Edited By Martin Hinton
Anna Drożdżowicz - Speakers’ Intuitions about Meaning Provide Empirical Evidence – towards Experimental Pragmatics
| 65 →
University of Oslo
Speakers’ Intuitions about Meaning Provide Empirical Evidence – towards Experimental Pragmatics
Intuitions have been seen as an important source of evidence in philosophy (e.g. Bealer, 1998; Sosa, 2009; Nagel, 2012). Recently, however, some have denied that intuitions have any importance for philosophical methodology (Cappelen, 2012), while others have concluded that intuitions are unreliable and ought to be abandoned altogether (Weinberg, 2008, Machery & Stich, 2013). Still, it is a common practice in philosophy of language and linguistics to appeal to intuitions about meaning as evidence for theories: Michael Devitt (2012, 2013a) calls this “the received view”, but the practice has been the subject of recent debate (Devitt, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; cf. Cohnitz & Haukioja, 2014). Michael Devitt (2012, 2013a) has argued that speakers’ intuitions are fallible empirical judgements about language that reflect speakers’ folk theories about meaning rather than meaning itself. This is what he means by calling them “metalinguistic”. Francois Recanati, on the other hand, argues that speakers’ intuitions about utterance meaning are direct intuitions about truth-conditional content, which are based on “the ability to pair an utterance with a type of situation”, they constitute data and our theories should account for them (2013: 1–3).
Among the crucial questions in this debate are: what is the nature of such intuitions, and what kind of evidence do they provide? In this paper I argue that speakers’ intuitive judgements...
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
This site requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals.
Do you have any questions? Contact us.Or login to access all content.