on the right to a fair trial. This right, also referred to as the right to court, which is regulated primarily in Article 45(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and in a number of other international legal instruments, is the basic means of protecting an individual against the arbitrary actions of public authorities and is one of the most important principles of a democratic rule of law. Due to the importance of the matter to which the doubts expressed in the public debate relate, they require in-depth consideration.
The research problem to be addressed below is the impact of selected provisions of the COVID-19 Special Act on the civil procedure model, on the one hand, and on the individual’s right to a fair trial, on the other. The lively public debate and academic discourse, as well as the importance of the legal issues raised, which require further analysis, make the problem raised here worthy of discussion in a separate work. So far, the issue has been the subject of individual academic papers and studies in the form of commentaries or guides to the amended provisions. In the last three years, several academic articles have been published, but they can only contribute to the further discussion of the amended model of civil procedure in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, there is no monography that deals with the changes in a comprehensive and systemic way. None of the studies to date has examined the changes introduced by the COVID-19 Special Act in relation to the issue of the right to a fair trial. Despite the fact that more than three years have passed since the entry into force of the COVID-19 Special Act, the jurisprudence on the institutions discussed in this work is not extensive. It must be stressed that, despite the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, the problems presented are still relevant, as some of the cases initiated during this period are still pending.
The issues presented in the following chapters also have a practical dimension, since they attempt to discuss the different approaches taken by the courts in applying the instruments provided for by the COVID-19 Special Act and to draw attention to the need to develop a uniform procedural model in order to guarantee an adequate level of protection of the parties’ procedural rights. The paper also puts forward a number of de lege ferenda postulates, the implementation of which would make it possible to introduce some of the institutions discussed into the civil procedure model on a permanent basis and to regulate them in a comprehensive manner. A more complex discussion of the issues addressed in this work seems necessary in order to determine the status of a party in civil proceedings in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic, to compare it with the status of a party before the introduction of a number of new procedural institutions into the legal order, and to present a prognosis of the position of an individual after the end of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The primary objective of the analysis is to present the most significant changes in the model of civil proceedings introduced by the COVID-19 Special Act and to examine whether the adopted provisions fully implement the standard of the right to a fair trial. This can be achieved by defining and comparing the standards of the right to a fair trial resulting from the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The study also aims to show the differences between the models of protection of the right to a fair trial defined in the constitutional, European and EU order. The analysis also seeks to resolve fundamental problems that arise in practice in the application of the provisions discussed by the courts. In addition, the study aims to assess whether any of the discussed institutions should be permanently introduced into the Code of Civil Procedure and, if so, under what conditions.
The provisions introduced into the civil procedure model in the course of the efforts to counteract COVID-19 will be examined with regard to the following issues:
- remote hearings (Article 15zzs1(1) points 1 and 2 of the COVID-19 Special Act),
- hearing of the case in closed session (Article 15zzs1(1) point 3 and Article 15zzs2 of the COVID-19 Special Act),
- composition of the court (Article 15zzs1(1) point 4 of the COVID-19 Special Act),
- electronic service of court documents (Article 15zzs9 of the COVID-19 Special Act),
- suspension of procedural time limits (Article 15zzs of the COVID-19 Special Act)
- suspension of public auctions in the course of real estate enforcement (Article 9521 § 5 of the CCP) and the execution of eviction orders (Article 15zzu of the COVID-19 Special Act).
The above provisions contained in the COVID-19 Special Act (and in one case directly in the CCP) had the greatest impact on the conduct of civil proceedings during the pandemic and on the realisation of the individual’s right to a fair trial. Some of them were permanently incorporated into the rules of civil procedure after the end of the pandemic. The issues discussed are therefore still relevant.
The main thesis of the research is that the normative solutions adopted by the legislator and listed above do not fully achieve the declared purpose justifying their introduction and do not comply with the minimum standard of the right to a fair trial guaranteed to the individual, and thus remain in contradiction with Article 45 of the Constitution, Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 47 of the CFR.
The research problem outlined above also allows for the identification of a research hypothesis that, after the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, remote court hearings and the possibility of deciding cases in closed sessions, as well as electronic service of court documents, may constitute a permanent element of the civil procedure model and significantly contribute to increasing its efficiency, provided that normative changes are adopted that allow for the adjustment of these institutions to the minimum standard of the right to a fair trial.
The following questions must be answered before the thesis can be examined:
- How is the right to a fair trial defined in the Constitution, the ECHR and the CFR, and are the standards derived from these instruments identical, and what is their scope of application?
- What is the real purpose of the changes to the civil procedure model introduced by the COVID-19 Special Act, and is this purpose consistent with the legislator’s stated aim of protecting health?
