Diametric and Concentric Spaces in the Unconscious World
The book, which also examines projected structures in modernist art, suggests a systematic refashioning of many Western assumptions, but it is more than a deconstruction. It also attempts to offer a new interplay between structures and meaning, as a spatial phenomenology. This significant expansion of the boundaries of human subjectivity opens alternative pathways for imagining what it means to be human, in order to challenge the reduction of experience to instrumental reason.
Part IV Primordial Structures Prior to Subjectivity: Projections of a Dynamic A Priori Structure
Part IV Primordial Structures Prior to Subjectivity: Projections of a Dynamic A Priori Structure chapter 10 Early Heidegger’s Search for Concrete, Dynamic A Priori Structures of Being-in-the-World A broadening of the unconscious world has already been observed to take place through a scrutiny of not only concentric and diametric spatial struc- tures but also of the dynamic background relation between these spaces. This background level moves the unconscious beyond anthropocentrism, while being resonant with a reinterpretation of the Freudian life and death drives, the Jungian self as circumference and dynamic mandala, and Derrida’s erasure of the trace of unconscious imprints. This dynamic back- ground level of interactive relation, allied with foregrounded concentric and diametric spaces, will now be argued to pertain to Heidegger’s (1927) structures of being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s (1927) structures of being are purportedly primordial, a priori transcendental structures of relation. Understanding of these unthought concentric and diametric spaces can revitalize early Heidegger’s transcendental project, one that was subse- quently abandoned by him. Early Heidegger’s question of being sought a primordial structure of relation, a holistic (though not simple), background structure of primor- dial experience and truth, transcendent of linear time. Heidegger (1924) refers to ‘the dangerous threat of relativism’ (p. 20E) and for Heidegger (1927), ‘the structure of existentiality lies a priori’ (p. 69), with his search being for ‘not just any accidental structures, but essential ones’ (pp. 37–8). Early Heidegger is not to be marshalled into a postmodernist straitjacket. The question arises as to how a structure...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.
Do you have any questions? Contact us.Or login to access all content.