Phenomenology and Existential-Hermeneutical Analysis of Knowledge
109 Phenomenology and Existential- Hermeneutical Analysis of Knowledge Keywords: phenomenon, reduction, epoche, alethe, existential Kant’s theory of the structure and limitations of knowl- edge provoked a broad reaction among all epistemo- logical schools. Some philosophers criticised Kant for being too intellectual, others for being scientiﬁ cally too rigid and for misunderstanding the meaning of intui- tion, belief, etc., whilst others criticised him for under- estimating the role and importance of language. One of the most criticised points of his examination was Ding an sich, which was considered hugely problematic because of its ‘incognizability’ (i.e. we are not even sup- posed to know that it exists) and many found this con- cept to be unnecessary. Edmund Husserl realised that Kant’s philosophy of knowledge opened dimensions for studying experience in ways which the assump- tion of the thing-in-itself is not necessary. Everything that we can encounter is in our experience and thus it 110 is necessary to explore what the subject of our experi- ence is. Husserl understood that the way we perceive things is inﬂ uenced by multiple rational and socio-historic circumstances which deﬂ ect our attention from how a thing is given to us in experience, and help us reach our assumptions about how the thing is. An example of such an overlook of experience is the eff ect of bias on a perceived thing. If an object is perceived with bias we do not see how the object is, but we rather what we expect to see. If we...
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