The entire study is divided into eleven chapters. Chapters I and II analyse the model of protection of the right to a fair trial in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. There is no doubt that the solution of the research problem presented at the beginning requires first of all a detailed explanation of the concept of the right to a fair trial. To this end, Chapter I attempts to define the scope of the right to a fair trial in civil matters under the European Convention on Human Rights by analysing the various components of this right, i.e. the right of access to court, the right to impartial, independent court and to court established by law, the right to a fair procedure before a court and the principle of openness and expediency of proceedings. Chapter II discusses the standard of the right to a fair trial under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Given the nature of this legal instrument, the discussion is preceded by an outline of the historical background to its adoption and an explanation of the scope of the Charter. The purpose of this is to identify the cases in which an individual may invoke the right to a fair trial under the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Chapters III and IV deal with the right to a fair trial in the domestic legal order. The considerations in Chapter III focus primarily on the right to a fair trial in the constitutional order. The analysis carried out serves to define the concept of the right to court under Article 45(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and therefore, as in Chapter I, the considerations in Chapter III concern the right of access to court, the concept of a competent, independent and impartial court, the right to a fair procedure before a court and the principle of openness and expediency of proceedings. This discussion will allow for a comparison of the Convention and EU standards with the constitutional standard. This, in turn, will allow for the development of a single standard of the right to a fair trial, which seems necessary for the later detailed considerations in the following chapters of the work. Chapter IV is devoted to questions of the implementation of the right to a fair trial on the basis of the Code of Civil Procedure2. This part presents the concept of procedural principles and discusses the principles of equality, expediency and openness of proceedings, also indicating the basic manifestations of their implementation in the CCP. These principles are fundamental to the realisation of the right to a fair trial in civil proceedings. Moreover, the introduction of the provisions of the COVID-19 Special Act discussed in this work has left its mark on the implementation of the procedural principles just mentioned, which is why it is necessary to discuss them in detail.
Chapter V, entitled ‘The COVID-19 pandemic as a premise for the limitation of civil rights and freedoms’, provides an introduction to the issue of normative changes relevant to the model of civil procedure in the era of the pandemic. The chapter first discusses the question of the validity of the restrictions resulting from the COVID-19 Special Act over time. For this purpose, it was necessary to establish a time calendar of legislative changes introduced in Poland during the COVID-19 pandemic, including a description of the type of instruments introduced into the legal system. The chapter analyses the question of the validity of individual provisions of the COVID-19 Special Act over time in the context of their compliance with the principle of proportionality of the restriction of civil rights and freedoms. The reason for placing these considerations in a separate chapter is that the way in which the issues discussed are regulated is common to most of the institutions of the COVID-19 Special Act examined. The assessment of whether the legislative technique applied can be considered correct in the light of the principle of proportionality has allowed relevant conclusions to be drawn regarding the compatibility of the regulation with the right to a fair trial. The chapter also presents the solutions adopted in other EU countries to combat the pandemic. These considerations contribute to the further analysis of the instruments introduced into the legal order by the Polish legislator. At the same time, the observations made in this part of the chapter are not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of foreign legislation, but only to outline the background, which will make it possible to identify similarities and differences between the solutions adopted in the Polish legal system and the regulations of other EU Member States. The considerations presented in Chapter V provide the necessary context for a more detailed analysis of the legislative solutions that are the subject of research in this study.
The issues addressed in the following chapters concern the various institutions of the COVID-19 Special Act (and the CCP) adopted to combat the spread of the coronavirus. These considerations, through a detailed discussion of the instruments under consideration, aim to compare them with the previously presented standard of protection expressed in the ECHR, the CFR and the Constitution. Chapter VI is devoted first of all to remote hearings in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic. The considerations begin with a detailed presentation of the institution in question, including the historical background of its introduction, as well as the resolution of interpretive doubts arising in the practice of its application. On the basis of these findings, the compliance of the regulation with the standard of the right to a fair trial was then assessed and own legislative postulates of a de lege ferenda nature were presented. A similar approach was taken with regard to the provisions of COVID-19 concerning in camera hearings (Chapter VII) and the composition of the court (Chapter VIII).
The next Chapter IX deals with electronic service through the Information Portal. The considerations begin with an approximation of the material and personal scope of application of Article 15zzs9 (2)-(5) of the COVID-19 Special Act, as well as the premises for waiving electronic service under the provision in question. Only the development of a unified model for the application of the institution of electronic service and the clarification of emerging interpretative doubts made it possible to assess the compatibility of the provision in question with the right to a fair trial. The next part of the Chapter also sets out de lege ferenda postulates for electronic service in civil proceedings.
