Edited By Piotr Stalmaszczyk
This book investigates possible common objects of inquiry in philosophy of language and literature. The topics discussed include proper names (analyzed from different theoretical perspectives), fictional names, truth in fiction, ontological status and metaphysics of fictional characters, metaphor, representation, interpretation, and other issues connecting research in philosophy of language with philosophy of literature. Theoretical frameworks include Millian semantics, Fregean semantics, hybrid semantics, realism, antirealism, and metaphorical expressivism.
On Objects of Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Literature (Piotr Stalmaszczyk)
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University of Łódź, Poland
On Objects of Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Literature
The first two volumes published in the series Studies in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics concentrated on various topics connected with the semantics of proper names and reference.1 Individual studies discussed abstract names, proper names, definite descriptions, types of reference, identity, and several other important recent developments in the field of (analytic) philosophy of language.
In this volume, the objects of inquiry – the possible common objects of inquiry in philosophy of language and literature – once again include proper names, however, this time with special focus on fictional names; authors also investigate the ontological status of fictional names and fiction, metaphysics of fictional characters, truth in fiction, metaphor, representation, interpretation, sense and nonsense, and other issues which in interesting and inspiring ways interconnect research in philosophy of language and philosophy of literature.
In a recent study devoted to metalinguistic descriptivism, Manuel García-Carpintero has presented the Mill-Frege view, which has two constitutive theses. According to the first, the Millian one, “proper names contribute their referents to the contents of the primary speech acts they help to perform, and are thus rigid designators” (García-Carpintero 2017: 1); according to the second thesis, the Fregean one, “proper names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions” (García-Carpintero 2017: 1). Further on, García-Carpintero...
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