The Relational Gaze on a Changing Society

The radical constructivist position may be criticised if one can sustain the belief that a gaze is not a purely self-referential ‘operation’ performed by an observing system, but rather a questioning of what is observed in order to find a meaning that is not merely dictated by the observer. It is not simply a reflection of the observer’s individual sensitivity, but is a comment made by the observer in regard to the relationship between subject and object in a sociocultural context. So, who is the viewing subject?

What is required here is a better grasp of the concept of ‘gaze’, that is, an analysis and understanding of precisely what an individual gaze consists in, so as to be able to compare one gaze with another. Although a gaze (the act of gazing) is something specific to the individual observer, this act is performed within a context that significantly influences the act itself. We ought to be able to explain that the differences between gazes are the result of the diverse relationships between observers and their relational context. This framework enables us to compare gazes expressing different visions of what is being observed. In order to do so, as I shall explain, an appropriate use must be made of reflexivity.

It is clear that a gaze may be reflexive to a lesser or greater degree, and may utilise different methods of reflexivity (Donati 2011a). If we were to ask people to describe, at first sight, a half-filled glass, it is a well-known fact that some would see it as a glass half full, while others would see it as a half-empty glass. This shows the self-referential nature of a gaze ‘at first sight’, which makes the difference. However, a person’s view of an object may go beyond this, and reflect on itself. It may reach the conclusion that the difference is only apparent, since the reality is the same. In fact, this is simply the case of a glass that has been half-filled. However, in order to take this latter step, a second observation is required in regard to the first observation; that is, reflection on the first relation is called for: this second action is what is termed the ‘reflexive gaze’.

In Greek, the term ‘theory’ (theoros, θεωρος) is synonymous with ‘gazing at’, ‘having a look at’. The fact that the two terms (theory and gaze) are synonymous tells us that in some way they are identical, while in another way they are dissimilar. In cases like this, we can only understand a term if we see it in relation to the other term. This means that a gaze reflects a theory (which implies an awareness), and the theory reflects a gaze (it is a questioning) characterised by a certain reflexivity.

I shall try to explain what I mean by gaze in general, and shall then focus on the scientific gaze in relation to the sociological gaze.

2 The gaze as a relation

What do I mean by a ‘gaze’? According to relational sociology, a gaze is not only a way of processing subjective perceptions, but also a way of relating to what we observe. In this present work, I basically refer to the gazes of human beings. I know that in everyday language, people talk about gazes, looks or expressions also in regard to non-human beings and androids (a cat’s sweet expression, a dog’s affectionate gaze or the friendly expression of a robot). However, I believe that the term ‘gaze’ or ‘expression’ of an animal or a robot is used in a very broad (vague) analogic manner compared to the concept of the human gaze. The fashionable belief that the gaze of robots, just like that of many species of animals, is similar to that of humans, raises an ontological problem, namely that of knowing whether non-human beings are ontologically capable of the same relations that characterise human beings. In my view (Donati 2019) they are not.

Obviously, even a lion observing its prey adopts a certain ‘gaze’. In fact, some people believe that even human beings, when they act as mere animals, adopt a similar expression or gaze to that of animals. That is not exactly true, however, since a human being who observes the world as an animal does cannot be seen as a mere animal from the ontological point of view. The differences between the gaze of human animals and that of non-human animals are substantial. Where does the difference lie between the human gaze and that of non-humans?

The human gaze constitutes a relational action performed by a subject who: (i) processes perceptions on the basis of the constitution of their body/mind, and (ii) on the basis of their own concerns, (iii) bearing in mind the context, and reflecting on that context in a more or less knowing manner, by diverse means of reflection. The human gaze represents a complex interweaving of circumstances and values (Gorski 2013). The referential link between the human observer and the observed reality (including virtual reality) always comprises a moral aspect.

As a rule, the human gaze is not simply recognition of that which lies before us, but is an act motivated by the need to respond to the demand for knowledge and the evaluation of that which generates such demand. Saying “I see you” is not the same as saying “I’m gazing at you.” The human gaze reflects a cognitive need resulting from emotions and feelings of a moral nature. Emotions and feelings may be positive (that is, of sympathy, empathy, exaltation, etc.) or negative (that is, of fear, repulsion, rejection, etc.).

However, there is also the apathetic or indifferent gaze which requires separate consideration since it denotes the fact that the observer has distanced him/herself from the observed object or person to the point where he or she is ‘mentally absent’ or incapable of relating to the latter, or has no desire to do so. Another specific kind of gaze is when you stare at a person, in your state of surprise or ‘paralysis’, that is, when you are incapable of looking away simply because you cannot work out what it is that you are looking at. This is the case, for example, when a person stares at a physically disabled or ‘strange’ person and remains stunned due to a strong sense of unease and anxiety (Garland Thomson 2009).

Briefly speaking, the human gaze is the adoption of a point of view for the purposes of observation; and as such, it selects what the observer wishes to know on the basis of an inclination or a concern, which may be more or less specific, in the search for the answer to a question coming from within the subject (it is agency dependent), and is always stimulated by a given context (it is context dependent). The question can be more specifically defined, such as when one says, “See if they’ve brought the milk yet!”, “See that the child isn’t in danger!” or “Look in the drawer and see if you can find the keys!”; or it may be less specifically defined, such as when one says, “Have a look at the market situation and see how things are going!”, “See whether things in the neighbourhood function properly!” or “Have you had a look at today’s newspapers to see if there’s anything that may interest us?”

All human beings share a certain capacity to observe the world: however, they do so in many different ways. That is, they may do so by exercising ‘good sense’ or ‘common sense’, or they may do so in a more sophisticated, reflexive manner, as when looking at the world from a scientific point of view.

To ask for a viewpoint is to ask for a relation. The relation remains invisible, but it materialises in a process that has to produce a certain outcome (or that one would expect it have, at least). It is a definite relationship that takes care to grasp what an object, person or situation may suggest, as a response to a more or less precise question posed by the observer. Thus the gaze is in itself a complex combination of cognitive, emotional and symbolic elements, all of which conceal practical aims and also moral needs. For example, when a woman asks her partner to “have a look at that website and see whether the children should really be looking at it.”

(N) The three previously-mentioned aspects of the gaze (I-intentional object, V-value of the gaze, and M-means used) are combined in different ways (according to a different norm or rule) which may be random to a certain degree, or may be guided by diverse combinations of practices and rules.

3 The scientific gaze

The scheme depicted in Fig. 1 may apply to people’s gazes during the course of their everyday lives, as well as to the gaze of the scientist observing an object. I am now going to examine the gaze of the person carrying out scientific work.

The scientific gaze tries to render the observer’s work ‘rigorous’. Exactly what ‘rigorous’ means is debatable. For classical scientists it means appropriate to the object of one’s observation, controlled, replicable, devoid of any distortion, whereas for those sciences based on constructivism, such terms lose their value given that the gaze creates, even imagines, its object. In any case, each science has more than one way of looking at reality, depending on how each of them constructs its relation with reality (in the components of MINV, intentions and value attributed to the gaze, instruments and means of use).

What happens is similar to when you switch on a light in a room: what you see depends on various factors: on what the person switching on the light wishes to see, on the observer’s visual capacity and on the characteristics of the device projecting the rays of light in terms of their colour, their intensity and their capacity to penetrate the objects in question. Each instrument possesses different qualities and powers, and each observer is interested in seeing different things.

From this point of view, important questions of social ontology, epistemology and social practices emerge.