The last two chapters are devoted to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic legislation on the course of civil proceedings. First, the solutions related to the suspension of procedural time limits under Article 15zzs of the COVID-19 Special Act are presented and the compatibility of this institution with the right to a fair trial standard set out in Chapters I and II is assessed (Chapter X). Subsequently, the provisions relating to enforcement proceedings, i.e. the suspension of judicial auctions of real estate serving the debtor’s housing needs and the suspension of enforcement of eviction orders, were analysed in accordance with the above scheme (Chapter XI). As these provisions have been repealed, the considerations are of a historical nature and therefore do not include de lege ferenda postulates. Despite the fact that the above-mentioned provisions are revoked from the legal order, their detailed analysis was necessary due to their significant impact on civil proceedings and the realisation of the individual’s right to a fair trial.
The study concludes with a verification of the initial thesis and research hypothesis and a concise synthesis of the considerations presented in the previous chapters.
1 Journal of Laws – Republic of Poland, 2024, item 340 (consolidated text).
2 Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) – Law of 17 November 1964 Code of Civil Procedure, Journal of Laws 2023, item 1550 (consolidated text).
1. European Convention on Human Rights
1.1. Introductory remarks
Article 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms3 establishes the right to a fair trial, i.e. fair and public proceedings before a court. According to the first paragraph of article 6 (first sentence): ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. The quoted article provides for the right to a fair trial, guaranteeing the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time.
The provision introduces a broad set of fair trial guarantees, formulating a general principle setting out the basic elements of civil and criminal justice4 . The second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 6 guarantees the openness of the proceedings before the court, while introducing permitted exceptions to this principle. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 of the Convention indicate a number of specific conditions to be met by criminal proceedings and are beyond the scope of this publication. Article 6(1) of the Convention not only establishes a number of individual rights, but also introduces the procedural guarantees necessary for the realisation of the other rights and freedoms provided for in the Convention. In this sense, the right to a fair trial is an expression of the principle of subsidiarity, whereby it is the task of national courts to protect individual rights and freedoms under the ECHR5.
In Golder v UK, the European Court of Human Rights noted that Article 6 of the Convention reflects the fundamental principle of the rule of law underlying the Convention6. It further pointed out that in civil matters, the rule of law is inconceivable without access to courts7. The rule of law is not viable if there is no justice system capable of remedying violations of universally accepted norms8.
As the right to a fair trial is a purely procedural guarantee, the Court, when hearing individual complaints, does not examine the correctness of the application of substantive and procedural law. The Strasbourg Court is not a court of ‘fourth instance’ and its role is limited to assessing whether there has been a violation of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Convention before a national authority9.
The guarantees under the provision of Article 6(1) of the ECHR are procedural in nature, with the Convention imposing an obligation on the Member States to achieve a certain result in terms of a fair, public trial, rather than to adopt specific solutions. Member States are left with procedural autonomy, while at the same time the ECHR imposes an obligation to organise the administration of justice in such a way that it meets the standards set by Article 6. The right set out in Article 6(1) ECHR consists of: (1) organisational guarantees of an independent and impartial court established by law; (2) the right of access to a court; (3) fair trial guarantees in the strict sense, i.e. procedural fairness10.
The right to a fair trial set out in Article 6(1) of the ECHR does not include a right of appeal11 (with regard to criminal cases, such a requirement is introduced by Article 2 of Protocol No. 7). However, if national law provides for a right of appeal, also the proceedings before the appellate instance must meet the Convention requirements of a fair trial12. Indication by the Strasbourg Court of a violation of Article 6(1) does not give rise to an obligation to reopen the proceedings before the national court or to annulment of a final judgment13.
1.2. Scope of application of Article 6(1) of the ECHR
Article 6(1) of the Convention relates to ‘the determination of civil rights and obligations’. This is an autonomous Convention term and should be interpreted separately from the meaning given to it by the domestic law of the Member State14. The guarantees set out in this provision will only apply if the following conditions are cumulatively met: (1) the proceedings concern rights or obligations derived from national law; (2) there is a real and serious dispute, the outcome of which affects those rights or obligations; (3) the right or obligation is of a civil nature15 .
The right or obligation must derive from domestic substantive law, and the Court cannot in its jurisprudence create new rights not provided for in the Member State’s legal order. However, the question arises as to whether the Court has the power to grant such a right to an individual where domestic law omits one of the fundamental rights of the individual which is generally granted by other domestic systems16. The judgment in Zavoloka v Latvia17 answered this question in the negative, stating that, in view of the great diversity of the legal systems of the Member States, the Court could not infer an absolute and general right to compensation for immaterial damage following the death of a close relative if the national legal order did not provide for such a right. The Court’s assessment must be agreed with. The right to a fair trial is intended to guarantee, on the procedural side, the realisation of other existing rights provided for in the domestic legal order of the State, and not to establish, through the jurisprudence of the Court, new substantive rights not articulated elsewhere. On the other hand, it is emphasised that the Court is not bound by the interpretation of the national court as to the existence of a particular right, and that the legal classification made by the national court is not binding for the Strasbourg Court, since this would lead to the protection of the Convention being subject solely to the decision of the Member State, which would be contrary to the purpose of the Convention. The Court is therefore free to conclude that an individual may derive a right from a substantive national provision, even if the national court has held that such a right does not exist. However, this cannot in any event lead to the recognition of rights which have no substantive legal basis in the domestic legal order of the State18.
