This book deals with correspondence truth, and offers an explanation of correspondence as a symbolization of reality. The author analyses those basic elements of known correspondence truth theories which are the cause of their inadequacy. She focuses on the theories which try to modify the strongest classical theories and shows that these theories are unable to free themselves from seeing correspondence as copying (mirroring). The book presents a «symbolic» correspondence truth theory claiming that correspondence is a specific kind of symbolisation in a Cassirer-close sense, and correspondence truth is neither a copy, nor any other imitation of reality, but its symbol.
Chapter 6. The Analytic Method and the Character of The Conception of Truth
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Chapter 6 The Analytic Method and the Character of The Conception of Truth
6.1 The Analytic Method and the Status of Common-sense Knowledge
Aside from the reservations about contemporary correspondence truth theories mentioned in the earlier chapters — and any similar objections against them from other sources — they all display a property which is rather disquieting for philosophies which strive to transcend common sense towards a deeper level of apprehension — on which, it is believed, matters and things present themselves to a greater and deeper degree, i.e. as they really are. The point is, that despite their frequently quite sophisticated conceptualisations and formal tools, analytic conceptions of correspondence truth do not appear to voice much criticism of the common sense. This may be because they lie too close to common-sense beliefs and therefore treat them as unquestionable truths, while in fact some of these beliefs (also about the correspondence, or representation, relation) are quite illusory. Thus, the most basic and biggest common drawback of today’s correspondence truth theories are not their inner failings but their rooting in the fundamental metatheses of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy’s present investigations into correspondence truth stand where they stand not because there are no further paths to explore or scholars have run out of ideas, but because it has reached the ultimate limit of its possibilities, determined by the rather restrictive method employed by the analytic philosophy. In fact, what analytic philosophers have been able to find out...
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