For the purposes of recognising the existence of a ‘civil right or obligation’, it is irrelevant whether it belongs to a specific branch of law (civil law, administrative law, public law) or to the type of body empowered to adjudicate (general court, administrative court, administrative body). Nor does it matter whether the public authority exercises its jurisdiction in the sphere of government authority, power (imperium) or non-power (dominium). It cannot be ruled out that a right or a claim is of a civil nature, even if it derives from regulations that are considered public under national law. In order to determine the civil nature of a right or a duty, reference must be made to its substantive content and to the consequences it entails for the individual19. The rights or obligations must be the subject matter or one of the subjects of the dispute, and the outcome of the proceedings must directly determine such rights or obligations, without any remote connection20. If the proceedings concern rights or obligations of a monetary, personal or private nature, the case is in principle civil21. However, on the other hand, matters falling exclusively within the sphere of public law will be excluded from the operation of Article 6(1), e.g. fines or obligations arising from tax laws or other civil obligations, even though they are of a monetary nature22.
The Court recognises that where a Member State grants a right to an individual and a legal remedy to enforce that right, that right must, in principle, be regarded as a civil23. The Court considered the following cases to be cases concerning the settlement of civil obligations: protection of reputation, family, change of name, social security and social assistance, patent cases24. On the other hand, according to the Court, the following cases are not of this nature: the right to asylum25, electoral rights26, prohibition of association in organisations27.
A dispute concerning a civil right or obligation must be real and serious. It may concern the very existence of the right or obligation or the extent and manner of its exercise. The outcome of the proceedings must be directly decisive for the right in question28. A dispute is presumed to be real and serious unless there are clear indications to the contrary. A dispute is ‘serious’ if it is fundamental to the existence or exercise of a right. By contrast, the ‘real’ nature of a dispute means that it must exist objectively. The dispute must be capable of being resolved directly by the courts29. Since the dispute must be real, hypothetical cases would therefore have to be excluded from the scope of Article 6(1) of the ECHR. The seriousness of the dispute means that Article 6(1) of the ECHR does not apply to situations where the violation of rights is minimal30.
Article 6(1) of the ECHR applies to civil proceedings, not only at the actual judicial phase, but also at the pre-litigation stage31 and in enforcement proceedings, which are a natural extension of the trial32. Otherwise, the right to a fair trial would be illusory33 if it did not cover the enforcement stage. The State must therefore guarantee the effective enforcement of the judgment, otherwise there can be no judicial protection of individual rights.
As the right to a fair trial occupies a non-negligible place in a democratic society, it is of particular importance for the proper functioning of democratic mechanisms and cannot therefore be interpreted restrictively. It is accepted that in cases of doubt as to whether Article 6 of the ECHR applies, the answer should be in the affirmative34. As the Court has pointed out, a narrow interpretation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention - as regards respect for the fundamental principle of the impartiality of the courts - would be incompatible with the object and purpose of that provision. In interpreting that provision, account must be taken of the important place which the right to a fair trial occupies in a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention35.
1.3. The right of access to court
The right of access to justice implies the possibility of bringing a civil claim before a court for consideration. It is an integral part of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ECHR and is an expression of one of the fundamental principles of international law which prohibits the ‘denial of justice’36.
Access to justice must be real. The Convention does not guarantee individual rights that are illusory and hypothetical, but rights that are practical and effective37. It does not satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1) of the Convention to formally grant an individual access to court, while at the same time imposing restrictions that make this right theoretical. The right of access to court must be seen in legal and factual terms. For example, if an individual is given the opportunity to formally initiate proceedings but is denied the assistance of counsel, the actual access to court is restricted38. Access to justice is therefore not achieved simply by providing a judicial channel. It is also necessary to ensure that access to justice is effective, i.e. that the individual is able to present his or her case effectively before the court. Effective access to justice requires the existence of a coherent legal system governing access to legal remedies, with sufficiently clear and certain grounds for admissibility.
Details
- Pages
- 330
- Publication Year
- 2024
- ISBN (PDF)
- 9783631928011
- ISBN (ePUB)
- 9783631928028
- ISBN (Hardcover)
- 9783631920275
- DOI
- 10.3726/b22434
- Language
- English
- Publication date
- 2024 (December)
- Keywords
- The right to a fair trial COVID-19 pandemic Constitution of Poland European Convention on Human Rights EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Polish civil procedure Justice system in Poland
- Published
- Berlin, Bruxelles, Chennai, Lausanne, New York, Oxford, 2024. 330 pp.
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